




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P R I N C E T O N
R E V I E W .

By *Whom*, all things; for *Whom*, all things.

FIFTY-FOURTH YEAR.

JANUARY—JUNE.

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RETRIBUTION, IN RELATION TO THE JUSTICE, GOODNESS AND PURPOSE OF GOD.

IS eternal punishment consistent with the infinite justice of God? Is it compatible with his infinite goodness? Is it in keeping with his design in the creation of the world? The objections which are suggested by these questions are the most formidable ones with which the advocate of the orthodox doctrine of Retribution has to contend.

I. RETRIBUTION AND THE DIVINE JUSTICE.

*Orthodox writers sometimes dispose of the Universalist's objection based on this attribute of God, by saying that since the Bible teaches eternal punishment, this doctrine must be compatible with God's justice. But this is hardly a fair way of dealing with the subject, for it might be rejoined: "Whether or not the Bible teaches the doctrine, is the issue in dispute. We claim that it does not teach it;—that the language alleged to teach it does not sustain the inferences based upon it;—that the contrary doctrine is implied in other passages of Scripture; and we are confirmed, moreover, in the belief that our exegesis is correct, by the view which we entertain respecting God as a just and good Being." There can be no valid objection to this reply, for it is plain that since the doctrine of retribution and the attributes of God are factors in the inquiry, it is possible for men to reason to opposite conclusions as they happen to regard one or the other as the known quantity. It is possible to argue that since God is a being of infinite justice, it is not likely that the Scriptures contain the doctrine of endless punishment—that

doctrine being, as some suppose, in conflict with this attribute ; and it is possible to argue that it must be just for God to punish men eternally, since the Scriptures represent him as intending to inflict this penalty. A strong exegetical argument to the effect that endless punishment is taught in the Bible ought, it is true, to force the Universalist to give up his *à priori* objections ; but it would be better and fairer to grapple with the objection by showing that it proceeds upon false assumptions. Besides, it will be easier to show that the Scriptures do teach the doctrine under discussion, if it can be shown that there is no antecedent objection to it in the admitted justice and goodness of God.

Now, when it is said that the endless punishment of sinners would be an act of injustice, the question emerges : What is justice ?¹ It is doing right ; but it is more than that. It is doing right in reference to another. It contemplates two parties : one the subject of the just feeling, the other the object of the just act. Justice is doing right, where doing wrong would be an injury to another. What is the measure of justice ? It is law. Justice, then, is doing to another what law (*jus*) says must be done. It is easy to see how, as Austin remarks, the statement of Hobbes that there can be no such thing as an unjust law may be true. Justice being conformity to law, the law cannot be at once the measure of justice and itself unjust ; that is, Austin says,² it is not possible that there should be such a thing as a legally unjust law ; a law may be unwise, or immoral, or—as judged by a higher law, say the law of God—unjust. But when considered as the measure of justice, it cannot be open to the charge of injustice. This view of justice, recognized by jurists, throws light upon the question under discussion. Justice, as an attribute of God's nature, is a word which affirms that he acts according to law in his dealings with moral beings. The Scriptures are careful to tell us that God is just : he is not arbitrary or capricious. Whatever he does is done in accordance with law,—

¹ Cicero furnished a phrase for the jurists and theologians alike when he defined justice to be a disposition *suum cuique tribuendi*. In the Justinian code it is thus defined : *Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi*. This definition is adopted substantially by Turretin, Markius, Mastrict and Reformed theologians generally.

² Jurisprudence, p. 575.

and when it is said that God acts in accordance with law, it is meant that he acts in accordance with his own law ;—but God's law cannot be unjust, for there is no higher law with which it can be compared. If, then, as a matter of fact, God does punish men eternally, it is folly to say that God is unjust on that account : for he never acts capriciously, but in accordance with law ; and if the law of God calls for the punishment of the wicked, it is folly to say that it is an unjust law : for by what higher law is it to be judged ? It would seem like presumption to suggest an amendment to a Divine enactment. The only modest way of stating the objection under discussion would be to say that the law of God—or what is the same thing, the nature of God—does not call for the endless punishment of the wicked. Stating the case thus, the Universalist does not undertake to say that if the doctrine of eternal punishment were true, God would be unjust—a blasphemous and absurd form of expression ; he simply says : “ The doctrine is not true, and I know it is not true because I know that it is repugnant to the nature of God.” This, however, implies great familiarity with the Divine mind, and it is interesting to inquire whence this information is obtained. It may be said that the Bible describes God's character in terms which show plainly that the eternal punishment of men would be abhorrent to his nature. But this is not the case. The Bible says that God is good and full of compassion ; but one has no right to infer from this that the doctrine of eternal punishment is incompatible with God's character. The truth is that the Universalist's argument is mainly subjective, and when written in plain words, amounts simply to the statement that the doctrine of eternal punishment is untrue, because eternal punishment seems to him unjust. But if this is a safe method of reasoning, we may as well abandon our dependence on a Divine revelation, and Pope may well challenge us to

“ Snatch from his hand the balance and the rod,
Rejudge his justice, be the God of God.”

It will be said, in reply to this, that man was made in God's image. True ; but, by the terms of the Universalist's argument, God is made in man's image. Again, it will be asked :

What advantage is there in saying that God is just, if one does not know what justice means when it is predicated of God? But it is not known what justice means; it means acting according to law. Is there no advantage in knowing that? A man is involved in litigation; he says: "I do not know how the case will terminate, but I am certain that the judge will be just." God is just. Do the words convey no meaning, because we do not feel competent to say what God will do? The Judge of all the earth will do right. Suppose, however, that he should pronounce a sentence of eternal punishment upon all the impenitent, who will dispute the justice of the decision? Who will join issue on a point of equity with the Lord Chancellor of the Universe?

To give the subject the fullest attention, however, let the objection be considered more minutely. Men must have sound reasons for saying that the doctrine of eternal punishment is repugnant to the nature of God, and is contradicted by his justice. What are they? It is difficult to imagine more than two. It may be urged that the disadvantages under which men come into the world are such that it would be wrong to punish them eternally; and it may be said that the sins of which men are guilty do not assume a gravity which calls for such a penalty: in other words, that endless punishment is excessive punishment. These arguments deserve separate consideration.

1. It is easy to imagine a man giving expression to his objection in some such way as this: "I came into this world of sin by no choice of mine, was born of sinful parents, and by sheer force of circumstances was led into sin long before I knew the evil of it; and I am told that for sins which I could not otherwise than commit, I am liable to eternal punishment. Where would be the justice of such a punishment?" It must appear at a glance that if these disadvantageous circumstances are a valid argument against eternal punishment, they are an equally valid argument against any punishment whatever; for they are an argument against eternal punishment, only by being an argument against responsibility: "We could not help ourselves; therefore, we are not responsible; therefore, we ought not to be punished eternally;" therefore, we ought not to be punished at all,—it might with equal propriety be added.

But men are punished ; punishment in this world is palpable, and even those who deny the eternity of punishment, allow that some punishment will be inflicted in the next world. It would follow, too, from this objection, that the advent of sin among a race of moral beings can overthrow the moral government of God so far as that race is concerned : for a race, in order to be under moral government, must be under law ; and law means nothing, if it has no sanction ; it is a *brutum fulmen*, unless in the event of disobedience the lawgiver has power to punish. Sin, however, when it enters, will perpetuate itself ; and the law of heredity, by *placing* men in disadvantageous circumstances, will take away responsibility. Conceiving sin, therefore, to enter, as in the case of our first parents, the condition of things is such that God cannot punish it ; and if God cannot punish it, it is as though the race had not sinned, so far as legal consequences are concerned. A race of bad men, if the objection under notice is valid, would be as free from legal penalties as a race of good men. Though living in flagrant and shameless violation of God's law, the individuals of the race would be as safe from penal harm as though they never had sinned.

2. The next objection which might be urged, and which, indeed, is urged by Universalist writers, is that punishment would be excessive if it were endless. To this it may be replied that, being criminals themselves, it is not strange that men should take this view of the sentence pronounced upon them. Moreover, it is a noteworthy fact, that those who say that eternal punishment would be excessive, are not able to say what punishment would suffice. They allow (many do) that the punishments of the next world may be indefinitely protracted, and that they may last for years, or centuries, or cycles ; the only thing which they venture to affirm with confidence in regard to them is, that they will not last for ever. But when men confess so plainly that they do not know how much punishment sin deserves, how can they be so confident that it does not deserve endless punishment ? They may say, of course, that punishment is disciplinary in design, and that, however long it lasts, the subject of it must be made happy in the end ; when they say this, however, they are not saying that endless punishment would be unjust, but that punishment being designed to make

the subject of it ultimately happy, it cannot be inflicted so as to make him endlessly miserable. (Eternal punishment, however, would be compatible with this view as to the end of punishment if it could be believed that the obduracy of men might defeat the purpose of God.)

That eternal punishment is not necessarily unjust, may appear from another argument. It must be evident, that if any sin deserves eternal punishment, every sin does. Since all sin is want of conformity to God's law, it follows that the difference between this and that sin is a difference of degree. If, therefore, a given sin deserves a finite punishment, then a greater sin would deserve a greater punishment in the ratio of its being a greater sin—that is to say, a finite punishment. If the punishment for this sin be represented by a period of finite duration, then the punishment of a slightly aggravated sin would be represented by a period of longer but still of finite duration, and so on. So that it might be argued that the punishment due for the most aggravated sin would be expressed in a period of finite duration, however protracted that might be. Were it otherwise, then it would follow that while sin *quâ* sin calls only for finite penalty, the difference between this sin and that calls for infinite penalty; in other words, that while sin in essence may be measured in a finite duration of penalty, sin as to its accidents is possessed of a demerit which calls for a penalty of infinite duration.

If what has just been said is true, it is equally evident that if a particular sin does not merit endless punishment, no sin merits this punishment. Let it be assumed, then, that the greatest sin of which a man has been or can be guilty is deserving only of a definite punishment in time—a punishment measured by so many years or cycles. Then it follows that sin against God, even the greatest sin which a man can commit, is not the worst thing conceivable, for it is an evil, the exact measure of which can be computed in the figures of arithmetic. Let that punishment be protracted as long as you please, yet the moment the mind reaches in thought the time when the punishment expires, it will instinctively say: "Men might have done worse; they might have deserved a still greater and more protracted punishment than that which they had deserved for sinning against God." This process of reflection is not an argument in proof of

eternal punishment ; but it is enough to show that so far as God's attribute of justice is concerned, the antecedent and *a priori* difficulty is greater when punishment is regarded as finite than when it is considered as endless.

There is another consideration which should be urged at this point, and that is the self-perpetuating power of sin. The operation of this law in human life does not ordinarily provoke complaint. Men see the victims of immoral life go down to lower and yet lower levels. They say, "This is the law of nature ;" but it never occurs to them to call in question the justice of the law. Arguing now on the basis of this self-perpetuating power of sin, it is not difficult to understand that punishment would not necessarily be unjust if it were eternal. For when the progress of the soul in sin and suffering in this world awakens in us no disposition to reproach the Author of our being, it would be unreasonable for us to raise the cry of injustice when the continuity of the soul's life is contemplated ; and if the soul should go into the other world under the operation of this self-perpetuating law, the difficulty which the mind would encounter would not be that of supposing this state of things to continue forever ; it would be the difficulty of supposing that this law should ever spend its force and become powerless. It is no answer to this argument to say, as objectors always say, that men are punished for the sins of this life. "This is true," as Dr. Hodge remarks ; "nevertheless, it is also true, first, that sin in its nature is alienation and separation from God ; and, as God is the source of all happiness, separation from him is of necessity the forfeiture of all good ; secondly, that this separation is from its nature final, and consequently involves endless sinfulness and misery."¹ Eternal ruin is the necessary result of an unregenerated heart. To regard punishment as something deferred to a remote assize, is to miss the real significance of character. Our condition by nature is one of spiritual death, with concomitants of suffering ; we are the subjects of a depraved nature, which not only has no power of self-regeneration, but which is constantly gravitating to a lower level of sin, and leading the way to a deeper abyss of suffering. This life is probationary, in the sense that it is the season during which the soul is to experience the regenerating

¹ Systematic Theology, vol. iii., p. 879.

influence of the Spirit of God, if it experience it at all. Limit the overtures of the Gospel to the present life, and of necessity the unregenerate soul is projected at death into an eternal career of sin and suffering.¹

II. RETRIBUTION AND THE DIVINE GOODNESS.

The reverential skepticism of a man like John Foster, who, while admitting that the language of Scripture is formidably strong in favor of the doctrine of eternal punishment, acknowledges nevertheless that he is not convinced of the orthodox doctrine, is not only worthy of respect, but it is a skepticism of which more than one orthodox believer has at times been the subject,

¹ Witsius gives this doctrine its true logical place in systematic theology by discussing it prior to the discussion of the covenant of grace. The following quotation shows how he appreciated the argument for eternal punishment based on character, and, moreover, that he had faced the question of annihilation. What he says on the latter subject is interesting, as showing (what must be evident to any one who thinks on the subject) that while Restorationism is not at all compatible with the doctrine of a vicarious atonement and the other factors in the Calvinistic system, Annihilationism is, though of course it is uns Scriptural.

He says: Sed an aeternitas illa necessario debeat esse, in poena *sensus*; an vero satisfieri possit justitiae divinae per aeternam poenam *damni*, in annihilatione creaturae peccatricis, nescio an determinari queat. Hoc mihi videtur probabiliter satis et sobrie dici posse: Si Deo lubeat creaturam peccatricem aeternum in existentia conservare, necessum est (nulla satisfactione intercedente) ut eam aeternum puniat; poena non *damni* duntaxat sed et *sensus*. Ratio est, quia non modo peccati reatus semper remanet; sed et macula, qua peccatum semel commissum animam inficit, quaeque in aeternum expurgari non potest, nisi sanguine Christi. Impossibile autem est, . . . ut Deus hominem peccato inquinatum ad sui communionem admittat. Porro fieri nequit, ut creatura rationalis, a communione favoris Divini exclusa, hanc indignationem Dei cum dolore maximo non sentiat. Conscientia dilapidati summi boni acerrimis flagellis miseros lancinat. . . . Sed an necesse sit ut Deus creaturam peccatricem aeternum in existentia conservet, fateor me ignorare. Annon poena suo modo infinita censi posset, si Deo luberet hominem natura sua aeternitatis candidatum totali annihilationi addicere, unde retrogradi ad vitam nunquam liceret? Scio aliter nunc Deus disposuisse et id quidem justissime. Sed quaeritur, an non convenienter justitiae suae hoc modo disponere potuisset: si tu, ô homo, pecces, ego tuum aeternae beatitudinis atque beatae eternitatis appetitum frustrabor, teque ex adverso mancipabo aeternae annihilationi. Liceat hic saltem *ἐπιχρῆν*.

OEcon. foed., Lib. I., Cap. V., §§ XLI., XLII.

when reflecting on the infinite goodness of God. In no spirit of controversy, therefore ; with no desire to champion a foregone conclusion, should a question which bears so terribly on the destiny of men be approached. It would be easy to quote passages which would show how Universalists are in the habit of stating the objection under consideration ; it is hoped, however, that no injustice will be done if their arguments are presented in our own words. This in substance is what they say : " Some men, it matters not how many, are doomed, you say, to eternal misery. God could have prevented the dawn of life ; he could have placed them in circumstances more favorable to the reception of truth : but as the case stands, their unfavorable circumstances work their ruin. God has saved some ;—you make a great deal of that to illustrate his goodness ;—but what would you think of the man who would save two men on a sinking vessel, and, with abundant means at his command, should leave the rest to perish ? Yet this is virtually what you ask me to believe concerning God ; nay, you ask me to believe this and at the same time to regard him as my Father, and to feel assured that all we know of parental love is true of God, since he is the great Prototype of Fatherhood. Would I deal thus with my own child ? Can I imagine the fountain of parental affection to be so dry that no responsive tears would follow the piteous cry of a suffering child ? No, love would overleap all barriers ; it would let nothing stand in the way ;—and God, because he is love, will not allow his children to bear the torments of an endless penalty."

This is the argument. Is it as strong as it seems to be ? Does it address the reason as powerfully as it impresses the feelings ? There are two generic opinions among evangelical Christians respecting salvation. According to the one (the Arminian), the salvation of the soul is in the hands of the individual, since it hinges on compliance with certain conditions, full power to comply with these being presupposed ; according to the other (the Calvinistic), the salvation of the soul is in the hands of God : he elects, calls, justifies, and glorifies whom he will. The objection under notice is brought to bear on the Arminian scheme by asking why God should limit the blessings of grace by the performance of duties which he knew men would

neglect. It is brought to bear with even greater plausibility against the Calvinistic scheme by inquiring whether it is not more compatible with God's infinite goodness, to regard him as saving all men ;—particularly in view of the fact that, according to the Calvinistic belief, the vicarious atonement of Christ is sufficient for all, and the election of men is founded only on the sovereign pleasure of God.

To the objection founded on God's goodness, the reply may be made : (1) That in the exercise of benevolence, God acts according to his own good pleasure. (2) That the area of benevolence must be limited by the demands of justice.

Mr. John Stuart Mill¹ gives it as his opinion that “ the only admissible moral theory of creation is that the Principle of Good *cannot* at once and altogether subdue the powers of evil, either physical or moral ;” in other words, Mr. Mill sees no way of defending the benevolence of God without denying his Omnipotence. But the fallacy of the argument lies in the epithet which is employed to characterize God's benevolence. It is assumed that because God is benevolent, he must be as benevolent as he can be ; that being infinite, he is infinitely benevolent, and that infinite benevolence is omni-benevolence.

It will be necessary to discuss this question with some care in the use of language. Like justice, goodness implies an act which terminates upon another. But, unlike justice, goodness does not imply conformity with a law or standard. A man who varied a hair's-breadth from the demands of law would be unjust ; but there is no standard by which goodness or benevolence can be measured so that this amount of good-will, or this amount of kindness, entitles a man to be called a benevolent man. Justice is essentially indiscriminating and impartial ; but a man may be both partial and discriminating in his benevolence—indeed, the men with whom the name of benevolence is most frequently associated are those who have turned their wealth or their energy in some favored channel of benevolence. The recognition of this distinction between justice and goodness as the attributes of men should pave the way for a similar recognition of their distinctness as attributes of God. God is bound to be just ; he is not bound to be generous. Men thank him

¹ Three Essays on Religion, p. 38.

for his goodness, but not for telling the truth. That the measure of God's benevolence is a matter of option and not of obligation, is taken for granted in the ordinary language that men use concerning him. It is felt that God might have left men to their fate without casting the least shadow on the purity of his own nature. And, if this is not so ;—if it is as easy to impute falsehood to God as to suppose that he would not interfere for the salvation of men ;—if the mission of Christ was a necessity, on the ground that the holiness of God and the stability of his throne were at stake : then will there not be some excuse for man if, when thanking God for his goodness to him, his soul rises to a contemplation of the moral catastrophe which would have ensued had God not come to his rescue, and the thought is suggested, "He dared not do otherwise"? The voluntariness of the divine goodness is a very essential factor in the contemplation of God's character ; and Dr. Bushnell taught a most pernicious error when he wrote upon the title-page of his book :—"The vicarious sacrifice grounded in principles of universal obligation."

If, now, it is allowed that in the exercise of his benevolence God acts according to his own good pleasure, one has no right to say how benevolent God will be, except on the authority of some special information. The bare epithet "benevolent" does not carry with it the exclusive significance which pertains to the word "just." In order to affirm with propriety that God wills the highest happiness of all his creatures because he is benevolent, it is necessary to add to the epithet "benevolent" another qualifying term ; accordingly, men who believe in the Universalist faith are in the habit of saying that since God is infinitely benevolent he must will the happiness of all his creatures. God is benevolent in electing some, they allow ; but—addressing Calvinists, they ask by way of objection—would he not have been more benevolent had he elected all ; and can that be infinite benevolence which shows itself in such a partial and discriminating manner ?

The infinite benevolence of God may mean either a potentiality in God or an actuality in the universe. This distinction is important in this discussion, for it must be kept in mind that the objection to eternal punishment founded on God's goodness

is one which essays to drive the advocates of the orthodox doctrine to a denial of God's infinite benevolence. God, it is said, has chosen some to eternal life for no other reason than that he was benevolent ; can he, however, be infinitely benevolent if he has chosen some and not all ?—or, assuming the doctrine of election to be true—would he not have been more benevolent if he had chosen a greater number ? The objection is clearly to the effect that a being of infinite benevolence must give expression to a benevolence which is infinite ; or, in other words, that a being of infinite benevolence must be as benevolent as he can be. But what are the facts ? The number of sentient beings in the universe is finite. God is not as benevolent as he can be so far as the number of those enjoying his goodness is concerned, for he could double that number. The benevolence of which sentient beings are the subjects is of various degrees. The benevolence of God might be manifested on a larger scale by bringing the lower grades of happiness up to the level of the highest. If infinite benevolence is that which cannot be increased, it is incompatible with gradations of happiness, and a dead level would be the logical outcome. The objects of God's benevolence differ in their capacities. A wide interval separates the foraminifera from the mollusk, the mollusk from the mastodon, the mastodon from man, man from his Maker. But if infinite benevolence must be so exercised as to forbid the question whether God might not have been more benevolent, are men not bound to say, and is not the Universalist forced to allow, that God is not infinitely benevolent ? Again, if a limited capacity hold only a limited goodness, will the aggregate of limited capacities yield more than a finite quantity ? And if what is finite is able to manifest only a goodness that is finite, is there any way for God to manifest—that is, to actualize—infinite goodness except by making an infinite being ? So that the objection that God must be as good as he can be in order that he may be a being of infinite goodness, really means that God must manifest or actualize a goodness which is incapable of being increased—that is to say, infinite goodness ; and this leads to the absurdity of saying that God must make an infinite being as the sphere in whom infinite goodness can be actualized before God is entitled to be called a being of infinite goodness. The ob-

jection, then, that God cannot be infinitely good or benevolent if he is discriminately and partially benevolent, must be given up, because it leads to absurd conclusions. In other words, men must treat God's goodness as they do his power, and regard it as an infinite potentiality in him, and not an infinity actualized in the universe.

So regarding it, however, the difficulty vanishes and the objection falls to the ground. There is enough in the universe to suggest the thought that God is infinite in goodness. It is not difficult to believe that God has resources enough in his nature to make glad a universe of sentient beings; that the pulsations of his heart are felt in Orion and the Pleiades; and that, after all, he could build another universe and sow the seeds of a wider harvest of happiness. Or ^{man}reflecting only on his own blessings when he takes account of the correspondence between his corporal nature and the external world; when he considers how his senses are made tributary to his enjoyment; when he reflects on the capacities for increasing happiness with which he is furnished in his mental structure; when he remembers that God has endowed him with immortality, and has provided for the happiness of that immortal life by the sacrifice of his Son; when he remembers that his life is to continue without stagnation through all time, and that God's goodness is a fountain from which he is to draw eternal joy—it is not strange if he falls down upon his knees and thanks God for his infinite goodness. Nay, though he were the only object of this goodness in the wide universe, he should still thank him for his infinite love, and it would not occur to him to challenge the accuracy of the epithet because on reflection he discovered that God had not been as good to others as he had been to him. A line may be regarded as infinite without implying that it fills all space. The ocean may be fathomless, though its waters are walled in by the shores of two continents. And men, when they have dropped the sounding-line of their experience into the ocean of God's love, will not be deterred from proclaiming that it has no bottom because the waters of that ocean break against the beetling coast-line of the divine decrees.

It is only necessary to add one word in support of the proposition, that in the exercise of his benevolence God acts accord-

ing to his own good pleasure, and that word is a passage of Scripture which, taken in connection with its context, is a specific and unanswerable refutation of the objection which is under discussion. It is found in the ninth chapter of Romans, and is as follows: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion."

It is not necessary to go beyond the words "even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight," in the attempt to find a satisfactory basis for a theodicy. The answer just given to the objection under consideration is an adequate answer; and yet it is not the only one which can be given. The fact that the area of benevolence is necessarily limited by the demands of justice may also furnish a very cogent argument in reply to the objection of the Universalist which is founded on the goodness of God. Let the objection be presented to the advocate of the Arminian scheme in the form of questions like the following: How is it that a God of infinite benevolence could offer to man a scheme of salvation burdened with conditions which he knew men would so generally fail to fulfil? Why did he not manifest his benevolence by an unconditioned salvation? The Arminian would very properly reply by saying that if these are proper questions it is proper to ask a question prior to them, viz.: Why, since God is a benevolent being, did he make man, at first, under a law which he knew he would violate? This, however, amounts to an inquiry by what right God set up a moral government; for a race of moral beings must be under law if they are under government, and a law is worthless if it has no sanctions. If, now, man, when sinless, was subject to penalty in case he disobeyed, it could hardly be expected that, having disobeyed, he would be redeemed without reference to any conditions; for then the fall would have been an advantage, since it would have been the occasion of a redemption which, being unconditioned, would allow man to sin with the largest license. It should not require much argument to show that the most effectual way of destroying the moral order of the world would be to issue a proclamation that, whatever happened, all men would be saved. Looking at the subject, therefore, from an Arminian point of view, there is no difficulty in supposing that the area of the divine goodness might very well have been limited by the demands of God's moral government.

But the Calvinistic thinker likewise has it in his power to reply to the Universalist's objection by an application of the principle under notice—the principle, to wit, that the area of benevolence is limited by the demands of justice.

Why, it is asked, does God limit himself to the election of some to eternal life, when the atonement was sufficient for all ; and how is this compatible with his infinite goodness ? One answer to this question has already been given and discussed. More, however, can be said. In regard to the destiny of men there are three possible hypotheses, assuming that God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass : 1. That none shall be saved. 2. That some shall be saved. 3. That all shall be saved. The first needs no attention. Let it be supposed that God had foreordained the salvation of all men and advised men of the fact. This would necessarily revolutionize all previously formed opinions concerning the Gospel, though from the standpoint of election it may seem that the only difference would be the substitution of the word "all" for the word "some ;" the choice of a larger number than is generally believed to be comprehended in the decree of election. It would be impossible to say with any force, "Believe, and thou shalt be saved," since all men certainly would believe, as they had been informed that they would be saved. Christianity as an educational system—a system which influences men by presenting to their minds what from their point of view are contingencies—would be inoperative. It is true that God might work faith in all, regenerate all, sanctify all, as easily as he regenerates, justifies, and saves some : but he could not work this sanctification by reference to their hopes and fears, nor would there be any place in the Christian scheme for "conditions," and the word "if" would have no place in the vocabulary of the Gospel. Now, without being able to see *how* there is, it is not difficult to imagine *that* there is something in God's moral government which made necessary the preterition of some in order that (among other reasons) salvation might be wrought out in a life which, with proper caution and within limits, may be called a life of probation. The Westminster Confession of Faith says : "The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for

the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, *to the praise of his glorious justice.*" The election of some and the preterition of others are here referred, in accordance with the teaching in the ninth chapter of Romans, to the sovereignty of God ; but is this truth incompatible with or exclusive of another idea which seems to be hinted at in the reference to " the praise of his glorious justice " ? Is it clear that the exigencies of God's moral government were not such as to call for the punishment of some ? Is it certain that when God passed by the rest of mankind he acted altogether upon the principle of sovereign election, and that there was nothing in the divine nature which made the punishment of some a necessary vindication of the majesty of law ?

These questions should not be entertained for an instant, if they imply, in the remotest way, any disparagement of the work of Christ as a full satisfaction for sin, and sufficient for all. There are, however, many orthodox Christians who would find some relief in the contemplation of this dark problem if they could believe that some are lost not merely because God was not pleased to elect more or to elect all, but also because there may be some occult necessity in the economy of God for the punishment of some which even the death of Christ does not remove. Such a belief would not militate against the all-sufficiency of Christ's atonement, even though its efficacy would be restricted to the elect ; nor would this belief, moreover, conflict in the least with the truth already discussed in the foregoing pages in regard to the voluntary nature of God's benevolence ; since the election of any at all would be a sovereign election, and in the designation of those who should be the heirs of grace the discriminating character of God's benevolence would appear.

III. RETRIBUTION AND THE DIVINE PURPOSE.

" God," says Southwood Smith,¹ " is a being of perfect goodness. He created man with a design to make him happy. There is nothing in the universe capable of frustrating his de-

¹ Illustrations of the Divine Government, p. 179.

sign. However, therefore, that design may be opposed — through whatever long or painful discipline man may be conducted to happiness, he must finally attain it." The better way of dealing with the objection to the orthodox doctrine of retribution which is embodied in this quotation, is to institute an inquiry concerning the final cause of creation. Three prominent answers have been given to the question, Why did God create the world? The first is, that he could not help creating it; that it was as necessary for God to create as it is for the sun to shine. This view of God, it is needless to say, eliminates will and personality from his being, and leaves him little more than a blind force or the *anima mundi*. He is a dead God: he will not answer men if they pray: they may "roll the Psalm to wintry sky," but it falls upon no listening ear. Whether they call him the "Unknowable" with Herbert Spencer, or "a stream of tendency" with Matthew Arnold, it matters not; he is the "living God" no more.

The second answer is, that God made the world as an arena in which he might exercise his attribute of benevolence, and that the happiness of the creature is creation's final cause.

But though it were true that happiness is the final cause of at least the moral creation, it would not follow—as the writings of Dr. N. W. Taylor and others abundantly prove—that all men will be saved; for it would not be difficult to argue—as it has been argued—that the highest happiness of men can be attained only under a government which implies law and sanction on the one hand, and a free agent on the other; that sin is a contingency which God could not provide against, seeing he had determined to create a race of responsible beings; and that, therefore, the present order of things (including the everlasting punishment of the finally impenitent) is not incompatible with the idea that God intended the highest happiness of men. This view of God's moral government is not free from difficulties which may be regarded as insuperable, but it nevertheless furnishes an argument strong enough to overthrow the conclusion which the Universalist would draw from the proposition that happiness is the final cause of creation, supposing even

that the proposition were true. But there are very serious objections to this view of the matter.

1. It would lead to the conclusion that this is the best possible world. If God's end in creation is the happiness of the creature, it is not strange that men look on "Nature red in tooth and claw," and ask whether God is Almighty. One can hardly rise from the perusal of Mr. Mill's terrible indictment of nature, and say with much confidence that God made the world for the sake of making happy creatures.

2. It would follow that happiness would be the ground of moral obligation, since man could hardly be supposed to have a higher end for himself than God had for him. But as if to teach that happiness is not the chief end of man, it generally happens that those who seek happiness as an end signally fail, while "the mint of nature and of God," as a recent writer observes,¹ "has stamped happiness, pure and elevated happiness, on the obverse of every metal inscribed with the legend of self-devotion and self-control." Besides, it is an instinctive feeling that men ought to do right, though the heavens fall. The law of the moral nature is a "Categorical Imperative." It does not say: *If* you do this (you will be happy); but: *Do* this (whether you are happy or not). Moreover, the idea of obligation is incompatible with any system of eudæmonistic ethics. If honesty is the best policy, it is expedient to be honest; but that does not warrant the commanding a man to be honest. There is something greater than happiness as the aim of human life; and Augustine has given expression to the true instincts of the soul in the immortal words of his Confessions: "*Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.*"

3. The view under consideration can have reference only to sentient beings, and does not explain why God made the material universe. Regarding man as a sinner and a wanderer from his Father's house, one may be willing to believe that God has hung out the lamps in the midnight sky to lead him back to heaven; but he can think of the material world as complete and glorious, though the sound of human voice or song of bird

¹ Jackson on Retribution, p. 82.

had not been known throughout the wide domain. A theory which would give proper place to the material world must be more comprehensive than one which can explain the use of that world only by supposing it to stand in some servile relationship to the happiness of sentient creatures.

This theory of the universe is therefore dismissed with the remark that if there may have been a higher end in the mind of God than the happiness of his creatures, that higher end, for aught that is known to the contrary, may not only be consistent with, but may call for, the eternal presence of evil in the universe.

The third answer to the question—Why God made the world—is that he made it for his own glory.

The common objection to this view is that it makes God a being of infinite vanity and selfishness. "What should we think," it is asked, "of a man who would live for his own glory, and who should make it the end and aim of his life to display his glory? Should we not say that he was vain and conceited?" The repeated statements of Scripture that God does act for his own glory should have prevented reverential minds from indulging in this line of remark; but a cursory survey of popular pulpit literature will disclose the fact that there is a sad willingness on the part of some ministers to make use of arguments in opposition to great scriptural truths, which arguments are as shallow and unphilosophical as they are dishonoring to God's word. Now glory is one thing and vain-glory is another. The poet who has succeeded in wedding to immortal verse the thoughts which have struggled to be free, has displayed his glory. He has expressed his better nature, and he can be accorded his meed of praise without the imputation of vanity. He is vain only when he bids for popular applause and solicits flattery. Such a man, it can be supposed, though conscious of the beauty and merit of his production, would not feel complimented by a child's expression of satisfaction. So when it is said that God acts for his own glory, it is not necessary to regard God as seeking the flatteries of men. He has not hung the art gallery of nature with his masterpieces in order that he may hide himself

behind them to listen to human flatteries, and drink in the compliments of tourists. And because self is not a proper centre around which man's acts should arrange themselves, it does not follow that self is not a proper centre around which the divine acts should move. Men should find the end of action out of themselves, for to live for God is a higher end than to live for themselves. But what higher end can God have than his own glory? If human duty takes its brightening way up to the throne of God, then what is the orbit within which the divine activity should move?

And though the analogy between God and man may fail when pushed too far, it is not difficult to illustrate the doctrine under discussion by reference to human experience. The artist may persevere in his profession because he dreams of wealth or hopes for an immortality in the memory of men. But you can imagine another laboring under the influence of a very different motive. He has a thought of what is true and beautiful and good, to which he wishes to give expression. This bright ideal visits him in his dreams; it flits before him and baffles his attempts to transfer it to the canvas. Day by day and night by night he works, until at last it is complete. His life, his history, as Madame de Staël observes, is in it; and as he gazes on the madonna it is not vanity which evokes the words of satisfaction: "It is very good." He did not paint the picture to expose it for sale in the world's markets; he did not paint it as a bid for popular applause; he painted it because the thought was in him, and though no human eye but his had ever seen it, he would have rejoiced in it nevertheless. And when this great universe which had been in God's thought from all eternity had been actualized in creation, it is not strange that the Creator's joy found vent in words, and that God pronounced it "very good." Without irreverence, one may think of God as a great artist enjoying the effect of light and shade and perspective in his wonderful pictures; as a great geometrician observing the harmony which pervades the universe and the even operation of the cosmic forces; as a great logician dividing existences into kinds and classes, and finding pleasure in a classification which,

from summum genus to infima species, knows no break and allows no gap.

And one can conceive, too, that God might look upon man as his masterpiece. For here it is that man fails. He has great power over matter ; he can combine and recombine its constituent elements ; but he stands baffled and disappointed in presence of the law which is formulated in the maxim : *omne vivum ex vivo*. He cannot make a living thing ; he cannot make a being like himself. But God can ; he has made man, and man is like him, for he was made in his image. Man is the choicest work of his hand—greater than the universe, says Pascal, though the universe might crush him : greater even than the universe, for he would know that he was crushed. It was the triumph of art that the shield of Achilles was so complete a semblance of moving life, that (to use Mr. Gladstone's words in allusion to it) " the upturning earth, though wrought in metal, darkened as the plough went on, and the figures of the battle-piece dealt their strokes and parried them, and dragged out from the turmoil the bodies of their dead." ¹ The triumph of divine art,—the masterpiece of divine workmanship,—is this moral world of movement, of thought, and feeling, and activity. Looking on the panorama of human history, men see what, from one point of view, is a series of contradictions ; but what from another point of view is plain enough. There is too much evidence of benevolence in nature for them to suppose that the world is in the hands of evil powers, or that God is a malevolent divinity. Yet there is too much truth in Mr. Mill's indictment of nature to make it easy for them to believe that the world was created with happiness as its final cause. Optimism and pessimism are alike excluded by a fair survey of facts ; but as in astronomy difficulty is avoided by adopting a heliocentric basis of calculation, so in theology difficulties are likely to disappear when men go out of man to find the final cause of his existence in God. And they can imagine that the present order of things does express the glory of the divine perfections as no other would. Even the advent of sin may have been a very important factor in

¹ Review of Lord Macaulay's Life.

the development of God's idea. Great thoughts have taken hold of the human mind as the result of its intrusion, which otherwise men may never have known. Two of these are law and love. Of law it is the judicious Hooker who says : " Her home is in the bosom of God, and her voice is the harmony of the world." But whether the majesty of law would have been so indelibly impressed upon the minds of moral beings had there been no sin and no salvation from its power, men dare not say. Love also occupies a prominent place in the list of great ideas. God is love ; but whether man would ever have known the love of God which passeth knowledge, had that love not been tested in a great moral crisis, is more than he can affirm. The mother loves, but does not know how much she loves until she understands how much she will endure for the sake of the idol of her heart. And without speculating as to the way in which humanity would have apprehended God had there been no sin, it is easy to see in sin the prelude to the Incarnation, and to view the Incarnation as a monument to the majesty of law and a tribute to the self-sacrificing nature of love. More than this, since pleasure is in great measure a matter of contrast, it may readily be believed that the trials of this life are afterwards to yield their rich results in enhancing the happiness of heaven.

Nay, one could almost go further, and hold that contrast may be a necessary factor in the divine economy, and that, for aught that is known, the eternity of evil finds some explanation here. It is here, however, that human sympathy is aroused, and would do violence to the laws of light and shade in order that the dream of a happy universe may be realized. Here, by the throne of the Almighty, is the point of highest light in God's great picture ; but as the light fades away into the deep darkness of the bottomless pit, men recoil and ask the artist to take away the shadows and flood the canvas with a golden glory. But how does the poet-painter of the Apocalypse handle the great theme of human destiny ? He paints the river of life ; the throne of God ; the golden streets ; the white-robed throng ; and, as if to bring out the bright light of the picture, men see in shadow the place whose portals bear the dark inscription : " All hope abandon, ye who enter here."

And now that so much time has been spent in ridiculing the scholastic and patristic writers who, in language coarse it may be and grating to the ear, have spoken of the punishment of the lost as a factor in the happiness of the saints, would it not be well to stop and ask whether, after all, there may not be a profound philosophy in the speculation of Aquinas which finds some support in the science of æsthetics, and in the psychology of pleasure and pain?

FRANCIS L. PATTON.

THE CHURCH IN ITS RELATION TO THE STATE AND CIVIL LAW IN SCOTLAND AND AMERICA.

THE westward course of empire has become a proverb. But the applications of the proverb have not yet been exhausted. It is here appropriate to manifest a special interest in that empire which is ordered peace—that harmless *imperium in imperio* which we call Presbyterianism. Born in Jerusalem, re-born in Geneva, cradled and roughly rocked in Scotland, it never has had full scope for its development till it reached American shores. So far there is nothing novel in the statement. But has any one noticed the very peculiar westward course of Presbyterianism in its relation to the State and to the Law? There was no conscious assumption on the part of the American church of a freedom which should serve as an example to the other side of the Atlantic. And certainly there has been no conscious imitation in Britain of that involuntary American precedent. In either case the course of the church was guided not by its own wisdom, but by a shaping Providence. And yet the relation of Presbytery to the State and to the Law in Great Britain is now becoming as nearly that which America substantially attained a hundred years ago, as though British Presbyterians had set up the Western system for a model. They have not done so. It is not thus that nations act. It is not thus that history grows. The Presbyterianism of the parent island, and in particular of Scotland, has followed its own course; but under the guidance of “larger, other Eyes than ours,” that course has led it altogether beside its intention, to where American Presbyterianism, equally without intention, had been suddenly thrust at the Revolution. The twofold course is like that of a river which, going out as from Eden,

might be parted and become two streams. One takes its direct course to the chain of encircling hills and, piercing through a narrow gorge, falls in a cataract of foam to the lower level of the plain. The other keeps the higher level, and moving in slow curves around the shoulders of a hundred hills, and winding its long circuit where the barren uplands are replaced by pastoral slopes, it arrives at last at the same point far below, which its sister stream had reached in a single bound.

It is proposed in this paper to take up the subject of the relation of the Church in Scotland to the State and the Law, and to show the more remarkable steps of progress by which it is now on the point of attaining very much the same relation to these powers which the Presbyterian Church already holds in America—attaining it by steps which, although they are slower—nay, because they are slower—are perhaps more instructive than the more precipitate course of things in the Republic.

But it must first be indicated what seems to be the legal relation of Church and State, and in particular of the Presbyterian Church to the State in the United States. Most men in Europe, and in particular most lawyers, answer the question very compendiously, by saying that there is *no* such relation. It is certain *à priori* that that is a mistake. There are relations between the State and all bodies and powers and influences within it and around it. How far these forces within and without are recognized by the State, and how far these inevitable relations are acknowledged by it, is another question. But when we come to inquire into this as a matter of fact, we find that American law—even American constitutional law—does fundamentally recognize, if not the church, at least religion. That is quite consistent with holding that it liberates the church and refuses to establish a religion. We must look back to the beginning of its history. The sudden crisis in this matter to which reference is made, was the declaration of independence and the severance of the colonies from Great Britain. From that date both the churches which owned the king as the head of the church, and those which never did so, were cut asunder from the crown, and they and the Republic had to adjust themselves to the new state of matters. It is true that in some of the States some fragments of local establishment lingered till a

late date. But the general frame and principles of the law seem to have at once taken a shape which has not since suffered much change. The clause in the Constitution of the United States of 1789 provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This seems to imply two principles: 1. That the free exercise of religion is a thing recognized as valuable; 2. That such an exercise of religion is not promoted, but is impaired or imperilled, by an establishment. The first of the ideas which the clause thus suggests to an English reader is borne out by the Constitutions of the separate States. The right to worship God is claimed in almost all these as the "natural and inalienable" or the "natural and indefeasible" right of all men, and upon this expressly are founded the negative provisions which forbid in the several States "preferences given to religious establishments." Now, whatever else or whatever more the church may be, it is at least an institution for the worship of God. And a State which recognizes the right of worship as fundamental, and at the same time earnestly disclaims its own interference with it, deliberately makes room for the church and its agency, even while it does not in words recognize it. And what the American Constitution thus originally provided for, American law seems to have carried out. The most important decision by the American courts during the last century on church matters was that by the Supreme Court in the case of *Watson vs. Jones*, in 1872.¹ That was the case of a Presbyterian organization, and it was accepted by the court as representing the case of all large churches where many congregations are united under one government with judicatories of its own. The case was "held under advisement" for a year by the high tribunal which dealt with it, because the "intrinsic importance and far-reaching influence" of the questions which were presented justified a "careful and laborious examination and discussion of the principles." Some of the points decided in this necessarily important case were difficult and perhaps narrow. But the following passage from the judgment of the court (delivered by Judge Miller) seems to deliver the unquestioned law of America on the general subject of the

¹ 13 Wallace's Sup. Court Reports, p. 679.

recognition by the law of the existence and the jurisdiction of churches :

"In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practise any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine, which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe upon personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body, do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent, and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that these decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeal as the organism itself provides for. Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting those decisions to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large influential bodies (to mention no others, let reference be had to the Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches) has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written organic laws, in their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the noblest minds to become familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would, therefore, be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so."

This passage seems to state the general principle of the recognition by the law of American churches and their organization almost as a constitutional principle. Of course every principle has applications. When introducing the subject to the too incredulous minds of British lawyers and general readers, the following details of principle seemed fairly to be gathered from the whole decisions and utterances of the State Courts and the United States Supreme Court :

1. American law acknowledges a jurisdiction in the Church ;

leaves all Church questions (questions of worship, doctrine, discipline and membership) to the decision of the Church itself ; and refuses to review those decisions.

2. American law claims for itself complete and exclusive control, not only over the life, liberty and goods of all Churchmen, but over all church property and church funds.

3. But, in order to decide purely civil questions of person, goods and estate, the law necessarily deals with innumerable religious questions and church relations.

4. Where such civil question (of property or money) turns upon an express trust, American law inquires for itself into the fulfilment of the conditions of that trust, whether these be religious or ecclesiastical, to the uttermost ; and it enforces the trust to the effect of settling the question of property, but to that effect only.

5. Where property is held by a church generally, or for church purposes, unspecified, and not on an express trust for the maintenance of certain doctrines or government, American law presumes, in questions as to that property, that the decision of the Church is right.

6. But the Supreme Court of the United States has also decided that, where there is no express trust as to the property, the law will not only presume that the decision of the Church (by its majorities or judicatories) is right, but will hold that decision as conclusive between the parties, and will regulate the civil question of property accordingly.

7. The two jurisdictions, the civil and ecclesiastical, work together on the quasi-international principle of *comity*.

The peculiar American institution of a "Church Society" has somewhat varied, and apparently lightened, the problem for the courts on that side of the Atlantic. But the fact remains that there, as in every country of Europe, the law has to meet and to deal with the Church in innumerable relations ; and that in the Republic, where there is no established Church, the legal position conceded to the Church not established is one of great dignity, energy and independence. In Europe, the vulgar idea has always been that this is impossible ; that disestablishment in some way severs all connection between the Church and the Law ; and that establishment of some particular church is

a necessity and not a hindrance to the universal worship of God. Within the last generation the course of affairs in Scotland, in Italy, in Germany, and in Ireland has done more to shake that ignorant prepossession than previous ages had done. In the first-mentioned country, in particular, the history down to the present date has been very instructive ; all the more because it is even now only in its penultimate stage. It will be well for Presbyterians, and especially for Presbyterian lawyers, in the United States to keep an intelligent watch upon the developments of English and Scottish Church-law during the years to come. Questions which have been settled long since in America without difficulty have yet to be fought out on the other side ; and while the ultimate result is certain, the process, in lands where an establishment exists, being encumbered by political difficulties and prejudices, is both more interesting and more instructive than in those where no such specialty is to be found. But in order to understand the present and the future we must go back upon all the past.

1. The first step in the Scottish history is a singular parallel to what we have found to be almost the first and last in America. That step was the severance of the nation from the king. It was a severance effected in a form most flattering to the national pride, but none less was it the first step to the end. When the statutory foundations of the Church of Scotland were laid in 1567, a feeble infant was the depository of royal power. His murdered father was scarcely laid in his grave. His unfortunate mother was already in that English prison which she only left for the scaffold. Church and nation were moulded around young James's cradle. To the Church he was from the first the magistrate—God's lieutenant—to whom "chiefly and most principally the conservation and purgation of the religion appertains."¹ And later on he became their covenanted king, taking personally upon himself, as representative of the nation, the vows and "band" which united it to God. But as the century closed, the great woman-sovereign of England died, and James succeeded. Nothing could be more flattering to Scotland. She gave a monarch to her ancient rival

¹ The office of the Magistrate is so described in the *Confessio Scotticana*, or old Scot's Confession of Faith of 1560.

—a monarch who often told his subjects that he retained “a natural and salmon-like affection”¹ for his ancient kingdom. But his ancient kingdom, without knowing it, had lost its covenanted king. He was now the temporal head of the English Church and its chief member—the member of a body with another though similar creed, a dissimilar hierarchy, a diverse origin, and a different destiny. The first-fruits of the change were the attempts to introduce Prelacy into the Church, now by persuasion, and now by violence. Its later results were the long persecutions and sufferings, “whose echoes ring through Scotland to this hour.” But henceforth Scotland and its king were no longer one, but two. History contains nothing more ludicrous than the coronation at Scone, with the Bible and the covenant, of that young reprobate, Charles II.—nothing more lamentable than the wasteful devotion with which Presbyterian Scotland poured out its blood in his defence. This prompt repression of the independence of the Scottish Church in 1660 is not to be looked at as a mere instance of the ingratitude of tyrants. It was carrying out the views of his father and grandfather; and it was in principle but an earlier rehearsal of the overruling of the Church of Scotland, by an English majority of Parliament, first in 1712, and again in 1843. The union or identification of Church and State, on the old theory, was based on the idea of the personal faith of the monarch. It had to be strained tremendously when (as in the case of Mary Queen of Scots) the faith of the monarch was different from that of the people. In that case, as John Knox taught his unwilling pupil, the people relieved the magistrate of the sword, which a temporary insanity prevented him from using aright. But doubtful and risky as was the theory while the monarch remained within the nation and a member of the Church, it became very hopeless when he lived outside of both. The fact that his personal faith was held important soon became at all times a practical danger. A monarch like Charles I. persecuted because he had faith; a monarch like his elder son persecuted because he had none.

2. The Revolution settlement of 1688 made a great change

¹ The “salmon-like affection” must have been what international lawyers call the *animus revertendi*.

in this respect. It recognized the distinction between the two countries. King William, who took a strong personal interest in the matter, desired above all things a toleration, and even a comprehension; and we have still preserved the private letter which he sent to Scotland to his commissioner, and which shaped the statute of the Scots' Parliament into its present form. That statute confirms all laws made "for the maintenance and preservation of the true Reformed Protestant religion, and for the Church of Christ within the kingdom," ratifies the Westminster Confession of Faith as the confession of "this Church," and ratifies and establishes the Presbyterian Church government as the form which the people demanded. And these, be it remembered, were Scottish Acts, to which William and Mary set their signatures as King and Queen of Scotland. The settlement was a hopeful compromise, but an ambiguous one. It promised fair, but it had in it the seeds of disruption, of dissolution, and perhaps of reconstruction. One party alone objected. The strong Covenanters or Cameronians stood out, protesting that the new settlement was Erastian on the one hand, and latitudinarian on the other. It ignored the independent action of the church during the years of persecution, and it did not even now pledge the Scottish State to the truth as a matter of conviction. And so they sung mournfully:

"The house we built in days of old,
With bars of iron, with bands of gold,
That house has vanished, bars and bands—
O for a House not made with hands,
In Scotland yet!
We turn from all that's past and done,
We look to an eternal Sun
That does not set!
Not in the Stuart or the Guelph,
Our covenant stands in God himself!"¹

3. The third point of unquestionable importance is the Treaty of Union in 1707. Hitherto Scotland, though she had partially lost her sovereign, had her own Legislature. Now she was to resign this also, and it was hard to see how she was to

¹ From a "Lament of the Covenant," which appeared in the *London Spectator*, on the occasion of the union of nearly the whole Reformed Presbyterian (Cameronian) body in Scotland with the Free Church in 1876.

have any separate existence longer. Great trading and secular advantages were proposed, and the nation, with a certain grudge, was almost willing to resign its own individuality. But it was not willing to surrender that of its Church. Great part of the storm of opposition which was raised sprang from the conviction that the Church of the weaker nation would be certainly exposed to attacks from the Parliament of the stronger. The consequence was a succession of the most solemn legislative guarantees in favor of the Scottish Church, its principles, and its government. Unfortunately, these guarantees, in 1707, did not prevent the first Tory majority in 1711 from attacking it in a most tender point of its government by the Act restoring patronage, which had been abolished at the Revolution. Henceforth, any gentleman—a high churchman or an atheist—might have the absolute choice as to who was to be the pastor of a Christian Presbyterian Church; and the only question was, whether the law would enforce the reception of his nominee by the congregation, and his ordination by the Church. Graver questions still have followed. Since the protest of the Free Church in 1843, most students of history hold with Lord Macaulay and Mr. Gladstone that the party of the Kirk composed of it and its friends, all now disestablished, represents the true Church of Scotland, to whom the legislative guarantees of 1707 were granted. How is modern legislation to deal with a state of matters like this? One result of so anomalous a condition was that in 1853, Parliament, with the applause of the whole country, released the principals and secular professors in the Scottish Universities from the obligation to be members of the Church established—one of the obligations provided in the Union Treaty to remain unalterably and forever unchanged. Notice has been given in the Council of Edinburgh University, that the same question will be raised with regard to the chairs of theology in the national Universities—chairs which at present, to the scandal of the little Presbyterian country, are confined to a section of its Presbyterians, who by no means profess to monopolize its learning. But even so obvious a piece of justice as this cannot be accorded by Parliament without trenching an inch or two further on the formal provisions of the Union Treaty. The more serious question of course relates to con-

tinued establishment, and to the bearing of 1707 on the parties of to-day.

4. The Revolution settlement of 1688 and the Treaty of Union were succeeded by a long and peaceful, but important time, for the Church of Scotland. Two considerable historical events occurred during that time, which may give the key to the character of the more important influences outside of it. One was a Declaration of Independence by the United States of America; the other was the French Revolution. In Scotland these external influences were felt chiefly by the congregations of the *secessions* of 1733 and 1752. These bodies separated—or in their own phrase, seceded—from the majorities of the Established Church, from a regard to that Church's honor and faithfulness. The word they chose was one which should express not dissent from false doctrines, but separation from unfaithful men; not an abnegation of their old tenets, but merely a change from their former surroundings. How was the law of Scotland to deal with such dissenting bodies or with their congregations? That law had been nursed in ages when there was no toleration and no recognition of any Church but that established; and so late as 1801 the Courts of Scotland hesitated to recognize these bodies. The argument used in a case, in that year (Morrison's Dic. "Society," App. 16), against the law recognizing a dissenting Church as a whole, was as follows: "It was said, there is no positive statute tolerating the secession; the Act of Queen Anne relates only to Episcopalians. But the spirit of the law gives the secession toleration and protection. This, however, is very different from acknowledging the Church judicatories, which has in no case been done by the courts of this country. The situation of a seceding minister, as to his temporal rights, is very different from that of a minister of the Established Church. The former *cannot be allowed* to represent his office as flowing in any other shape, or deriving permanency from the proceedings of what may be called a synod, or other ecclesiastical court of his sect. His rights depend wholly on his agreements with the members of his congregation who elected him; and where a dispute arises with regard to the property of the congregation, it must be decided without reference to the

sentences or doctrines of the Church courts, and according to the ordinary rules of municipal law."

The contrast between the view here presented and that of the Supreme Court in the case of *Watson v. Jones*, already quoted, is very striking. But it is plain that the Scotch view is a very partial idea even of toleration. It is a toleration of individuals, but not of the society. Toleration of the society cannot exist without some kind of recognition of the society. And in Scotland, as in other countries, recognition of churches not established has been postponed as long as was at all possible. The date of the judgment from which we have quoted goes back to the period of reaction and fear after the French Revolution. That was also the period when Voluntaryism first took its place as a distinct theory of the Church in Scotland. Years passed on. The dissenting churches spread and became powerful. The country was grateful to them for having preserved the lamp of faith during the dark fogs of Moderatism of the previous century. But gradually the same evangelical spirit passed over into the Established Church. Chalmers, and the laymen whom he influenced, sought to make the State institution not only powerful but popular. The law and its administration leaned in the same direction. The cold and slothful orthodoxy which had long dominated in the Church gradually relaxed its power. In 1833, the evangelical party at last attained a majority. But, at this very moment, the subterranean forces were preparing for a new explosion and a final revolution.

5. One bearing of the "Ten Years' Conflict" in Scotland before 1843 has not always been noticed. So long as the law, in recognizing an established church, seemed to recognize an independent church, there was a possibility of ignoring others. If the others came in for toleration, it was about as much as they could well expect. The Constitution which established one sect might seem in this to discharge its duty to the Church of Christ. But if it should turn out that the condition of establishment was subjection, the inference was not so clear; and this great question was now to be decided in the Church of Scotland. That Church, more than a generation ago, sought to move outwards by erecting new pastoral charges, and by giving its communicants a veto in the intrusion of pastors on

congregations by the "patrons." The law stepped in, and with extreme difficulty and by a narrow majority of the Bench, held that both steps were incompetent. The Church submitted so far as stipends and civil interests were concerned ; but insisted that in the mere cure of souls it had, by the law of Christ and of the Church, what neither the patron nor civil statute could interfere with. The answer of the Court, through the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, was clear and conclusive : "Whether that is, or ever was, a law of the Church of Scotland is perfectly immaterial, if the *statutes* contain enactments and confer rights inconsistent with any such principle, or with the execution of any such law." But the tremendous forensic struggle which divided the Bench and riveted the attention of the country, was protracted year after year. The Church and its opponents brought up from all parts of Scotland case after case which hinged upon the question of its independence, and so forced upon the Court the position stated by its chief, that "Parliament is the temporal head of the Church, from whose acts, and from whose acts alone, it exists as the National Church, and from which alone it derives all its powers." The power then exercised by the civil courts of Scotland of authoritatively enforcing upon the Church courts the performance or omission of sacred duties contrary to the rules they had proclaimed themselves bound in conscience to observe, has sometimes led to misconstruction. It has occasionally been put as if they claimed a right of interfering with the Church courts in their ordinary work, or of reviewing it. Something of this view may be found even in the classical "Journal" of Lord Cockburn, one of the judges on the Bench at the time, whose marvellously sagacious comments, published so many years after his death, have recently shed a vivid light on the whole history. The Scottish courts never, even before 1843, intended to interfere with the ordinary working of the Church courts in things ecclesiastical. They have uniformly disavowed it, and consistently. They no doubt did at that time habitually interfere in certain classes of cases. But these were always cases in which the Church, in the exercise of its supposed independence, had declined to walk according to the rule laid down for it by the State. The courts never interfered except to support the law,

or what they alleged to be the law. And the real question to be decided was whether the Church as established was bound, actively as well as passively, to obey the statutes of the secular power. The Church of Scotland, long an established Church, did not dispute its obligation to do so, except in one region. But in the one region—that of things spiritual or properly ecclesiastical—it earnestly pleaded an exception, and maintained its independence. The answer of one of the heads of the court was, that although their functions “are strictly ecclesiastical, and to be exercised by them in their ecclesiastical capacity, yet the obligation to perform them is statutory—statute imposes the duty on the Church courts of the establishment”—and in a long series of cases, it was finally and solemnly decided, that where civil law of any kind (whether immemorial or in the form of express statutes) bound the Church, the plea that the subject-matter was spiritual or ecclesiastical, was absolutely irrelevant. It was when this was laid down as the authoritative law and the condition of establishment, that the question of obedience and disruption at once arose. The Church declined to acknowledge this law as the condition of its establishment. The courts insisted upon it. The Church applied to the crown and legislature to change the law as laid down, or in some way to relieve it, and in the meantime it declined to obey in things spiritual. The courts compelled its members to do so by force, and the Crown and Legislature formally refused to interfere, and sanctioned the law laid down. Then the Free Church came out, protesting against the conditions of establishment thus sanctioned. It seems clearly to follow that all this was no mere contest between civil courts and church courts—both acknowledged by the law. It was from the first based by the secular tribunals upon the general rights of the State and upon the subjection of the Established Church to the Legislature; and, as each case was decided, this became more and more manifest. A few years ago a distinguished Scottish nobleman, who took an active part in the abrogation of 1874 of the Patronage Act of 1711, stated rather rashly that the decisions of 1843 proceeded merely on that Act and not on general constitutional principles, and that in all those decisions “the great constitutional statutes of the Reformation remained behind unquoted and undisturbed.”

The result was a careful resifting of the judicial decisions and utterances, from which it appeared that these older statutes had been incessantly quoted and explained, or explained away, by the Bench in order to arrive at their general principles of law like those quoted above, addressed to the constitutional question whether the Established Church was or could be independent. And since this last analysis,¹ no one in the legal profession doubts that these statements "were given as the ground and were the ground of the innumerable decisions and orders of the court enforced against the Church, and were intended to settle, and did settle, what both parties knew and confessed to be the great constitutional question then in dependence."

There is probably no people so competent as that of America to estimate the effect of such constitutional decisions upon a nation endowed with the grave enthusiasm and the passion for logic of the Scotch. It was both a legal and a national settlement, and a settlement of a question unsettled since the days of Knox. And the certainty that the Established Church of Scotland was henceforth really dependent upon the English Legislature, gave a tenfold interest to the question, What is the relation to the same law and legislature of the Church of Christ in Scotland,—outside establishment?

6. But the mere legal and constitutional decisions on the meaning of establishment was a small part of the influences thus maturing general church law. The attraction and heroism of the history had at least as much to do with it. The legal ploughshare in this case tore through the very heart of the Church. The history of the years of strengthening and revival, of increase of popular and pastoral power, in the Church of Scotland before 1843, as told, for example, in the four volumes of the life of Dr. Chalmers by Dr. Hanna, is one of intense interest. But, as it happened in fact, it was the course of a drama hurrying to its catastrophe—"the torrent's smoothness ere it dash below." And the pathos and moral power of that catastrophe have attracted in recent years not less but much greater attention than they did of old. One reason of this has been that another generation has set itself deliberately and officially to gather up the precious fragments of a story of faith-

¹ "The Scotch Law of Establishment." Alex. Taylor Innes, advocate.

fulness and suffering. But another ground has been that as the great men who were leaders in that time itself have one by one passed away, their biographies have recalled to the new generation that heroic episode of modern Presbyterianism. Thus the life of Dr. Guthrie could not but contain most touching fragments from the sorrows to alleviate which his famous "manse scheme" was undertaken. The charming journals of Lord Cockburn, already referred to, broke in 1874 like a river from underground, and have already led some English and American lawyers into the historical study of a question in which otherwise they would have felt little interest. Yet the Free Church history since 1843 has had more to do with the progress of the legal question in Europe and in Scotland than the legal decisions before and at that date.

The intense spirit of nationalism, the administrative and organizing power, and the religious initiative and independence of the new body reacted upon Presbyterianism generally, and set a new ideal before Scotland for the future. The extent to which a "new departure" had thus been supplied came out most strikingly after a generation had passed. When in 1870 it became a question in the British Parliament of disestablishing the Episcopal Church in Ireland, Mr. Gladstone was able to refer on the floor of the House of Commons to the Scotch Free Church as a body "to whose moral attitude scarcely any word weaker or lower than that of majesty is, according to the spirit of historical criticism, justly applicable." Since that date the financial part of its powerful organization has been imitated both in Scotland and Ireland, and the complete abolition of patronage in the Established Church of Scotland by Parliament has shown that the most influential objection taken to its proposals before 1843 can no longer be maintained. But it must not be forgotten that the romantic origin of the Free Church has tended to obscure both the bulk and value of the other Presbyterian elements outside the Established Church in Scotland. Lord Cockburn, whose work already quoted shows a strong animus against dissenters, makes it at the same time plain that during the years of his friendship with Chalmers before 1843, the Secession Churches, now represented by the United Presbyterian Church, were rapidly increasing both in

energy and in favor with the people. The two streams flowed alongside of each other, but in rivalry rather than in union; and the shock of 1843, which precipitated the one to the plane on which the other already moved, revealed to lawyers also the volume of liberated Presbyterian force with which jurisprudence must henceforth deal.

7. The immense improvement in the attitude and feeling of the Established Church of Scotland on this subject of church independence is one of the most certain symptoms of this advance. There are many circumstances which prevent men both at home and abroad from duly noticing this change for the better. Some of these are almost unavoidable. One is that, so far as future obedience to the law in church matters is concerned, neither the feeling nor attitude of the Church is of any consequence (that was one of the points expressly and repeatedly ruled in 1843); and that therefore it would require Parliamentary legislation to give effect to any aspirations. And there has been no attempt to procure such legislation, but rather a sensitive shrinking from it. This is true, and came out very strongly when the Patronage Act, in 1874, seemed almost directly to call for something of the sort. But it was scarcely reasonable to expect any other result. The claim of the Free Church, in 1843, to be the Church of Scotland, meant even then, as Chalmers explained to the House of Commons in 1847, that it should be restored to its forfeited dignities, and allowed to deal with the members of the Church now established in the way of mild ecclesiastical discipline. And though the new generation of Free Churchmen would certainly decline to judge their Presbyterian neighbors, however mildly, they continue to insist on disestablishment as the necessary preliminary to any honest legislation and to the union of Presbyterians. And in this they of course have the full concurrence of the great United Presbyterian body. The Church established may yet come to acquiesce in this. But it is too soon to look to it voluntarily to propose such a thing. Besides, in the second place, it is impossible to say what is the official opinion of the Church on the matters on which legislation would be necessary. The famous Protest of 1843 was laid on the table of the Assembly, and a rejoinder was again and again attempted, but it remains unanswered to

this day. What the official attitude of the Church would be to the new legal "conditions of establishment" which that protest sets forth, if it were driven to pronounce on them, no one can certainly say. All that is clear is that, so long as is at all possible, it will take up no official attitude to them. It would be an awkward thing directly to controvert them, but still more awkward to accept them. But the drift of irresponsible sentiment inside the Church is not to be mistaken. A thin counter-current (of principle) no doubt runs in the direction of Erastianism, and another (by no means of principle) in that of Establishment at any price. But when the eloquent and courteous and charming Dean of Westminster came to Edinburgh, in 1873, to advocate these views, he found a reluctant soil in which to sow his seed. The Presbyterians of the Establishment for which he fought were soon eager to disclaim his principles and to apologize for any apparent acquiescence in them before Principal Rainy's crushing reply; and the result upon the whole was a clear gain both to Presbyterianism and to church freedom. Indeed, with regard to the mass of the people within that Church, as well as to the animus of the publications addressed to them, there is no doubt. The latter are either simply Free Church in principle or hopelessly self-contradictory; while, as to the people, "that Church in the mass disclaims, disavows, and regrets the principles of Establishment so solemnly laid down. It has no legal power to do so, and its moral right may be questioned. But that all the more entitles any inarticulate protest to favorable construction," and "on this matter I do believe the Scottish people are at one, and that in the Established Church the large majority of the clergy, and nearly the whole of the people, are with their brethren outside."¹ And along with the sentiment of freedom has come to a great extent the practice of freedom. The great bequest of half a million to the Church by Mr. Baird, ordered and distributed within it by a Board of Trustees in a way familiar in America, and now in Scotland, makes the Church to a large extent voluntary and self-supported; and it is by no means the only stream that buoys it up on the same principle. A body like

¹ From the "Church of Scotland Crisis," and the "Scotch Law of Establishment"—Pamphlets of 1874 and 1875.

this, which, if cut loose from the State to-morrow, would swim and not sink, has already much of the spirit of freedom. And even in Establishment it has already administrative, though not constitutional freedom. Since 1843, there have been several attempts to get the civil courts to review alleged injurious or unjust decisions of the ecclesiastical judicatories. But in *Lockhart v. Deer*, *Sturock v. Gray*, and *Wight v. The Presbytery of Dunkeld*,¹ the courts distinctly adhered to the position which they had always taken up, that the church courts had by law a jurisdiction of their own which, while not exceeded, was not subject to review. And so far as these decisions excited any attention at the time, they were sympathized with and approved of by the great majority of members of the Church.

8. The measure, however, of the advance of the law of Scotland in church principle since the beginning of the century, as well as of the still existing discrepancy between it and the law of America, is to be found best in the *Cardross* case, decided in 1861-62. That was a case in which the suspension of a minister by the Free Church was questioned in the civil courts on grounds of irregularity in the subordinate church judicatories—grounds which were especially appropriate for decision by the Supreme Church Court, and which would certainly have been decided according to its previous ruling had the case gone on to a decision at all. The *form*, however, of the action, being an action *reducing* or cancelling the church sentence, so arrested public attention and excited public interest that the case never got on to the merits at all. On both sides it was at first suspected that this “reduction” of a church sentence might be intended to apply not merely to civil and pecuniary, but, as in the cases before 1843, to proper spiritual or ecclesiastical results. The Free Church accordingly instantly denied the jurisdiction of the civil court in such an action; but the court, while on the one hand it affirmed its own jurisdiction, on the other protested that the sentence could only be cancelled to the effect of giving Mr. Macmillan pecuniary redress if he should be found entitled to it. “When a man loses his leg,” said the Lord President, “we may give him damages for his loss, but

¹ See the “Law of Creeds in Scotland,” p. 201 and 205; and third Series of Session Reports, vol. viii. 921.

we shall not attempt to stick it on again." The Free Church, however, was not satisfied with this concession, and fought the case keenly on all preliminary questions; the result being that a number of very important points were decided in its favor, and that this action, as well as one which followed, was thrown out. Among these points it was decided: 1. That an action concluding for damages against a non-established church judicatory, as such, and its officers as representing it, is incompetent. Such an action, if at all admissible, must be brought against individual members. 2. That even when brought against individual members, such an action of damages is bad, unless "malice and want of probable cause" is alleged against the individuals who took part in the sentence—as in the case of a church sentence in the Established Church. 3. That the present action of reduction, being merely directed against a church court, must be thrown out. These decisions, in addition to the still more important announcement that the court would only grant remedies in the form of damages, and not do any thing affecting church status or relations, may seem to be sufficient for the future. They are certainly an immense improvement on the state of matters in the first year of the present century, when the same court hesitated to tolerate or to acknowledge the existence of the courts and judicatories of churches not established. There is little doubt that, had the question been tried out, the full amount of authority and jurisdiction given by the Church to these courts would be at once conceded to it. The only question is the mode of arriving at this result; and on this point there seems to be a difference not wholly in favor of Scottish law. In the United States, the law seems to acknowledge the existence and separate jurisdiction of churches as a public and notorious fact, not needing in the ordinary case to be proved. In the Cardross and previous cases, the Scotch court intimated that they must look on churches (not founded by statute) as being founded on contract, and must have evidence what the contract is. This of course is a legal theory rather than a fact, and even as a theory it is inade-

¹ See the points decided in the Cardross case analyzed by Mr. Murray Dunlop, and quoted in an Appendix (p. 295) to the Rev. Sir Henry Wellwood Moncrieff's "Vindication of the Free Church Claim of Right."

quate. Churches are not founded on contract historically any more than families or nations are. They all grow and men are born into them, but the tie that binds their members may no doubt be expressed in the form of a contract if the law prefers to take that view of it. Still the theory as expressed is a poor one, and bears marks of the degradation of the church law of Scotland in the unfortunate decisions before 1843. One great principle of those decisions was, that the jurisdiction of the Church was necessarily derived from the grant or acknowledgment of the State; and in the *Cardross* case an attempt was made to apply something like the same principle to the Church, outside establishment. "All jurisdictions," said Lord Deas, who, however, was the only dissident from the ultimate decision in favor of the Free Church, "all jurisdiction flows from the supreme power of the State." With such a definition it is plain that the Church of Christ can have had no native jurisdiction, and could acquire none, unless and until it had been taken up by the State; and that particular churches, which scornfully decline to receive the gift from that lower source, can have no jurisdiction at all. Accordingly, the judges, in a hesitating way, adopting the theory of voluntary contract, adopted that also of no proper jurisdiction—no "jurisdiction in the strict sense," as the Lord President put it.

But it will be found that any present inferiority in the treatment of ecclesiastical law by the Courts of Scotland, as compared with those of the United States, is theoretical rather than practical, and will not be permanent. In a certain sense, both jurisprudences hold that the Church is founded on voluntary contract; that is, they hold that its jurisdiction only extends over those who voluntarily join or adhere to it. And though the American Supreme Court certainly seems to recognize all existing churches as of course possessing a jurisdiction, the nature and incidents of that jurisdiction would even there, if questioned, require in particular cases to be made matter of proof. On the other hand, while the Scotch Courts have in some cases denied jurisdiction, at least "in the strict sense," to all churches which are not willing to accept it as a gift from the State, they have virtually and substantially conceded it, even in those very cases. Thus, in the *Cardross* case, they

went so far as to hold that such a jurisdiction (founded on contract) would protect the individuals who exercised it, however irregularly and injuriously, unless it were proved that they had done it maliciously also—a distinction quite satisfactory to the Scotch theologians, as it makes all the difference between a mistaken judgment and a perverted judgment. On this whole subject of ecclesiastical tribunals there can be no doubt that the Scotch Courts will be driven without delay to adopt the principle laid down by those of England in the case of *Long v. Capetown*,¹ a principle substantially, if not formally, identical with that quoted on a previous page from the American Supreme Court. And as in questions of ecclesiastical discipline and its review cases, so it is in those of church property. Here also the Courts of Scotland lag behind those of the United States in the freedom and vigor with which they recognize the corporate action of the church. It is partly that the precedents of England have been a burden to them (as was recognized in the case of *Watson v. Jones*), but partly also that here, too, they have been slow to tolerate Presbyterian churches and their judicatories as a whole, and have leaned strongly in the direction of Congregationalism. It is plain that where questions of church property are intended by the builders, or other parties interested, to be decided by the church concerned itself, the duty of the civil court is to inquire what that decision is, and to give effect to it. Where, too, the members of a church have, by the act of membership or otherwise, submitted their interests in civil property to the jurisdiction—*i. e.*, to the arbitration—of the church itself, the course for the Court to take is equally plain. The law of America has already clearly recognized this in the case of Presbyterianism; and that of Scotland, hitherto more slow and helpless, is sure to follow in its train. The great distinction must never be forgotten, that, by Presbyterian prin-

¹ In this case the Privy Council laid it down that "where any religious or other lawful association has not only agreed on the terms of its union, but has also constituted a tribunal to determine whether the rules of the association have been violated by any of its members or not, and what shall be the consequences of such violation, then the decision of such tribunal will be binding when it has acted within the scope of its authority, has observed such forms as the rules require, if any forms be prescribed; and if not, has proceeded in a manner consonant with the principles of justice." 24th June, 1863.

ciples, while internal church questions, such as those of doctrine or of membership, come before the civil courts only incidentally, all questions of property are *proper* for their decision, and belong to their own region. The more fully and broadly their right to adjudge these last is recognized, the less will the courts be inclined to exceed that right, and the more to give their due weight in adjudging them to all ecclesiastical decisions already passed. What that due weight is may often be doubtful, especially when constitutional objections are taken to an alleged decision of a church court. In such a case, the difficulty cannot be wholly evaded, whether the civil courts proceed on the theory of a public church jurisdiction (as in America), or on that of a voluntary jurisdiction conferred by contract (as hitherto in Scotland). Only, in the former case, the question will be whether the alleged ecclesiastical judgment was really a decision of the church concerned :¹ in the latter, whether it was really an exercise of the power conferred upon the church in the contract of the church members. In both cases justice may be done ; but justice will only be done when the full incidents of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, *and no more*, are acknowledged by the civil courts.

9. The decision in the case of *Watson v. Jones* seems to indicate the high water-mark of acknowledgment of ecclesiastical law by the civil law of the United States. It is difficult to see how more can be conceded than has there been done ; and the strong pretensions of the Church of Rome on both sides of the Atlantic, encroaching even upon civil rights, make it probable that equal attention will have to be given to the necessary restrictions upon overweening ecclesiastical claims. On the Scottish side, on the other hand, the law as to Presbyterianism has lagged behind the fact ; and the decisions of the courts during this century have been poor in principle, and inadequate in their acknowledgment of existing church rights in general, and of Presbyterian unity in particular. But the sketch of historic fact

¹ In at least one recent case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, after an able argument (for the perusal of which I am indebted to Mr. C. Stuart Patterson, counsel in the case), has decided this *constitutional* question in the opposite way from the United States Supreme Court in *Watson v. Jones* ; *i. e.*, it has declined to take the Church's judgment on its own constitution as conclusive.

has brought us down only to 1843—a period of disruption, and therefore of weakness, where the law, triumphant over one Church, cherished a serious grudge against another. We close by recalling the later developments, which make it certain that, if this has been too much the case hitherto, it will not be so in future; that Presbyterianism in the coming time has a great field before it in the region of Scottish and British law, and that, believing this, we need not “make haste,” while we ask the sympathy of the great transatlantic brotherhood.

The first important point was the Union negotiations between the four chief Presbyterian bodies in Scotland and England, between 1863 and 1873. These have as yet resulted only in actual incorporating union of certain of the fragments—two small bodies joining in England, and a smaller mingling with a larger in Scotland. But a more important result has been the affirmation by all the bodies of their unity in principle, and that upon a basis¹ which seems to be nearly that of the great Presbyterian churches of America. They all affirm the duty of the State to recognize religion, agreeing in this, as we have seen, with the Constitution of the United States and with some recent movements there; but they also all demand that the Church submit to no State authority or control; some expressly denouncing establishment in name or thing; others only eschewing it in so far as it implies subjection. It is worth observing that while the Established Church remained outside these negotiations, there was nothing but its establishment that compelled it to do so. The “common principles” laid down would include every man in that body with a decent claim to be a theologian according to his church’s views; and would certainly take in the mass of the people. But the postponement in 1873 of the union between the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church, together with the natural resentment felt by the former body at being wholly ignored by Parliament when abolishing patronage in 1874, has brought the question of unification of the Kirk, by means of disestablishment, finally to the front. The United Presbyterian Church is

¹ The “Principles held in common” on these points will be found quoted in an article on “Ten Years of Contemporary Church History in Scotland,” in the *Contemporary Review* for March, 1873, p. 892.

unanimous about it, and in the Free Church only a fragment, numbering one fifth or one sixth of the General Assembly, hesitates, while each year renders more enthusiastic the mass of a body whose intense feeling of nationality makes it "move altogether if it moves at all." Whether the expected issue is to be attained by ecclesiastical negotiation or political agitation is still in the future. Meantime it is a noble warfare and a great question, and the fact that the United States have no exactly parallel difficulty ought not to make Presbyterians there neglectful of history which is being transacted in Scotland on a national scale. Outside, in Europe, the shadows of the same question are gathering and unfolding more rapidly year by year. In Germany and in France, church administration by the State has been so conspicuously unsuccessful as to have turned the press even of England, when discussing foreign matters, to the "Free Church in Free State" theory; and in Italy, that theory, carried out almost exactly in the Scoto-American form, has become the centre from which every deviation has been found a mistake. But while the continental problem must work itself out at a distance,

"With agonies and energies
And undulations to and fro,"

that of Scotland, while partly mixed up with British politics, is eminently a question for our common Presbyterianism. And one of the most powerful contributions, as it was the last, towards its successful solution, was the General Presbyterian Council in Edinburgh. It was long doubtful whether the Established Church of Scotland could join in such a gathering, and in its Assembly it was strenuously resisted. But when it at last resolved to meet with its brethren on their common ground, all parties seem to have agreed to do so without any *arrière pensée*; and the spectacle of a world-wide Presbyterian Church, maintaining itself throughout the earth in unity yet diversity, reacted strongly upon those who had the honor to welcome representatives from so many shores. Henceforth there is one Presbyterian Church. Kingdoms may rise and fall, nations may sever or may unit, but the Church grows upon another root, and has an independent life. The State does not

give that life, and cannot control it. But it may recognize it. How that recognition is to be maintained is the question for the civil law in all lands. And, to the end of time, those who work out that problem are not likely to omit from their studies the yet unfulfilled history of Church and State in Scotland.

ALEX. TAYLOR INNES.

THE EASTERN PROBLEM.

A DISTINGUISHED historian has suggested that much may be said in favor of the founding of Constantinoplè in 324, its capture by the Turks in 1453, and its rescue from the Russian attack in 1853, as the three signal epochs by which the history of the world may be divided.¹ Its founding, the year of the beginning of the sole reign of Constantine and his open acknowledgment of Christianity as the religion of the Roman empire was significant of the overthrow of the old pagan world. Its capture by the Turks, contemporaneous with the invention of printing, was indirectly the means of revolutionizing the world, and bringing in a new era of learning and Christianity, and was therefore the herald of the rise of modern civilization. Both these are certainly most notable epochs; but for the rescue of Constantinople from the Russian, perhaps as much cannot be said. Outside of a small circle of aristocratic politicians in Great Britain, it is an event contemplated with mingled feelings of regret and shame, save as the hand of Providence is seen in it. But even if the historian of comprehensive views rejects it as unworthy of a place by the side of the other and signal epochs, he cannot fail to see in the Crimean war the beginning of the levelling of the military pretensions of Great Britain and of the old European diplomacy, of the regeneration of Russia and of the final experiment of Europe with the Turk, and therefore, of the removal of the principal obstacles in the way of the settlement of the Eastern question. There are, however, indications in the present aspect of affairs, that a third

¹ Philip Smith, "Ancient History," vol. iii. p. 687.

great pivotal event, altogether worthy, in connection with the city of Constantine, may be in the very near future, and that it is again to be an event which will revolutionize the world as did the founding and the fall of that city. As twice before during the Christian era, so now the third time, the eyes of all intelligent and right-thinking men in Christendom are turned intently toward the great historical city of the Bosphorus, with which the destinies of Christianity and the world have been so long and strangely linked. Perhaps it is not too much to say that anticipation and hope are predominant in the Christian world as the vexed Eastern question is thus apparently approaching a rapid solution in the present Russo-Turkish war. It is a growing conviction, arising from study of the progress of events, that the results of the present struggle will ultimately bring the world to the third signal epoch, which is destined to herald the speedy downfall of modern heathenism and the triumph of Christianity throughout the world.

From this point of view, the great problem, which has been under discussion for centuries, is seen to involve the most momentous interests, present and future, for all Christendom. A sense of its importance has led to the preparation of this review, the object of which will be to give the present condition and apparent future prospects of the hitherto insoluble problem. Advantage will be constantly taken of the papers of the strongest and best men in England, where the subject has been discussed with an order and extent of ability and learning probably never before brought to bear upon any subject of contemporary interest.

A brief survey of the races of European Turkey is a necessary preliminary to the understanding of the present aspect of the Eastern question.

Overlooking less important elements, there are four Christian races in Europe, under the dominion of the Porte, or at least tributary to it,—the Wallachs of Roumania, the Slavs, the Hellenes, and the Armenians.

To the north of the Danube, on the borders of Russia, lies Roumania, the home of the Wallachs. It was organized by the Convention of Paris, in 1858, in accordance with Article XXVII. of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and was formed by

the union of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia with a part of Bessarabia wrested from Russia by the Allied Powers in order to take from her control the mouths of the Danube. On the ground of this Treaty and Convention, it claims autonomy and has exercised it, but the Turk asserts sovereignty over it, and cites in proof the annual tribute paid to the Porte by Roumania. The bitter discussion of the question by the Turk, within the last five or six years, shows that nothing but the lack of ability has prevented the maintenance of sovereignty by military force. The composition of the Roumanian population—5,000,000, out of which 275,000 are Jews, and 29,000 Roman Catholics, 1300 Mohammedans, and 4,700,000 of the Greek Church—brings out clearly their antagonism to Turkey and their natural friendship for Russia. It is manifestly in accordance with the fitness of things that in the present war the Roumanian troops constitute one of the bravest and most effective corps in the Russian army.

Below Roumania, in the region belting Turkey from Dalmatia and the Adriatic to the Black Sea, is the country of the Slavs, including Servia in the centre, Bosnia in the west, and Bulgaria in the east. They belong to the Southern of the three great branches of Slavonian peoples, and are therefore of the same race with the Russians and Poles, the representative Eastern and Western Slavs. To the same race belong the people of Montenegro.

In the centre of this belt, to the south and west of Roumania, across the Danube, between Austria and the Balkans, is the principality of Servia. Conquered in 1385 by the Turks, it was speedily reduced to a condition of miserable slavery. Forming the border-land across which the Turkish armies bore the banner of the Janissaries for centuries, in their long and bloody war with Austria, its Christian people were subjected to those untold horrors to which were doubtless due, in great measure, their heroic efforts for freedom, unsuccessful under Czerny, or Black George, in 1806, but more successful under Milosch in 1814. Since the Peace of Bucharest, in 1812, Servia has claimed partial independence, and her autonomy was guaranteed by the Allied Powers, in 1858, by the Treaty of Paris; but the Sultan held the right to maintain his garrisons there,

and exacts a tribute of 2,300,000 piastres, and on these grounds claims sovereignty over the principality. The composition of the population of 1,500,000—not more than 15,000 of whom are Turks, while the remainder are chiefly connected by race and religion with Russia—has resulted in an intense sympathy with the Russian and an inveterate antipathy to the Turk, which have had much to do with bringing about the present bloody war. Nothing but the threatening attitude of the outside nations prevented Serbia—defeated in its first encounter—from earlier taking its present place on the side of the Russians and Roumanians against the common foe.

To the westward of Serbia lies Bosnia, shut in on the north and west by Austria, on the south by Albania, and traversed by the Dinaric Alps. Of the more than 1,200,000 inhabitants of its two provinces, Bosnia proper and Herzegovina, over 400,000 are Mohammedans in religion, but chiefly descendants of the Slavonic converts to Mohammedanism at the time of the conquest; so that while they are fanatical Mussulmans, they are nevertheless very hostile to the Porte. The men of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the original insurgents in the present rising against the Turkish rule in Europe. The slavery, which had lasted without mitigation for three centuries and a half, at last became unendurable, and in the summer of 1875 the revolt in Herzegovina began. For a time it attracted but little attention, although a few discerning minds perceived, as Mr. Freeman, the distinguished English historian, writes, "that now, at least, the enslaved nations had made up their minds to win their freedom or perish." The heroic struggle continued for a year and a half before hope dawned on these brave mountaineers; both the story of their heroism under Despotovitch and of the Turkish atrocities in butchering, impaling, and torturing, being kept to a large extent from the outside world.

To the eastward of Serbia, along the Black Sea, between the Danube and the Balkans, is Bulgaria, the eastern extremity of the Slavic belt of Turkey. The Christian population, chiefly Bulgarian, numbers about 1,600,000; the Mohammedans, consisting of Osmanli Turks, Tartars, Circassians, and Albanians, numbering in all perhaps 700,000. Until 1872, the Christians of this province were under the Greek Patriarch of Constanti-

nople, but were then placed, by an edict of the Turkish Government, under an independent Patriarch of their own. This was done in accordance with their own wishes, but it brought down upon them the excommunication of the Patriarch of Constantinople. In this crisis, the Greek Church of Russia interfered in their behalf, alienating in some degree the Patriarch of Constantinople, but attaching the Bulgarians firmly to itself. In sympathy with the Bosnians and Herzegovinans, the Bulgarians were driven to insurrection by the terrible cruelties of the Turkish rule. The Turk attempted the suppression of the insurrection, and hence the "Bulgarian atrocities,"—the inhuman massacre, according to Mr. Schuyler, of 15,000 men, women and children. The obscure affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to attract much attention in the outside world. Little was known of them. The Turk did his work in Bulgaria. It was this that roused the righteous indignation of Christendom in behalf of the enslaved Christians of Turkey, and brought the hosts of Russia to the rescue. Bulgaria has for months been the chief centre of the Russo-Turkish war.

To the southward of Bosnia, between it and Albania, lies little Montenegro, or the Black Mountain, in the heart of the Turkish dominions, though never a part of them. This Slavic principality of less than 2000 square miles, and less than 200,000 inhabitants—the seed of freedom planted in the mountains to keep alive its kind until God's day of deliverance should come to the Slavic belt of Turkey—has maintained its independence from the beginning against the power of the Ottoman Empire, although Midhat Pasha is represented in the London *Times* as speaking of it as a part of "his country." It was doubtless the freedom of these unconquerable and implacable foes of the Turk that inspired the Herzegovinans to seek like freedom. That the Hospodar is a firm ally of Russia, receiving from the Czar an annual pension of 9000 ducats, led to the recent tremendous effort of the Sultan to annihilate these men of the Black Mountain, and to the heroic part which they have played, and are still playing, in the Russo-Turkish conflict.

It will be seen at once that the Slavic peoples of Turkey are those who are most immediately engaged in insurrection against the Turk. They are struggling to escape from his despotic yoke.

South of the Slavic belt is the Hellenic belt, extending from the Adriatic to the Ægean, including Salonica in the centre, Albania on the west, and Constantinople, or Roumelia, on the east. The Hellenic peoples predominate in this portion of Turkey.

On the west, bordering on the Adriatic and Ionian seas, between Bosnia on the north and free Greece on the south, is Albania, the ancient Epirus. Its inhabitants, probably descended from the ancient Illyrians and Epirotes, belong to the Hellenic races as distinguished from the Slavic, and have been exposed more helplessly to Turkish despotism and barbarity than any of the Turkish provinces thus far mentioned. In sympathy with Russia in religion, they hate the Turk with perfect hatred. Notwithstanding the difference in race between the Slav and the Hellene, they have only been restrained from joining in the present war by their horror of Turkish revenge, the helplessness of their position, and the unrighteous interference of the outside nations—notably of Great Britain—against them, and in favor of the Turk.

To the eastward of Albania lies Salonica, the ancient Macedon, having a population of between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000, belonging chiefly to the Hellenic and Slavic races. To the eastward of Salonica lies the ancient Thrace, in which is chiefly situated the larger ancient metropolitan province of Roumelia, in which is Constantinople itself. The inhabitants are largely of Hellenic, Slavic, and Armenian descent. To the southward of the Hellenic belt, are Crete and the islands of the Ægean, which are also essentially Hellenic in their population. In all southern Turkey, the Greeks, Slavs, and Armenians constitute the masses of the people, and the Greek Church is the chief religion; so that this entire belt is in sympathy with the Greek and Russian rather than with the Turk. Even in the city of Constantinople, the very centre of Ottoman rule, one half of the inhabitants are Greek Christians and orthodox Armenians. It is in precisely these lands that the hand of the oppressor has been most constant and heavy, and repeated instances of Turkish barbarity, as in the massacre in Scio, in the time of the Greek struggle for independence, when 70,000 out of a total of 100,000 were butchered or sold into slavery, has developed an intense hatred of every thing Turkish.

The three chief races in this Hellenic belt are the Turks, Armenians, and Greeks. In it are found considerably over 1,000,000 out of the 1,500,000 or more Turks in European Turkey. The Armenians and Greeks, each quite as numerous, are seeking freedom from the Turk. The Armenians presented their case in a *Mémoire*, dated October, 1876, and laid before each of the great Powers of Europe. This action shows their relation to the Porte. The Hellenic peoples of Turkey, numbering almost as many as the Slavs, have also been moving in the interests of freedom so far as they have been able. Immense popular meetings have been held at Athens and other places in the interests of Hellenic freedom. At a meeting of 10,000 Greeks at the Pnyx, at Athens, the Professor of History, in the University of Athens, said : "The Slavs have risen this year, the Greeks have not." Prof. Papparrhigopoulos gives the reason :

"The Powers have made use of every means to repress the disposition of the Greeks to war, by promising that the Greek nation, which for the time refrained from complicating the situation, should at the settlement obtain the same advantages as the Slavs."

Equally, then, with the other three Christian races, the Hellenic peoples of European Turkey are against the Turk. We have thus, at the lowest figure, somewhere between 12,000,000 and 15,000,000 of the inhabitants of European Turkey who are either by birth or by religion, or by both, as well as by hatred of slavery, the enemies of the 2,000,000 Turks who are to be found in Southeastern Europe, and who are therefore but a handful as compared with the Christian races. This hasty survey makes it evident that the present is not, in the ordinary sense, a "war between Russia and Turkey." This has been very forcibly put by Mr. Freeman :

"Seven years ago, we spoke with perfect accuracy of a war between Germany and France; so we are now tempted to speak of a war between Russia and Turkey. But there is in truth no war between Russia and Turkey. The war is waged by Russia and European Turkey against the Turks. By France we mean a certain part of the earth's surface and its inhabitants; by Germany we mean another part of the earth's surface and its inhabitants. When France and Germany were at war, every inhabitant of France was on the French side, every inhabitant of Germany was on the German side. There was no fear of any Frenchmen helping the Germans or of any German helping the French.

The war was really a war between two nations. . . . But he would be grievously mistaken who should think that there is now any war between Russia and Turkey in this sense. If by Turkey, we mean the land and nations which are under the Turkish power, such as Bulgaria, Roumania, and the still enslaved parts of Greece, those lands and their inhabitants are not at war with the Russian; they are at war with the Turk. They welcome Russian aid to free their country from the Turkish intruder. Those who have read the account of the entrance of the deliverer into Tirnova will hardly believe that the people of Turkey look on the Russians as enemies."

It will also be observed that the Christian inhabitants of European Turkey have risen against the Turk wherever insurrection has been possible, and that the Mohammedans where native to the soil, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are passively hostile to the Turk. The struggle may therefore be described as one between Russia and the non-Turkish peoples of European Turkey on the one hand, and the Turk on the other. It is, as Professor Goldwin Smith regards it, a war of races, of political and social principles, rather than of religions.

The elements entering into the Eastern problem are thus seen to be very various, and the question a complicated one. The non-Turkish peoples, the Turks, the Russians, Christian Europe at large, and notably Great Britain, are all more or less interested and all have their modes of putting the question.

The Turk asserts his right to continue to play the Turk in Europe. The cardinal thing with him is, How may the Turkish rights be maintained over the non-Turkish peoples?

The non-Turkish peoples, who have been driven to desperation by ages of the most terrible oppression, assert their right to freedom or, at least, to so much of freedom as is comprehended in autonomy. The one thing with them is, How shall we reach the deliverance and freedom which are our just right?

The Russian asserts above-breath his right, based upon race and religion, to protect and deliver the oppressed; the suspicious say that under-breath he asserts his own right to play the despot in the place of the Turk. The cardinal thing with him is, How shall the Russians free these oppressed and struggling brethren who appeal to them for help? or, How shall this step toward the completion of the Pan-Slavic Empire best be taken?

The Government of Great Britain openly asserts its right to

deal with the entire matter in accordance with its very peculiar views of "British interests," and it regards the interests of Turk and Christian as alike subordinate to its own ends ; while under-breath it claims the right by "manifest destiny" to Egypt and the Suez Canal, to Stamboul as its great Eastern commercial capital and centre, and to the Euphrates Valley Railway Route. The only question which the present Premier of Great Britain puts to himself is, How shall the progress of Russia be prevented and "British interests" be advanced, or the way be prepared for permanent British control in the Orient and in India ?

The advanced thought of Christendom led by Christian England, boldly asserts the right of the oppressed peoples of European Turkey to the freedom to which they aspire, and demands that the Machiavellian policy of Europe and the British Government be brought to an end, and his just deserts be meted out to the "unspeakable Turk." The question with the true Christendom is, How shall the Eastern problem be solved in accordance with the principles of humanity, morality, and Christianity ?

It is self-evident that if all these claims are to be persisted in, a solution of the Eastern question must take its place among the impossibles, and the sooner all thought of its solution is given up the better. If the Turk be right, then the non-Turkish peoples are wrong ; if the British Government be right, then Russia and the Christians of Turkey are wrong ; and *vice versa*. No adjustment is possible so long as these antagonisms prevail.

It may further be taken for granted, by all who are not blinded by "politics" or "diplomacy," that the only possible permanent settlement of the Oriental question will have to be made on the basis of absolute right and justice. The unrighteous claims put forward in behalf of the various interests involved have alone stood in the way of a righteous conclusion of the whole matter. The moment all the parties concerned are brought to just views and just policy, the hitherto insoluble problem will be solved. A consideration of the character and claims of these parties, and of the progress of events in bringing them to righteousness or in exposing the baselessness of

their unrighteous pretensions, will give a comprehensive view of the matter and make clear the recent marvellous progress toward a permanent adjustment. Such a consideration will make it abundantly plain, that although the problem may appear insoluble to the diplomatists who think they have it well in hand, Divine Providence—in these later years manifestly so independent of the diplomatists—is pushing the matter inevitably to the right conclusion.

THE TURK AND HIS RIGHTS.

The Turk asserts his right to continue to play the Turk in Europe. If he be justly entitled to this, then it follows that the changes for the better in South-eastern Europe, which philanthropists and Christians supremely desire, must bide the will of the Sublime Porte and be reached in that manner alone.

1. It will be found by careful examination that the Turk has not won a permanent place in Europe by heroic character or superior civilization.

Certain writers in the present age have made the Turk and the Mohammedan civilization their fetich. They would have men believe the Turk every way superior to the Greek race which it conquered, and his civilization every way in advance of the Greek culture which it supplanted. Mr. Buckle writes,¹ "Mohammed, the greatest man Asia has ever produced," and assures us in the same breath that "every one acquainted with the progress of civilization will allow that no small share of it is due to those gleams of light which, in the midst of surrounding darkness, shot from the great centres of Cordova and Bagdad." Mr. Draper goes even further and calls the rise of Islamism the "Southern Reformation," and claims² for it the preservation of the truth of the one God, which Christendom had lost, and the leadership in scientific progress. Even a moderate knowledge of history would have taught any one of ordinary discernment, that, in the language of Professor Flint, "although the Mohammedan was a powerful and in many respects admirable movement, it yet involved no great original idea, the religion

¹ "History of European Civilization," vol. i. p. 725-6.

² "History of the Conflict between Religion and Science."

which it contained and diffused being drawn from Jewish, and the scientific truth from Greek sources.¹ Whewell and Renan agree that the contributions of even the Arabian schools to science were insignificant, while to philosophy they added nothing.

But whatever may be true of Mohammedanism in general or of the Arab in particular, the unquestionable verdict of all history must still be, that the Ottoman Turk, with whom we have to do in the Eastern question, has been from the beginning the enemy not only of Christianity but of all true civilization as well.

History stamps the original Turk as brutal, sensual, savage, deceitful at the core of his nature, reckless in physical courage, a born robber and tyrant. The Arab will tell you : " Avoid the Tartar if you can ; he will either eat you in his love or hack you to pieces in his hate.

His religion has not improved him ; rather it has developed the worst parts of his nature. Mohammedanism at the best, as Neander has shown, suppresses wholly the sense of relationship and communion with God, and so prevents the developments which are the glory of a Christian civilization. The marvellous pictures, given in these days, of the devout communion of the Mussulman with God, are the merest fancy sketches. He has no sense whatever of the presence of God. Major Osborn, who confirms this fact, shows that there is no possible element of progress in Islam. Add to this the fact of the divine sanction it gives to the darker and lower passions of man's nature, and its degrading character, even at the best, becomes manifest. It *must* brutalize man.

But the Turk has not had Mohammedanism at its best. He has always followed the system of Abou Hanifa, the second of the four great orthodox Imams or founders of schools of doctrine. It is the Mohammedan Jesuitism. Hanifa's system was reached by deduction from the Koran, and was intended to meet the exigencies arising from the lax morality of Koufa, a commercial city. It assumes that whatever can be deduced from the Koran is true. There is a verse in the second Sura of the

¹ " The Philosophy of History," vol. i. p. 91.

Koran which says : " God has created the whole earth for *you*." That text, say the Hanifite jurists, is a deed which annuls all other rights of property. The "*you*" means, of course, the true believers. He then classifies the whole earth under three heads : 1. Land which never had an owner. 2. Land which had an owner, and has been abandoned. 3. *The persons and the property of the Infidels*. From this third division the same legist deduces the legitimacy of slavery, piracy, and a state of perpetual war between the Faithful and the unbelieving world. These are all methods whereby the Moslem enters into the possession of his God-given inheritance.

It must be remembered that it is this doctrine—the further legitimate developments of which it is easy to anticipate—and not the Koran, pure and simple, nor even the higher teachings of the Imams, Malek, As Shafi, and Abu Hanbal, that has moulded the Ottoman in his fanaticism, sensuality, and despotic and heartless cruelty. Mr. Gladstone has, accordingly, called attention to the fact, that the present difficulty in the East is not a question of Mohammedanism, pure and simple, but of Mohammedanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race. He might have gone further, and pronounced it a question of the worst form of Mohammedanism compounded with the peculiar character of a very bad race.

The Turk of the present day is, therefore, a strangely mixed being—in blood, Turanian ; in religion, Semitic ; in surroundings, Indo-European ; immovable amidst changes, uncivilized in the midst of civilization ; feared and disliked by all men ; forced in his official capacity, and in his exterior, now to Gallicize, now to Anglicize, and now even to Russianize himself—in short, the Jesuit of Islam.

Says Professor Goldwin Smith :¹

" Considering that they have been four centuries settled in Europe and in contact with European civilization, their history may safely be said to be without a parallel as a prolonged and unchanging exhibition of the vices of barbarism, and, above all, of barbarian cruelty. A fiend, the Turk, when his fanatical and tyrannical passions were excited, has always been, and he has always been a valiant fiend. The Ottomans who added some of the most

¹ " Contemporary Review," Nov., 1877, p. 1065.

hideous pages to the sickening annals of massacre and torture, were just as conspicuous for physical courage as those for whom our respect is now claimed on that account."

It requires not only a most sublime independence of historic records, but also a most peculiar definition of "the fittest," to enable one to see in the success of the Turk an illustration of "the survival of the fittest." There were other and better reasons for the fall of the Eastern Empire. The Greek was a civilized man, and not a barbarian, finding his ideal of manhood in Christ, and Constantine, and Chrysostom, and the martyrs for the faith, rather than in Mohammed, and Bajazet, and the Janizaries. Although he had heroically defended himself for almost a thousand years against the hordes of Islam, he had never taken naturally to war and conquest. When the fall of Constantinople drew near, his military power had been weakened by ages of struggle against adverse circumstances and hostile influences. The capture and sack of the city by the Crusaders, in 1204, was a terrible blow. For two centuries the Turks had harried all South-eastern Europe, carrying fire and sword to the very gates of the city, and when the hour of extremity came, political and religious jealousy led the West to decline to aid the Greeks, and to look upon their downfall with satisfaction. "Had it not been," says Dr. Pichler, the learned historian of the schism, "for the religious division of East and West, the Turks never could have established their dominion in Europe." In the light of these facts, it does not require even the imaginary Turkish quality of a sublime religious enthusiasm and devotion to account for the career of Islam in the Orient. His religion, a blind fanaticism based upon fatalism and selfishness; a bloody spirit of conquest, growing out of the belief that the world was made for his exclusive use and benefit; a sublime impudence and intolerance, or, as some one by euphemism has called it, a "magnificent insolence," arising out of the teaching of the Hanifites, that he alone was the man of Allah, who hates all other men, and commands the true believer to hate them; an insatiable lust, finding its motive and development in the sensuality which the Koran makes a chief element of earth and heaven—these, added to the natural Turk, made him a fiend whenever his passions were roused. All this

has been true of him from the day when Orkhan established his throne in Brusa, early in the fourteenth century, named the gate of his palace the Sublime Porte, and founded the Janizaries, down to the last of the recent outrages, the echo of which is still in the ears of all the world.

Nor need so much admiration be wasted upon the power of the Turk in keeping his hold upon the empire he conquered. The "miserable Byzantines" held Constantinople against all the warlike forces of barbarism for a thousand years; what marvel if the warlike barbarian holds it against his unwarlike neighbors—thoroughly cowed by the horrors of Ottoman tyranny, robbery, butchery, and sensuality—for almost half as long? But history warrants the absolute denial of the statement that the Turk has, by his military prowess, maintained his old place in Europe for these four centuries. Even with all the advantages of his impregnable position, of the finest commercial capital on the globe, and with all the prestige of military success, he maintained his military supremacy in Europe for only about two centuries. It ended with the disastrous defeat by the heroic Polish leader, John Sobieski, before the walls of Vienna, in 1683. Concerning it, Schlosser writes:¹

"A comparatively new relation between the Christian Powers and the Empire of the Osmons resulted from the last victories of the Austrians, and from the complete exclusion of the Turks from Hungary and Transylvania. After the last siege of Vienna, the Turks had completely lost the military importance which they previously possessed; for that reason they became, what they have since remained, a political machine, which may be used against Austria or the waxing power of the Russians."

So that Turkey has held the anomalous place it now holds, as a broken and dependent power, for almost two centuries. The Turkish power, from its very nature, went into decline when its extended conquests and butcheries were brought to a stand-still. To use Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's phrase, Turkey has been on an incline plane moving downward from that day to the present. Everybody knows that Islam has kept its place in Stamboul for the last fifty years, not because the followers of the prophet have been so heroic and noble, but be-

¹ "History of the Eighteenth Century," vol. iii. p. 6.

cause the principles and policy of the European governments have been so utterly base. History ruthlessly puts this illusive conception of the "noble Turk" along with that of the "noble savage."

2. Nor did the Turk win a right to a permanent place in European Turkey by any event in his career for the first four centuries, or till the Crimean War.

While history reveals the defects of the Eastern Empire, it gives it a unique place in the world, the place of the only Christian nation worth the saving, when the Old World went down before barbarian invasion in the fifth century. The advantages of the position of Byzantium, which had attracted the attention of Polybius long before Constantine, mark it as "the one spot of the Old World best fitted to be the capital of an universal empire." But when the dream of universal empire had passed away before the barbarian, there was still needed such a convenient and impregnable centre for the preservation of the treasures of learning and Christianity through the long and stormy period of the Dark Ages. Constantine himself began the work of gathering in the treasures which, for the world's sake, needed to be saved, and when the power and tradition of the Papacy had reached their height, it remained, with its Greek Scriptures, the forlorn hope of the world—the one spot from which light might possibly irradiate the thick darkness fast becoming universal.¹ Says Gibbon :

"The ecclesiastics presided over the education of the youth; the schools of philosophy and eloquence were perpetuated till the fall of the empire; and it may be affirmed that more books and more knowledge were included within the walls of Constantinople than could be dispersed over the extensive countries of the West."

To the careless eye, the fall of Constantinople seemed what the Turk meant it to be, the death of Christian hope. It seemed the fall of Christendom before Islam. It was in reality one of those wonderful providences by which all human purposes and diplomacy are set at naught and the grandest results attained. It scattered the Greek Scriptures and Greek

¹ Gibbon, "Decline and Fall," etc., vol. vi., *passim*; and Phillip Smith, "Ancient History," vol. iii.

learning over all Western Europe. When the Turk sat down in the gateway to the East, India, the old source of wealth, was no longer accessible to the western nations by the way of the Bosphorus and the caravan route across the desert and down the valley of the Euphrates. The search for a new route at once began. The ship took the place of the caravan, the ocean of the desert route. In a half century, more or less, the great voyagers, Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and Magellan, had done, in spite of the Turk, their work of opening all the globe with its wealth, wheeling Western Europe to the front of the world, and bringing in the modern era of enterprise and commerce.

The cause of the great revolution, therefore, let it be distinctly understood, was not "the light that shot from Cordova and Bagdad," but the light scattered from the burning city of the Constantines, at no less a price than the untold sufferings of a noble race conquered and enslaved after the most heroic struggle of history, continued through a thousand years.

These vast changes can be set down to the score of the Turk only as redemption can be put to the credit of Lucifer. To him must rather be set down the system of slavery, robbery, and butchery which he introduced and has perpetuated in South-eastern Europe.

The past history of Turkish oppression, with its full horrors, will never be written out. Slavs, Roumanians, Armenians, Hellenes, have all alike felt these horrors: the last and noblest no doubt most deeply. A few facts from the story of the enslaving of this race, and from the general history of the Turkish rule, will be sufficient to give some faint conception of the boundless range of such facts which cannot be told.

There is a saying reported of the Prophet, that "if God valued the world at the wing of a fly, he would not allow **an** unbeliever to obtain so much as a drink of water from it."¹ Even this contempt, as different as possible from what we understand by toleration, has sometimes given the races subject to Islam, in times of peace, some of the advantages of toleration; but it has always, when Moslem greed and lust have been excited, made the non-Mohammedan races liable to be

¹ Osborn, "Mohammedan Law."

savagely slaughtered. The Christians in Turkey have seen chiefly the latter aspect of this contempt.

Mohammed II. began with an apparent toleration, but Gibbon tells us that "the scene was soon changed ; and before his departure the hippodrome streamed with the blood of his noblest captives." With what Mr. Gladstone calls "far-sighted cruelty," the leaders, the aristocracy of the Greek lands, were completely swept away. To the so-called taxation, amounting to robbery, there was added the still more terrible exaction of the "children-tribute," the debasing effects of which are not yet effaced. Robbery and piracy were pushed everywhere by land and by sea, property and life were everywhere insecure, and at times the coasts of Greece became uninhabitable. The chastity of women, from the princess to the peasant, was often the price of life. The creation of the Phanariots and the career of the Janizaries give hints of what was done to degrade and destroy. The absolute master and tyrant made himself felt everywhere, down through the four centuries, in every form of oppression which Turkish cruelty could invent.

It would be impossible to enumerate the brutal butcheries with which the Moslems have visited, and are at all times liable to visit, the Christians over the empire. Going back of the more recent transactions in Bosnia and Bulgaria, the deliberate attempt to assassinate every leading Servian, in the efforts to suppress the insurrections under Black George and Milosch, and the depopulation of beautiful Scio, are but specimens of what the Turk has always been finding occasion to do, and of what Christian Europe, under the old diplomacy, permitted him to do almost without protest down to the time of the Treaty of Paris.

But it would be an injustice to two men who rose above the Turkish ideas, if not above the Turkish character, to pass unnoticed the attempts made by Selim III. and Mahmood II. to introduce military, social, and civil reforms into the empire. The alliance between Solyman the Magnificent and Francis the First of France was the first in a series of concessions which Viscount de Redcliffe well says "may fitly be called *extra-Koranic*, and which were gradually made to the necessity more

and more felt by the Porte of obtaining a less insulated position as to the States of Christendom."¹ Toward the close of the last century, Selim III. commenced, in the same spirit, the work of internal reform. The attempt roused the fanaticism of the Moslems, and cost Selim his throne and his life.

Mahmood II., at a later period, took up the work of Selim. It was a struggle of the prince of Turkish butchers, almost single-handed, with the fiercest and widest outbursts of fanaticism. It really shattered and dismembered the Empire, which was only prevented from falling to pieces immediately by the interference of Russia. Mahmood strangled or threw into the Bosphorus the family of his predecessor, butchered the Janizaries, opened diplomatic intercourse with the Christian nations, attempted the reorganization of the army and the courts, and other improvements. The proclamation of *Gulhané* and the introduction of extensive reforms under the name of *Tanzimat-kairich* in 1839, the year of his death, gave earnest of his determined purpose. But it was all contrary to the spirit of the Turk and the Koran, and the old Turk in his fanaticism proved too strong for the young Turk in his ambition. Something was accomplished, with the aid of a salutary fear of foreign powers, in and around Constantinople, but its cost was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and the experiment demonstrated the impossibility of the coexistence of modern progress and Turkish rule, at least without some more powerful influence from without.

History thus leads inevitably to the verdict that the Turk brought little of value with him into South-eastern Europe, that he did his best to destroy whatever of value was already there, and that in more than four centuries of oppression he has not been the source of very great good to the millions of his non-Turkish slaves. In short, his career up to the Crimean War did nothing toward winning him a just title to sovereignty.

3. The Crimean War ended with the Treaty of Paris, which organized the final experiment with the Turk in Europe. That treaty was an attempt to take the Ottoman Empire into the society of Christian nations, and to uphold its government in a last struggle for reform. The Hatt-i-Humayoun of February

¹ "The Nineteenth Century," July, 1877; article, "Turkey."

8th, 1856, was "to place all Christian sects in Turkey on a level with Mohammedans in respect to life, property, religion, etc." It was drawn up by the Allied Powers and indorsed by a protocol of all the European powers.¹ Although the Turkish minister objected to its embodiment in the treaty on the plea of sparing the dignity of the Porte, and Lord Palmerston, with the aid of his usual "diplomacy," succeeded in securing its exclusion from the body of the treaty, the Sublime Porte bound himself by the most solemn engagements to carry out its provisions. The Ottoman was to win himself a place in Europe by this last experiment. Let him be tried by the results.

The brief array of general facts, which is all that can here be presented, is drawn chiefly from the statements of Rev. Malcolm Maccoll, based partly upon his own observation in Turkey while travelling there with Canon Liddon, and partly upon British consular and parliamentary documents. The main statements are confirmed by Right Honorable W. E. Forster, the distinguished statesman and orator, and by Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, both of whom spent many years in Turkey—in fact, they receive confirmation from every source. They warrant the conclusion that the reforms have not been carried out.

The taxation has not been equalized. With the Christians, it often amounts to confiscation.

The so-called tithe is levied on all the produce of the ground. It is no longer a tithe; for when Sultan Abdul Azziz travelled in state over Europe, an extraordinary tax was laid to bear the cost of his journey, and so the tithe became and still continues to be an eighth. With the extortion, it is oftener a sixth or a seventh. The tithes are sold by the government to the highest bidder, and the competition is so keen in ordinary times that the successful bidder often pays more than the entire amount of the tax. This, of course, means extortion of the worst form for the poor rayahs. The "spahi," or tithe-farmers, instead of making a careful estimate of the produce, assess it, without examination, far beyond its value. If the rayah seeks redress, he can only appeal to the government officials who are "in league with the tithe-farmer, who is frequently nothing but a dummy behind which some influential member of

¹ Woolsey, "International Law," p. 420.

the government robs and harasses the Christian peasant." The peasant must pay the tithe not in kind but in money, and ready money must be paid down. The case of the poor man, who has not money enough at hand to meet these exactions, is pathetically described in the paper of the Herzegovinan insurgents to the Great Powers :¹

"His house will be occupied at his expense until he has paid the whole. He is bound to maintain and serve those who are quartered upon him at their imperious pleasure, and his expenses in so doing go for nothing in the account. By way of example : if a person owes twenty piastres, and spends one hundred in the maintenance of these people, it is not taken into consideration. At last an arrangement is made ; the peasant acknowledges his debt, with double interest ; or an animal is taken for fifty piastres, though it may be worth one hundred or more. Many cause the poor people of the villages to be put in prison where they suffer from hunger, cold, flogging, and other ill-treatments. Sometimes false receipts are given, and the amount of the debt has to be paid again."

This system has been extended to every thing the peasant can call his own. Besides, there is the compulsory service for the military ; the road tax ; the "rad" or labor tax of the fortieth piastre on the imaginary earnings of the rayah ; the poll-tax of 30 piastres laid upon every male Christian, from babe to beggar and from birth to death, and collected from the village for those who cannot pay for themselves. In this way, the rayah of average means pays in taxation somewhat less than 3000 piastres annually.

Nor is this all ; for in Herzegovina and Bosnia he rents his land from the aga, or Turkish proprietor, who extorts from him a fourth part of the produce obtained from the ground, besides gifts in produce and labor, which swell the amount to three times what he produces for himself. All this, it must be remembered, comes after the rayah has passed through the hands of the government and the tithe-farmer.

The rights of property and person have not been secured. A Christian peasant can hold no property in Turkey. The few who have been foolish enough to make the attempt, in reliance upon the promised reforms, have found themselves stripped of it, and helpless in the Turkish courts. Even the life of the

¹ "Parliamentary Papers, No. II.

rayah is held at the discretion of his Moslem neighbor. Resistance to a Turk is now, and has for generations been, so certain to end in assassination, that thought of resistance has almost died out of the Christian mind.

But the most cruel torture of all to which the rayah is exposed is doubtless, as Mr. Maccoll has written, "the peril to which the chastity of his female relations is daily exposed." The Ottoman system which uses sensuality as one of its most powerful motives, puts a premium upon outrages upon Christian women. All authorities agree concerning the helplessness of the Christians against such outrages to which every rayah's family is liable. Not to refer to the evidence in the consular reports on the condition of the Christians in Turkey, the recent case at Batak is sufficient for present purposes. Concerning it, Mr. Baring despatched from Philipopolis, November 24th, 1876 :

"I suggested that the act of carrying off the girls (from Batak) was in itself an illegal one; but I was told that, by Turkish law, a man could not be punished for carrying off a woman, provided he married her."

To the Christians in Turkey, the so-called courts of justice are simply "legalized instruments of oppression and torture." Theoretically, the evidence of a Christian is admissible, except before the religious tribunals; practically, it is inadmissible, in any court. If he insists in presenting it, the judge easily gets rid of it by making him repeat, and then rejecting it for the most trifling variation; or if this does not succeed, the court adjourns, and the Christian witness is followed home and denounced on some trumpery charge, and when the court meets again he is set aside as a notoriously bad character, or he is imprisoned for an hour, and then excluded from testifying; or, anywhere outside of Constantinople, his testimony is summarily set aside without even such pretexts as these; or, worse than all, the vindictive Moslem pursues him for bringing a false accusation against a true believer, and he perhaps gets the bastinado or the dagger. This is all admitted to be true, even by such advocates of the Turks as Mr. Gifford Palgrave.¹

In short, assurance comes from all quarters that the Chris-

¹ "Essays on Eastern Questions," page 85.

tians have not been accorded the rights promised them, and that the Hatt-i-Humayoun of the Sultan, published at the close of the Crimean War has been of little more avail than so much blank paper. Just in and around Constantinople, under the pressure of foreign power, some few of its provisions have sometimes been feebly carried out, but in the provinces it is a dead letter. Indeed, according to the best authorities, it has never to this day been proclaimed throughout the Turkish Empire.

The Turk has continued to play the Turk in Europe for more than twenty years, under the shadow of the Treaty of Paris, by the aid of the fiction of the Hatt-i-Humayoun. He has been relieved from the fear of insurrections and of interference from without ; and so released from those checks necessary to even good governments, and without which the peculiar vices of the Turks must inevitably reach a rank and terrible luxuriance. The Duke of Argyll very strongly presents the influence of this condition upon the Turk :¹

"And such, accordingly, we know by overwhelming evidence to have been the actual result. Twenty years of peace and of protection from external violence have seen no reform, but only a descent from one low level to another depth still lower, of personal corruption, and of corresponding administrative oppression. There has been the confessed violation of every pledge solemnly given in the face of Europe, that the Christian subjects of the Porte should be admitted to some of the commonest rights of humanity ; and this violation has gone on in the face of remonstrances, of exhortation, and of warnings perpetually renewed by one, or other, or by all of the guaranteeing and protecting powers."

Utterly bankrupt in character, the Sublime Porte has made use of the Hatt as an aid in securing from the capitalists of Western Europe vast loans, which have been squandered on armies and fleets, and in luxury and vice, instead of being used to carry out the promised reforms. Even with the addition of an extortion and cruelty in its taxation, such as no land under the sun ever before witnessed, the government at the opening of the war had already reached financial bankruptcy, and the practical repudiation of its debt of more than \$1,000,000,000.

Nor does the story of massacre for these twenty years in-

¹ "Contemporary Review," July, 1877, page 324.

dicating that the ghost of the Hatt has brought the Turk to the reign of humanity. The story of Crete, and of Lebanon and Damascus, and the atrocities in putting down the insurrection in Bosnia and Bulgaria, too fresh to need repeating, show that the Turk is essentially the same to-day as of old. Says Mr. Freeman, concerning the massacres in Bulgaria :

"His doings there were nothing new, nothing wonderful. They were simply what the Turk always does whenever he has a chance. They were what the Turk did fifty years ago in Chios and Cyprus; they were what he did in much later times at Damascus. They are what he is doing always on a smaller scale in Bulgaria, and in every other land subject to his yoke. The only real difference between the Turkish doings of 1876 and the Turkish doings of any other year, was that the doings of 1876 were done on a greater scale than any doings of the same kind that had happened for some years. There was indeed another difference, namely, that the facts were brought home to the minds of the mass of the English in a way that earlier facts of the same kind had never been brought home. The mass of Englishmen then learned, for the first time, what the Turk really was."

Mr. Gladstone brings out with great clearness and force the peculiar features of the "Bulgarian horrors," which were indicative of the contempt of the Sultan for the requirements of the Hatt-i-Humayoun :

"The essence of the case of 1876 lies, not in the massacres themselves, but in the conduct of the Porte about the massacres; the falsehood, the chicane, the mockery and perversion of justice, the denial of redress, the neglect and punishment of the good Mohammedans, and, finally, the rewards and promotions of the bad in pretty close proportion to their badness."

The "Andrassy Note," the "Berlin Memorandum," and the "Protocol" of Constantinople, were but successive stages in the progress of the European powers in reaching the verdict that the Hatt-i-Humayoun is a dead letter, and the Turk incorrigible.

In September, 1875, the insurgents of Bosnia and Herzegovina presented their document of grievances to the representatives of the Great Powers, closing with a pathetic appeal to Christian Europe. "In order to get out of this misery," they ask to be let alone by outside powers, in their struggle for freedom; or that some Christian power should give them some corner of land for a home, or that the powers should intercede with the Sultan to secure them autonomy; or that the powers

should at once occupy the principalities with a strong body of troops and secure their just rights.¹

Count Andrassy, the Austrian minister, in behalf of Austria, Germany, and Russia, thereupon published his famous "Note," declaring that the Sultan had habitually violated the solemn pledges of 1856, and demanding that the promised reforms should now be made. The Porte formally accepted the "Note," but did not even promulgate the proposed reforms.

The Turkish fanaticism and excesses increased, and on the 6th of May, 1876, a mob murdered the French and German consuls at Salonica. This was the period of the shocking barbarities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The "Berlin Memorandum" was issued by Gortschakoff, Bismarck, and Andrassy on the 11th of May. This added to the Andrassy Note the demand upon Turkey for the execution of its terms, and for proper guarantees, threatening, in case of refusal, to take such "efficacious measures as might be demanded." Great Britain declined to assent to the Memorandum, and therefore, by the terms of the Treaty of Paris, which required unanimous assent, it was of no avail. In less than a month after the course of Great Britain was known, the Bulgarian atrocities occurred, which thoroughly roused the humanity and conscience of all Europe. The Turkish Government, which sent Achmed Agha and his fellows on this work of slaughtering many thousands of the almost defenceless peoples, decorated them for their achievements, and thus cast its defiance in the face of the Great Powers.

The Conference of European Powers met December 20th, 1876, in Constantinople, inviting Turkey to sit with them, and after a month of deliberation united in the "Protocol," presenting substantially the same terms as the Andrassy Note and Berlin Memorandum. It did not, however, make the demand emphatic, and was rejected on the 20th January, 1877, two days after it had been presented to the Porte, who, however lavish of promises, declined all performances and all guarantees. The Turk would do nothing unless forced by foreign armies. The Conference, too much under the influence of the old "diplomacy," and distracted by too many jealousies to agree upon an effective armed intervention, adjourned, leav-

¹ "Parliamentary Papers," No. 11, pp. 30-40.

ing the helpless Christians to their fate, and the "incorrigible Turk" to his own will.

To say the least, that adjournment was the solemn judgment of the Powers, that the Porte ought no longer to be upheld in his course in Europe, and their solemn verdict that the experiment of the Hatt-i-Humayoun was an absolute failure. In the eyes of Europe and the world, the mission of the Turk, as a ruler over Christians, has come to an end. Almost fifty years ago, immediately after the treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, the Duke of Wellington, "the statesman-warrior," said :

"There is no doubt it would have been more fortunate and better for the world if the treaty of Adrianople had not been signed, and if the Russians had entered Constantinople, and if the Turkish Empire had been dissolved."

The lapse of the half century has made that the judgment of Europe, and removed one great obstacle to the settlement of the Eastern question. The Ottoman's claim to the sovereignty over the twelve or fifteen millions Christians of Europe has no just basis in his character, in his past career, or in his present performances or promises. If it comes to the matter of debt, Europe *owes* to the great *robber* and *butcher* of the world, the "incorrigible Turk," nothing but a hempen cord, with a short shrift and a deep grave.

THE CHRISTIANS AND THEIR RIGHTS.

The Christian "slaves" (such the Andrassy Note declares and shows them to be) of the Sublime Porte affirm their right to freedom. The answer to the Eastern question, in their view, is to be found in the answer to the question, How shall we secure our just right to freedom? If this be the Christian's just right, it is certain that it were better that the Ottoman Empire, or even the heavens, should fall rather than that it should be denied him.

Before the question of right is taken up, certain allegations, made to break the force of the claim presented by the Christian, must be met and disposed of.

The brief survey of the four Christian races of European Turkey, with which this review opens, has shown that they are all

apparently at one in their view of the matter. It is alleged, however, that this is only *apparent*, and that there is really a very great diversity of sentiment concerning the present issues among the non-Turkish peoples, and that even in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Great efforts have been made in the interests of Moslem misrule to spread abroad this statement. It was necessary to impress Europe with the idea that orthodox Christians and Turks were united under the Porte in putting down the insurrections. A band of orthodox Christians was accordingly "swept from the slums of Stamboul," and marched out, under "a flag on which the Crescent and the Cross were displayed side by side," to fight in the "sacred cause." On the way, the Bashi-Bazouks fell upon them and slaughtered or dispersed them. It was important to show that the Roman Catholics of Turkey were with the Porte in his efforts to put down rebellion. A sham address to the Porte from the Catholics of Bosnia was prepared by the Turkish authorities. Bishop Strossmeyer, whose diocese extends over Bosnia, told Canon Liddon and Mr. Maccoll that the Roman Catholics of Bosnia were no more represented by it than were the orthodox Christians by "that famous band of warriors swept from the slums of Stamboul." The butcheries in Lebanon showed the Roman Catholics the love the Turk bears toward them, and no class of men more ardently desire the spread and final success of the insurrection than the Roman Catholics in Bosnia. There is, in fact, practically a moral unanimity, as Mr. Maccoll shows, on the part of the Christians of all names, in the present struggle for freedom. It must be especially noted that the Crimean War made an entire revolution in the sentiment of the Slavic peoples of Turkey, leading them to turn toward Russia as their prospective deliverer.

It is also asserted by some that the rising in Turkey has less claim upon the sympathies of the world from the assumed fact that it was not spontaneous. Russian intrigue and Slavonic societies are appealed to as the springs of the insurrection. We confess to but little faith in the marvellous stories of the agitators, who publish so many volumes of "secret despatches," which to them are such open secrets. Why seek for some hidden cause when there is a sufficient cause, open and confessed,

just at hand? The Turkish Government itself admits that the insurrection is traceable "to the unseemly conduct" of its own "functionaries," and that the insurgents have substantial cause of complaint.¹ Why is all Christian Turkey ablaze with the thought of freedom? It assuredly takes more than outside influences to beget revolutions. The case is put strongly by Mr. Forster, in his Bradford speech. There is cause sufficient in the confessed oppression of the Turk. These poor people have been driven to desperation, and they feel that in the unfoldings of Providence their hour has come, and, whether by Russian intrigue or by Slavonic societies, or by the help of the strong arm of Russia, all may say heartily, God help the oppressed!

There are still others who admit all the horrors of Turkish slavery, but who can find no substitute for the Turk. Educate him and retain him as ruler. It will be better for the interests of Christian missions and of humanity. It is not too much to say that the education hypothesis has already been tried with the Mohammedans in India, and in much more favorable circumstances than could be found in Turkey. The Mohammedan college, founded by Warren Hastings, has been one of the worst of engines in developing bigotry and fanaticism.

The venerable Dr. Hamlin said, some time since, "Let Turkey stand, that Islam may fall." Before the war opened, the American missionaries were often quoted as favoring Turkey. They said, "Take Turkey in hand, compel her to be just, or, if need be, dismember her; but in no event suffer Russia to come in and rule her and us." One missionary is represented as saying, "The coming in of Russia would be like a return of the glacial epoch." The missionaries naturally have somewhat Turkish ideas of Russia. Moreover, they would preserve the Turk for the sake of missions. Dr. Henry M. Field gives a somewhat different view of the Christian opinion in Constantinople. The most intelligent men he met, missionaries, foreign merchants and bankers, resident for many years in the Turkish capital, were unanimous in their despair of Turkey under the rule of the Turk. But whatever may be the opinions of men other than the sufferers themselves, the respon-

¹ "Parliamentary Papers," No. II, pp. 17, 56, 64.

sibility of keeping from 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 of Christians in such slavery, or in some mitigated form of it, even for so high an end as that of Christian missions, would be a most weighty one, involving a somewhat questionable application of the principle of doing evil that good may come. The Duke of Argyll doubtless comes very near the heart of the matter when he says, "The simple truth is, that any change must be better for Turkey." He points to the fact that the revolted and independent States that have found a substitute for the Turk "are as the promised land—to which all eyes are turned by the Christian subjects of the Porte."

These preferred claims in behalf of the Ottoman must all inevitably go down before the terrible indictment based upon the facts of oppression already presented. It must be manifest to every intelligent man, whose thinking is controlled by Christian principles, that the demands of these races of European Turkey for freedom can be denied only on the old theory of the divine right of despots. The bill of rights which they are entitled to present to the Turk and the world is a most extended one, having, to say the least, ten thousand times greater force than that which the American people drew up and vindicated against Great Britain.

It is obvious that a Christian morality cannot but adjudge to them the right to freedom. Obedience is to be rendered to the State as to God. The limit is reached when the ruler perverts the ends of government and frustrates the very design of the State. This the Porte has unquestionably done. The State was designed by the moral governor chiefly to widen man's sphere of social effort and insure freedom and security in that sphere. It is manifestly seen that the Turk has made his empire the very opposite of all this to nine tenths of its people. He has proclaimed and executed as law what God has not proclaimed. He has habitually gone further, and forced his Christian subjects to do what God has positively forbidden. He has deprived them of all their most precious rights, and has thus attempted to stamp out their manhood. With these oppressed peoples, the question of freedom has ceased to be a question of right, and has simply become a question of method. What is the right method for the Christian to take? Shall he refuse to

obey, and, standing in this place, take the consequences? There is something of manliness in such a course ; but the consequences of the refusal of the rayah to obey when the sensual Turk demands his daughter, or sister, or even his wife for his harem, may include death. Anywhere else than in Turkey he might try passive resistance while agitating the question at issue and seeking by constitutional or legal methods to change the unjust laws or constitution ; but in Turkey, agitation is death, and there are no constitutional or legal methods of accomplishing such results. The last resort is open resistance, rebellion, revolution. It is self-evident that revolution is justifiable where the wrong and injustice on the part of the civil authority amount to the permanent subversion of the great ends for which the State exists. Where national oppression, and injustice, and corruption usurp the place of freedom, and justice, and purity, and where the true national mission is made impossible by the inefficiency or moral worthlessness and baseness of the existing government, it may become the most sacred duty of the citizens toward themselves, mankind, and God, to overthrow that government and build the State anew upon the foundations of right, justice, and truth. The Christian races have already reached that point ; for the Turk has filled up the full measure of his iniquity.

International law clearly accords to these Christians the right to deliverance and freedom. They appeal to the powers of Europe for help. Even Machiavelli teaches that cruelty may be well or ill applied,—and that when it is ill applied and shows a tendency to repeat itself and to increase rather than diminish with time, a State which practises it cannot continue to live.¹ Was cruelty ever worse applied, or more habitually or longer persisted in? Does not even Machiavelli teach that it is high time for the Turk to die, if need be, and this enslaved people to rise to life and freedom? It is a plain principle of international law that States may interfere in another State “in extreme and outrageous cases,” or where “some extraordinary state of things is brought about by the crime of a government against its subjects.” And, moreover, every State is bound to aid in maintaining justice in such cases. Is not the

¹ “*Il Principe*,” c. viii.

most extreme and outrageous case in history found in the Turkey of to-day : a most extraordinary state of things, brought about by the crime of the government? A corresponding obligation to help rests upon the nations to whom appeal is made. The Duke of Argyll, speaking in behalf of an elevated morality and of British Christianity, has pointedly and convincingly presented the minimum and maximum of British duty :¹

"It is now the solemn duty of the British nation, as a great war has arisen mainly out of their inaction, to see that, through mistaken ideas of self-interest, their government does not interfere to prevent the population of Turkey from deriving whatever benefit may arise to them from it. This is the minimum of duty. I should say more. It is our duty to do our best to make those benefits as large and as secure as possible. . . . But when the time comes, it ought to be remembered that no arrangement can be final, no arrangement can be lasting, for such ordinary length of time as human policy can hold within its grasp, which places any great or even inconsiderable people under restrictions incompatible with the natural and peaceful development of their industry and wealth, or incompatible with the due influence which may belong to these in the general politics of Europe. And that is doubtless the duty of Christian Europe."

The final crisis in the sham experiment of the Hatt-i-Humayoun brought all Europe to understand the sufferings of these Christians, to comprehend the helplessness of their case under the continued rule of the Ottoman, and to recognize their rights in their struggle for freedom. In removing the prevalent blindness, and ignorance, and indifference, it has already put out of the way what has hitherto been one of the chief obstacles in the way of any final disposition of the Eastern question. The non-Turkish people of European Turkey may be fairly said to have made good their view of the Eastern question. It is primarily a question of their *deliverance*, and every other just interest of humanity is bound up in that ; for doubtless their cry has reached the ear of the God of Sabaoth.

THE RUSSIAN AND HIS PURPOSES.

Russia, at present the prominent figure in the Eastern struggle, claims to act the part of the deliverer of these enslaved people. When Europe, largely through the influence of

¹ "Contemporary Review," July, 1877, pp. 332-3.

the British Government, decided to leave them to the tender mercies of the Turk, Russia single-handed took up their cause, and, aiming at the maximum of international obligation, has already spent the first campaign in furthering it. The Eastern question presents a new phase in her case. Is the cardinal thing with her, How shall the Russians free these oppressed and suffering brethren who appeal to them for help? or, How shall this great step toward the completion of the Pan-Slavic empire best be taken? or, Are the two indissolubly linked together? What, in short, are the purposes and rights of Russia? These questions can only be answered in the light of present Russian character, ideas, and conduct.

The Russian has been described as a dual character—half European and half Asiatic. The representative Russians, the Slavs—about 65,000,000 of the 78,000,000 in European Russia, by the recent census, are Slavs—belong to the Indo-European family, and came from the wilds of Scythia. The name *Russ*, Hebrew *Rosh*, unfortunately mistranslated in the English version "the chief Prince," first appears in Ezekiel xxxviii: 2, 3, and xxxix: 1, and is the only name of a modern nation found in the Old Testament.¹ The Slavs first made their appearance in European history, in the neighborhood of the Carpathian Mountains, in the fourth century, and from that point spread northward to the Baltic and southward to the Adriatic.²

Western notions of the Russian people are chiefly derived from pen-pictures of the fierce Cossack, and are as representative of Russian character as the Texan cut-throat of American. Mr. M. E. Grant Duff asserts that "the inhabitants of Great Russia, the nucleus of the empire, are the most naturally pacific of mankind. In this all authorities agree. Some are inclined to add to the Russia of the new *régime* the despotic ideas of the old; but Russia has been renewing her youth. Herzen, the Russian wit, brought out the striking change and contrast when he asked the English why, because they were hostile to the *old bear*, the Russia of Nicholas, they should be hostile to the *young bear*, the new Russia, which Nicholas hated more heartily than he hated the English.

¹ Dean Stanley, "History of the Eastern Church," p. 397.

² Max Müller, "Science of Language." First series, p. 196.

The Crimean War proved the regeneration of Russia. It is true that none of the diplomatists or sovereigns understood it in that light. It was one of the independent moves of Providence without the advice or consent of man. Czar Nicholas entered into the war by making an unjust demand upon the Turk for the extradition of refugees, and his misfortunes brought him to his grave a year before its close. Alexander II. ascended the throne, March 2d, 1855, only six months before the fall of Sebastopol, which completed the shattering of his army and the annihilation of his navy in the Black Sea. A year brought the Treaty of Paris, which left himself and his country humiliated and bound by most unjust and oppressive restrictions. He seems to have taken in the situation with the eye of a great statesman, and he began at once the series of radical and comprehensive changes which have transformed the old Russia into the new. On the day of his coronation he ordered four translations of the Bible, by the four Universities, into modern Russ, for his people; just six years later, in 1861, he emancipated the serfs; in 1864, he reconstructed the entire judicial system of all the Russias; in 1870, he threw off the chains with which the Treaty of Paris had unjustly fettered his people, and began the reconstruction of the army and navy; in 1877, in response to their appeal and the generous uprising of the Russian people, he began the present war for the deliverance of the Christians of South-eastern Europe. It will be seen at a glance that his watchword is *progress*. It is obvious that Russia was in the past the representative despotism, the soul of the Holy Alliance in the reactionary movement against European freedom. Alexander the Liberator has undertaken to bring his country into a new position by a great liberal movement. He is taking advantage of the remarkable fact, confirmed for us by Mr. Wallace and other authorities, that the Russian people are the most democratic people in the world,—and is establishing upon it the government. An administrator of the new levelling school in Russia is said to have declared that his wish was to build “a tower upon a steppe”—that is, he desired to see the Imperial Power rising out of a vast democracy.

The Czar has made serf-emancipation the basis of his new

movement. On the morning of the 3d of March, 1861,—the day preceding the inauguration of President Lincoln, and a year and a half before his famous “Emancipation Proclamation,”—there were in Russia, chiefly in European Russia, twenty-two and a half millions of ordinary serfs. At evening of that day, to be forever memorable in the annals of freedom, the whole of that vast population had ceased to be serfs, and had become free. Not only were they free, but the government had clothed the old *mir*, or communal organization, with administrative functions, had provided for the pecuniary indemnity of the *boyar*, or master, and had opened the way for each *moujik*, or freed serf, to become at once a landed proprietor of from 5 to 25 acres, by furnishing him the money, to be returned in forty-nine annual payments. According to Mr. Wallace, who has given the best account of this whole transaction, the work has made good progress—5,300,000 male peasants having already availed themselves of this method of securing lands: upward of 50,000,000 acres having passed into their hands, and the government advances having already aggregated more than \$500,000,000. It must be remembered, too, before the full grandeur of the movement can be understood, that there were 20,000,000 more living upon the government lands, in very much the same condition as the serf; so that it was an effort to lift up more than 40,000,000 of the population to a higher plane of freedom and manhood.

In 1864 an entirely new judicial system was set in operation, formed partly on English but chiefly on French models, and even introducing trial by jury in criminal cases. Mr. Wallace, in spite of his evolution sympathies, reports the workings of the new system to be decidedly satisfactory. It is the chief co-operative agency in securing the ultimate full benefits of serf-emancipation.

Of course no one who has studied history and read human nature—especially in connection with emancipation in this country—will for one moment suppose that this great movement—the most enlightened and liberal as well as the grandest ever attempted by any monarch—has at once transformed Russia into a paradise; but eye-witnesses such as Mr. Wallace, Mr. Duff, and gentlemen like Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Freeman, and

Mr. Goldwin Smith, who look upon it with the eye of the statesman and historian, agree in representing the results, even after this short lapse of time, as very great and beneficent, and the prospects for the future as most encouraging.

One of the grandest present results is that a new national spirit has taken possession of the people. Mr. Freeman sees in the present war "emphatically the war of the people." There are those who see in it only the outcome of the Plan-Slavic idea, the expression of the consciousness of Russia of her mission to unite all the Slavonian peoples into one mighty empire. This is one of the bugbears made use of in Western Europe against Russia. Mr. Duff thinks that it may be said of the radical Slavophiles, as was said of themselves by one of the ablest of the English positivists, that they are a stage army, which, marching round and round, appears in consequence to be much more numerous than it really is.

Co-operating with the national is the religious idea. No other great nation is so united in any form of religion as Russia in the Greek Church. The authorities already referred to agree in representing it as a source of national strength and unity in various ways : that it has had something to do with the gentleness and docility which are so characteristic of a large portion of the Russian people ; that the connection of Church and State enormously strengthens the latter for all internal purposes ; that the old ecclesiastical connection with Constantinople, and the instinctive hostility to those who now hold that city, are a powerful support of the State in the present war. But travellers generally agree in representing the "vast majority of the Russian clergy as very little above the peasantry amongst which they live," and give a very sombre view of the state of religion and education. But turning from the ordinary travellers, often themselves irreligious and seldom seeing beyond the merest surface of things, we find great regenerating forces at work transforming the people of Russia.

Passing over the reforms by Nikon, including the revival of preaching, and the transfer of the supreme control of spiritual and ecclesiastical affairs to the Holy Synod by Peter the Great, with the resulting modifications, we are assured¹ by most ex-

¹ "Church History," vol. ii. p. 403.

cellent authority, Dr. Kurtz, Professor of Church History in the University of Dorpat, that :

"The orthodox Church in modern times has elevated itself more and more, especially since Alexander I. Theological learning was not rare among the higher clergy, and the government also provided for the better intellectual culture of the lower clergy."

Dean Stanley, referring to those "who look on the Oriental Church merely as the dead trunk, from which all sap and life have departed, fit only to be cut down," calls attention to the fact that "it is also the aged tree, beneath whose shade the rest of Christendom has sprung up," whose "roots have struck too widely and deeply in its native soil" to give place to any other form of religion. He adds :¹

"We may reflect with satisfaction that should ever the hour come for the reawakening of the churches of the East, there is no infallible pontiff at Constantinople, no hierarchy separated from the domestic charities of life, to prevent the religious and social elements from amalgamating into one harmonious whole. We may gratefully remember that there is a theology in the world of which the free, genial mind of Chrysostom is still the golden mouthpiece; a theology in which scholastic philosophy has had absolutely no part. . . . But there is a future also for the Church of the East. . . . The Eastern Christian has the rare gift of an ancient orthodox belief without intolerance and without proselytism. . . . The Greek race may yet hand back from Europe to Asia the light which, in former days, it handed on from Asia to Europe. The Slavonic race may yet impart by the Volga or the Caspian the civilization which it has itself received by the Neva and the Baltic."

He also calls attention to the admirable elements in the very structure of the Greek Church which prepare it for a wonderful development; that the nation was converted not through the work of the missionary but by the agency of its own Prince, and that the clergy have always lived in comparative poverty, dependent on the free offerings of their flocks; that the Russian establishment is a combination—difficult for the Western mind to understand—of the strictest form of State religion with the widest application of the voluntary principle; and that the Scriptures in the vernacular have always been accessible.² Mr. Gladstone has pointed out the connection of the popular services of the Eastern Church, rich in Scripture, with the preser-

¹ "History of the Eastern Church," pp. 137-9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 414-16.

vation of what life remained in the Greek Church in Turkey, and the awakening of the Greeks to new life. The same influences are at work in Russia.

The charge has been repeatedly brought against the Greek Church, that, like Rome, it is an intolerant and persecuting Church. It is not well grounded. Dean Stanley emphasizes its tolerance. Mr. Duff partly admits it, but directs attention to the so-called persecutions in Poland proper and in the western provinces of Russia, and narrates a case, which occurred in 1865, in which a Russian lady of high character "asked, and asked in vain, to be allowed to return to St. Petersburg for the purpose of assisting, in her capacity of sister of charity, to nurse the sick during the outburst of cholera which took place in that year." It is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Wallace has shown, that the Russian religion is intensely national, that it expects every Russian to be orthodox; but it is true also that Mohammedans, Protestants, and other dissidents from the orthodox faith, live in the country without molestation, and serve in the armies of the Czar. The so-called propagandism in the Baltic provinces and the persecutions in Poland were for the purpose of political assimilation rather than of spiritual conversion. The hostility to the Romish Church has been, like that in Germany, hostility to Jesuitism for self-preservation. So the Duke of Argyll shows. Concerning the insurrection in Poland in 1863-4, and the Russian cruelties in connection with it, it may be said in mitigation, if not in defence, that the vast majority of the Poles were, by the concession of Karl Blind, entirely opposed to the insurrection, and the Democratic Warsaw Committee who managed it consisted of twelve members, mostly very young men. While we sympathize deeply with the wrongs of Poland, may not the protection of the people of Poland have required severe measures against the rampant radicalism of such Polish patriots?

But the chief hope of the Greek Church is in the great Bible movement inaugurated on the coronation-day of the Liberator. It received its inspiration from that honored American, to whom Europe owes so much, Dr. Robert Baird. Of its progress, Rev. W. H. Bidwell has recently given an interesting account. The first edition of 20,000 copies of the Gospels and the Acts

was speedily exhausted. The noble empress entered into the work; while ladies of high character established depositories and superintended the work. A general of rank ordered a thousand copies for the men under his command. The work of translation and revision was completed under the auspices of the Holy Synod, and the Bible has since been scattered throughout the Russias, superseding the old Slavic or Bulgarian version, by Cyrill and Methodius. As illustrating the progress of the work, Mr. Bidwell writes, that in 1876 the circulation in Northern Russia amounted to 264,227 copies, while for 1877 it amounts to 247,656 copies, and that in Southern Russia for the past three years the circulation has averaged 80,000 copies annually. He likewise calls attention to the efforts of the Czar in educating his people, including the establishment of from eight to ten thousand schools.¹

Taking all the facts into account, the anticipations of Dean Stanley for the future of Russia bid fair to be more than realized. The seeds of intelligence and religion are being sown broadcast, and who can doubt that there will be a mighty and beneficent harvest?

But before this harvest has time to ripen, may not Russia be carried far out of the course proposed at the outset in behalf of the Christians of Turkey, by certain traditional ideas, necessities, or tendencies inwrought into her very structure? She is the natural protector of the Greek Church, and has for centuries regarded it as her duty and mission to deliver Constantinople from the oppression of the Turk. Moreover, the free passage of the Bosphorus is absolutely essential to the future Russian development. Still further, a nation that within a century advanced its frontiers almost five hundred miles toward Stamboul, almost nine hundred toward Berlin and Vienna, and a thousand toward India, may perhaps well arouse something of fear in the neighboring nations. Those who have dwelt almost exclusively on these traditional ideas are suspicious of the Czar, and accuse him of engaging in the present war for territorial aggrandizement rather than for the interests of Christianity and humanity.

¹ "The Bible and Alexander II."

Nor can it be denied that there are facts which seem to justify their suspicions. The breaking of the shackles imposed by the Treaty of Paris, and the reorganization of the army and navy, can here only be adverted to as steps in the progress of Russia in asserting her place in the European world of the future. When the measures of 1870 are completed, the army, as shown by the *London Times* of December 4th, 1876, will reach a total of 1,945,000 men. The removal of the great naval arsenal of the south from the indefensible Sebastopol to Nikolaieff on the river Bug, at a point some distance from its mouth, and easily made inaccessible to the navies of all the world, while giving to Russia every advantage for defence by her land-forces, has prepared for the work just begun, by the Grand Duke Constantine at the head of the naval authorities, of reconstructing the navy with the aid of the newest lights. What does all this mean, if not an aggressive future?

The character of Russia opens the way to the probable answer to some of the queries connected with the Eastern question.

Does not Russia propose to play the oppressor in place of the Turk? Her past record is appealed to, and the stories of "Russian atrocities" in Turkestan and Bulgaria have been told round the world, to prove that the change of masters will at best be but that of one monster for another. The plain answer is that the Russia of to-day is not the old Russia but the new. Mr. Gladstone has shown that Mr. Schuyler's story of horrors, narrated in his first volume, are only "hearsay," contradicted by Mr. MacGahan, an eye-witness of the events professedly narrated, and by Mr. Schuyler himself in his second volume. Mr. Freeman has shown that the Bulgarian stories were manufactured by the Sublime Porte, and sent out to the world by his special agents with the help of British officials, to influence public opinion. The correspondent of the *London Daily News*, writing on the 15th of July, declared his conviction "that there had not then been a single case in Bulgaria of personal maltreatment of a Turkish civilian by a Russian soldier." Germany fixed the indictment upon Turkey, and discriminated justly between the two nations, when she recently demanded of the Porte that the prisoners taken in Bulgaria

should be treated according to the laws of civilized warfare. There is doubtless much of cruelty and brutality in the broad dominions of the Czar, but it is not endorsed as such by the authorities, as it is in Turkey, nor is it rewarded by decorating the perpetrators with honors. Besides, the tendencies to freedom and Christian civilization have been found working most powerfully in elevating the nation above the deeds of barbarism and inhumanity.

Was the Czar sincere in his public statement of his motives in engaging in the war? Authorities of the most varied sentiments all agree in ascribing to Alexander the noblest character. Writing in 1866, Mr. Duff said :

"After making every deduction, we still think that unless the policy of Alexander the Second very materially alters, he is likely to take a high place amongst the benefactors of mankind."

Recalling these words, he writes in 1877 :

"The figure of Alexander the Second will stand out as one of the most remarkable in contemporary history."

Professor Goldwin Smith, writing of him in his relation to the present struggle, adds his most emphatic endorsement :

"There is not a statesman in Europe whom, on the whole, and having due regard to the exigencies of his position, rational liberals may more justly claim as their own, or whose career they can regard with more satisfaction, than Alexander II. He has not only done much, but he has risked much for humanity; he has risked every thing which vulgar and selfish despots prize, and to which vulgar and selfish despots cling. Almost alone in this calamitous imbroglio, he has behaved like a man of honor. There was not the slightest reason for doubting the sincerity of the assurances of moderation which he gave the English Government, and the treatment which those assurances received from the English minister was in perfect accordance with the whole of that minister's public life."

In the same vein write Mr. Freeman and the Duke of Argyll.

If Alexander the Liberator cannot be trusted, there is not a sovereign in Europe that can be. "If any prince ever strove to avoid war, he has done so." He had evidently no thought of war at the outset ; but when Europe deserted the Christians

of Turkey, the spontaneous uprising of the Russian people rendered it impossible for him to avoid it. His course since the opening of the war has been entirely in accordance with his public professions. Moreover, he is actually engaged in a great work for right and humanity, at immense hazard and cost,—a work which, by the clear principles of international law, he is solemnly bound to do—and which Christian Europe has left him to do alone, although the duty was theirs as truly as his—and he has therefore a right to the sympathy of Christendom until he has shown himself unworthy of it.

But it is alleged that the course of Russia has already shown that she is not sincere in her professions. When the Franco-Prussian war broke out, she gave notice to the powers of Europe that imposed the Treaty of Paris upon her, that she felt compelled to deviate from its stipulations, and keep a fleet of sufficient capacity in the Black Sea. It has been pronounced in many quarters a high-handed and defiant act, making revelation of ambitious plans for territorial aggrandizement. But it cannot be denied that the Turk had violated every pledge made in connection with that treaty; so that Russia was already morally released from obligation to regard it longer. She simply took an opportune moment for making the announcement. This brings forward another question: What are the just rights of Russia in South-eastern Europe? Or has she none as against the Powers that placed restrictions upon her? Even if Turkey had not broken the Treaty of Paris, on what grounds was Russia bound to keep it? She regarded her exclusion from her Black Sea as a high-handed outrage. It was such, in the light of correct moral principles. Ostensibly it was done to protect Turkey: really it was done by two great naval powers to annihilate practically the naval power of Russia, who was feared as a rival. Great Britain holds almost every great strategic point on the globe,—the great passing and crossing places of commerce,—is now reaching out after Egypt, and the Bosphorus, and the Euphrates valley. But the Russian navy must be excluded from the Black Sea, and a power unfriendly to her and friendly to Great Britain must be sustained in Constantinople, and 12,000,000 or 15,000,000 of Christians must be held in slavery

to keep her helpless. Beautiful morality, certainly ! The case has been justly and forcibly put by General McClellan :¹

“Cut off from the open highway of the ocean by the rigorous winter of the north, and to the south by a closing of the Bosphorus, almost as effectual as when, in prehistoric times, no Bosphorus existed, she has been suspected of the design of forcing her way to the sea, and thus gaining a free and untrammelled outlet for the productions of the vast regions she controls. Could we for a moment imagine our Atlantic ports hermetically sealed by ice during the greater part of the year, and the lower Mississippi under foreign rule, we might, perhaps, be able to answer the question as to how long we would permit the control of New Orleans by another Power.”.

Morally speaking, Russia was just as much bound by that treaty as the man waylaid and robbed is bound to the robber. It was proper that when the announcement of the abrogation of the treaty had been made, Alexander should begin his preparation to vindicate the national honor against his adversaries of the robber-morality. Nor is it any wonder that a great nation should feel deeply, and remember long, and resent strongly, such a humiliation, and take measures to prevent its recurrence. This is doubtless the meaning of the new Russian military system. This, too, is doubtless the meaning of the fact that the impregnable Nikolaieff is rapidly replacing the indefensible Sebastopol as the great arsenal of the south. But the military and naval schemes had not been pushed far enough at the opening of the war to raise suspicion touching present professions.

These questions of right have got to be settled sooner or later, and the events connected with the present struggle have opened the eyes of Christian Europe to see most clearly that, by the plainest principles of international law, Russia rather than Great Britain has a right to the Black Sea and to a friendly power—a Christian Turkey or Greece—if not a capital, on the Bosphorus. She will undoubtedly assert her right in time, and there can be no settlement of the Eastern question by any scheme that either denies or ignores her just rights. The deliverance of the Christians and the rights of Russia are evidently both involved in the struggle, and the two can only be

¹ “North American Review,” July and August, 1877, p. 38.

reached together. If unrighteous obstacles to this are once put out of the way, the problem will speedily reach its true solution.

CHRISTIAN EUROPE AND ITS COURSE.

Heretofore the diplomatists of Christian Europe have always stood in the way of any just solution to the Eastern question. But in the present instance, Providence seems to have almost taken it out of the hands of these wise men by three great movements: the first more strictly providential, the second diplomatic, the third moral. The last twenty-five years have revolutionized Europe and destroyed the balance of power for which the rulers had fought so long and fiercely. At the time of the Crimean War, there were five Great Powers: France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia,—France clearly heading the list. That war reduced Great Britain to a secondary place. The weakness of her military became so patent to the world that the historian Green writes,¹ that the great Indian mutiny of 1857 followed partly as a result. She has since been well-nigh helpless, a looker-on in the struggles which have shaken the Old World and the New. Austria and France have since gone down before Prussia; and Germany and Russia, twenty-five years ago at the foot of the roll, now stand alone in Europe as Great Powers. In the struggle of Prussia, the Czar showed himself a fast friend of the Emperor, and Providence thereby bound the Emperor to the Czar in the present conflict. These two men, incomparably the two greatest and best crowned heads of the present times, are in a position to lay down the law for Europe on the Eastern question. Austria, Great Britain, and France, the three Powers next to Russia most interested in the Eastern question—the first through its Slavic population in Hungary, the second by its possessions in India, and the third through the Suez Canal and the old ambitious projects connected with it—have thus found it practically necessary since the war began to stand aside. Providence has crippled the opposers of south-eastern freedom.

The second or diplomatic movement has been equally re-

¹ Green, "Short History of the English People," pp. 801-2.

markable, especially in the results upon the British Government, the Power chiefly interested and the perpetual marplot in the Eastern game. It is not the present purpose to descend into the sink of European diplomacy and attempt the understanding of the schemes of the wise ones who have confounded themselves by their own wisdom. The great motives and movements stand out clearly, in spite of the skill of the diplomats. It has long been the favorite theory in London that "British interests" require a weak and unaggressive power in Stamboul, and the authorities have therefore always done their utmost to sustain the Porte. For that end, the territory of Greece was limited. For that, the Crimean War was undertaken—contrary to the advice of Prince Albert—and in righting a little wrong a very great one was done to Russia and to the suffering Christians in Turkey, and the way paved for the decline of British influence in Europe. For that, the butcheries in Crete were sustained and morally shared in. As the result of a long course of such conduct, it was natural that when the threatening cloud of war appeared in the Orient, the British Government should have had more influence than any other with the Turk. It might have used that influence in behalf of the Christians, and was bound by every proper consideration, international and moral, to do so. It was invited to do its duty by Russia and the other Powers. The diplomatists at the head of the government deliberately set to work to prevent interference in Turkey, knowing that it would inevitably weaken and ultimately overthrow the rule of the Porte. It was the British Minister by whose influence the Hatt-i-Humayoun was left out of the Treaty of Paris, and only put into the Protocol, so that Turkey, in violating it, need not violate the terms of the treaty. In the trial of the Hatt experiment before the bar of Europe, already sketched, the British Ministers claim the credit of having defeated the efforts of the Christian Powers and "saved" Turkey. The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum was the decisive act. The one government which, before all others in Europe, should have been the prompt protector of the Christians, made its boast of having proved their criminal betrayer. But the one thing which these astute politicians counted certain not to happen did happen. Russia took up the cause

of the oppressed alone ; and they found, when too late for remedy, that they had brought about that which they most of all dreaded. It was the hand of God bringing to naught the counsels of the wise and delivering the oppressed.

The third great movement has been a moral one. While the British Government was busy confounding itself over its question, How shall the Turk be sustained on the Bosphorus and "British interests" be thereby conserved? the question of humanity and justice took possession of the hearts of the great Christian leaders and masses, How shall we do right, and help on the emancipation of these millions of enslaved Christians? This last question was asked all over Europe, and it bewildered the diplomatists everywhere. There are indications that it was this spontaneous movement that decided the Christian Emperor of Germany in his sympathy and alliance with Russia : and that even against the far-seeing but unscrupulous diplomatist, Prince Bismarck. But its influence was chiefly felt in the British Islands, where it brought about the grand moral conflict which has done more than any thing else in modern times to bring the Eastern problem to its ultimate solution, on the basis of right and humanity. In order to understand this critical conflict, it is necessary to understand the dual character, motives, and purposes of Great Britain, or rather of England, since English sentiment controls the kingdom.

From the days of the Norman Conquest, England has had two phases of character and of thought—the Saxon and the Norman—perpetually struggling for supremacy. She has had her Wickliffes and Wilberforces, her Lollards and Puritans and Evangelicals, and her Bonners and Lauds ; her would-be Inquisitors, and her Roysterers and Ritualists. There has been the frank, free, generous missionary, Christian England, ever foremost in the work of the world's redemption ; and the scheming, despotic, selfish, commercial, Jesuitical England, always pushing on in the search for wealth and self-aggrandizement at the expense of all the world. The two together have made the English the commercial, colonizing, cosmopolitan race of the modern world—what the Greek was to the ancient world—and vastly more than that. The two elements have wrought together in extending the dominion of English thought

round the globe—the one, always in the van in bearing the Bible and Christian civilization, has given Christian England the first place in the hearts of men ; the other, always leading in the Machiavellian policy which has so largely controlled the course of the empire, pushing the wars of conquest, the opium wars, the selfish and heartless intrigues, as in our civil war and in the present Russo-Turkish war, has made the Government of Great Britain an offence to the world. The one is represented by the Livingstones and Gladstones and Argylls ; the other by the Matthew Arnolds and Disraelis and Derbys. The one is the England of Christianity, the other the England of diplomacy. They have in common the one idea of making conquest of the world ; they differ in other things, *toto cælo*, for the one desires it for Christ and the other for self.

The eyes of both Englands have long been steadfastly fixed on the Orient. With what different motives, can be better understood in the light of the sketch just given.

In the capture of Constantinople by the Turk, in 1453, is to be found the historic reason for the commercial supremacy of the English race in the modern world. That event, in wheeling Christendom about, brought England to the front in just the position to command the carrying trade—made it, as Herschel phrases it, “the terrene centre of the globe.” The race, with its six great continental centres, with its grasp upon all the chief strategic points over the globe, the passages and transits, the entrances and exits, of the nations, with its commerce penetrating and its navy claiming control over all seas, dates the beginning of its wonderful development from the establishment of the Ottoman in Europe. Its past career has led the England of the diplomatists to think the rights of all men subordinate to “British interests,” *i. e.*, to the extension of British control and commerce. Regardless of the rights of humanity, England must control the Bosphorus, and the Euphrates valley, and the Suez Canal ; for the Eastern commerce of England depends upon them. Such is the present view of these men, boldly proclaimed and advocated by Ministers of State and able writers in the Reviews.¹ In the pursuit of

¹ “The Nineteenth Century.” Articles by Mr. Edward Dicey : “Our Route

"British interests," economical and political, the diplomatist has shown a disregard for the law of God and the rights of man ; an absolute moral darkness, difficult to parallel in the annals of the pagan world. Years ago, we were struck with John Ruskin's estimate of the morals and religion of English economists and politicians, presented in his incisive style :¹

"The entire *naïveté* and undisturbed imbecility with which I found them declare that the laws of the devil were the only practicable ones, and that the laws of God were merely a form of poetical language, passed all that I had ever before heard or read of mortal infidelity."

Perhaps in no previous English history did this practical infidelity ever take such entire possession of the government as in the present. It decided its course with reference to the Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum and the final Congress ; its course in making light of the horrible butcheries in Bulgaria ; its course of bluster and brag when Russia declared war ; its course in sending the English fleet to Besika Bay, and in reinforcing the garrison of Malta ; in short, its course up to the present time in violating every principle of neutrality in order to sustain the Ottoman Power. It would doubtless have led to an immediate declaration of war against Russia, had it not been for two things : the consciousness of the military weakness of Great Britain, and the great moral awakening which brought Christian England to the front with her imperative demand that the government should adhere to the principles of justice and humanity.

It is this great moral movement that has hastened the solution of the Eastern problem. When Christian England is once fairly roused, there is no resisting the mighty army of "Round-heads" ready to die for principle ; and she has hardly been so roused since the horrors of the French Revolution roused and girded her for the Napoleonic wars and Waterloo. The news of the Bulgarian massacres "stirred up a sublime national emotion such as has had few parallels. . . . Never was any move-

to India," June, 1877, and "The Future of Egypt," August, 1877 ; article by Sir Julius Vogel, "Greater or Lesser Britain," July, 1877.

On the other side, see Mr. Gladstone's article, "Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East," August, 1877.

¹ "Modern Painters," vol. v. p. 362.

ment more spontaneous, more heartfelt, and, as it seemed, more universal. The current of generous feeling was so strong that it utterly swept away one of the most deeply-rooted traditions of modern English political belief"—the belief that freedom and just government had no place beyond the Adriatic Sea. The wisest and best men of England have been at the head of the movement—Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Mr. Freeman, and Thomas Carlyle being among its leaders. It has hampered, cowed, almost crushed the power of the government under control of the "Semitic instinct" of Lord Beaconsfield and the heathen morality of Lord Derby, and has completed the grand work of emancipation for which Providence had been preparing for a quarter of a century, and which the folly of the diplomatists unwittingly helped on in 1876, by preventing the unrighteous war in behalf of the doomed Turk and against the enslaved Christians, for which that government has shown itself only too anxious.

THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION.

Those who best understand the condition of affairs anticipate but one final result—the securing of all just rights. The completion of the work may be delayed in part, but it must ultimately come in full.

There are none so blind as those who will not see; but even the British Government is gradually being forced to accept the inevitable. It has come all the way down the scale of insolent and immoral demand. In the summer of 1876, it officially declared "the *status quo ante* as the desirable and normal termination of the Eastern crisis." For some months longer, it emphasized the "maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," and the upholding of the Treaty of Paris. It next settled down upon the preservation of the independence of Constantinople. Then followed its vaguer talk of the protection of "British interests," and of the route to India. Latest of all, Lord Derby laments that even Austria cannot be relied upon in any effort to bring about a settlement between the parties. What is to be the next step in the descent?

Mr. Edward Dicey, who is in sympathy with the govern-

ment, feels assured that "the war, whenever and however it closes, will not leave things as they were previous to its inception." He adds :

"Putting aside the passing speculations of the hour, it seems to me as manifest as any unaccomplished fact can well be, that we are on the eve of a fundamental revolution in the affairs of Eastern Europe. We have come to the beginning of the end."

All Christendom is beginning to understand that Providence has taken the matter in hand—as in so many other critical cases in human history—and, just when no man purposed or anticipated such results, is hastening the solution of the hitherto apparently insoluble Eastern problem. Writing in the summer of 1877, Mr. Gladstone expresses what must call forth from the enlightened sentiment of the world a most hearty response :

"In the face of these great events, of the gigantic military movements on the surface, of the subtler and deeper changes that are apparently in preparation underneath, the daring of human speculation is abashed, and we seem to see how the hand of the Most High has lifted the vast human interests of the case far above the level of the vacillations of Cabinets, the confused and discordant utterances of a journalism reflecting bewildered opinion, the intrigues of the schemer, and the dreams of the enthusiast. More and more, however, does the great Emancipation, which, twelve months back, friends did but hope for and every adversary scoffed at, mount above the horizon in a form growing more defined from day to day, and promise to take its place in the region of accomplished facts. No such deliverance has for centuries blessed the earth."

It has already been made apparent that no answer to the Eastern question can be final which places any great or even any considerable people under restrictions which will prevent the natural and peaceful development of their industry and wealth, or which are incompatible with their just rights in the general politics of Europe. "The Lord God omnipotent reigneth." Right and justice must have way.

But while all are agreed about the final result, there is the widest range of acknowledged present possibilities. As these lines are being written, the news comes that Plevna has fallen. So the good cause of freedom and humanity moves on. But will Russia be willing to close the war now? In justice to herself and the cause she has undertaken to champion, she cannot.

Will not the British Government interfere at last in behalf of Turkey? It must be confessed that with the present Premier and Foreign Minister, any thing is possible. As the distinguished orientalist and scholar, Mr. F. W. Newman, has very clearly shown,¹ the British Ministry has by slow degrees usurped the place of the nation, and does not hesitate even to declare war in secret Cabinet without consulting Privy Council or people. Christian England will have to stand guard very heroically and patiently to prevent some such rash and immoral course when the extremity of Turkey comes. But while the last results of the working of great principles can be forecast with certainty, these questions, and many more which might be raised, belong to that region of contingencies in which it is wise "never to prophesy unless you know."

Are we not, however, warranted in anticipating, in connection with the emancipation of the Christians of Turkey and the return of Constantinople to Christian hands, the third great signal epoch in the history of the world?

Will not the city of Constantine become again the great centre of commerce? It is nearest the centre of the population of the world. With the Suez Canal, the Euphrates Valley route, the Central Asia route,—“the way of the kings of the East,”—the access to all Eastern and Middle Europe, the extension of railway systems, will there not come the reversal of the epoch of 1453, so that the Bosphorus shall once more be at the front of the world, and not the Thames? Is not the decline of British commerce, of which Sir Julius Vogel complains, one of the signs of the change already begun, by the Suez Canal, in turning the tide of commercial prosperity eastward?

With the new tide of oriental commerce in Christian hands, may not Dean Stanley's hopes for the future of the Greek Church be speedily realized? The forces already at work in Russia, her open Bible, and pure doctrine, and flexible religious system, and the character of her people, all give promise of this. All that is needed is the breath of the Spirit of God. And must not the disintegration of the Ottoman Power in Asia and Africa follow? Its parts have long been held together by

¹ Contemporary Review, "On the War Power," November, 1877.

the interposition of Christian Europe. Once separate, Christian influences may speedily penetrate, and pervade, and regenerate them, and the Crescent in all Turkey go down forever before the Cross.

Once more made the Capital of Christendom by the marvellous progress of events, the City of Constantine will occupy the vantage-ground of all the world in the work of handing back the true religion to Asia, and of giving the truth of that pure Gospel, to which even in the darkness she has always held fast, to all mankind. May God speed the day when all Christendom shall see that there is no secret diplomacy which can defeat the glorious purpose of God, and that there are no "interests," whether British or Russian, which are not identical with those of the Christians of Turkey,—that the sun of righteousness may again shine out from the Orient as in the dawn of Christianity!

DANIEL S. GREGORY.

CATHOLIC ELEMENTS IN PRESBYTERIANISM.

PROFESSOR MITCHELL, in his valuable introduction to the "Minutes of the Westminster Assembly," recently edited by him from transcripts of the original records, pays a thoughtful tribute to the moderation and the catholicity which characterized that remarkable body of divines. While he admits the rigidness and even the sternness with which the views of the Assembly were sometimes expressed, and confesses the occasional want of breadth and of true liberality apparent in their action, he still claims, with historic justice, that "by limiting obedience to the lawful commands of civil and ecclesiastical authority : by limiting lawful commands in matters of faith and worship to things positively enjoined in the Word of God or by fair inference deducible from it : and also by recognizing the right of the civil authority to form an independent judgment in things religious, the Assembly helped to forward the cause of freedom, both in Church and State, and to plant the seed from which, as the Word of God was better studied, a fully developed system of toleration could not fail to grow." He further claims that, although the Westminster divines did not at once perceive fully the effects and issues of their own teaching, or themselves illustrate in all cases what they taught, yet "this will ever remain as their unquestioned honor, that they first reclaimed for liberty a large province in which the civil and ecclesiastical authorities had previously claimed absolute and arbitrary sway." To this he appends the important statement that, in addition to a considerable amount of toleration within the Church in things of minor importance, they ultimately

acquiesced in a larger amount of it, without the Church, than had ever been enjoyed in England before.¹

It may be a profitable task to inquire how far such moderation and catholicity were actually incorporated in the Westminster symbols, and to what extent they have been characteristic qualities in historic Presbyterianism. It must be confessed that these are not the qualities which the popular mind has been accustomed to associate with the Presbyterian name, or to regard as dominating in Presbyterian catechisms and confessions. It must be admitted that Presbyterians themselves are not accustomed to speak frequently or glowingly of these as the characteristic excellences of either their creed or their church. Nor can it well be questioned, in view of some phenomena in both belief and history, that there is room for a reasonable, and possibly a stern challenge of the claim here made by the eminent historian of St. Andrew's. How far is that claim historically just? In what degree are the Westminster symbols suffused and animated by this temper of Christian moderation? To what extent may it be properly affirmed that Presbyterianism, though a strong and positive, is also a tolerant and catholic type of the common Christianity?

Presbyterianism, as a system, must be regarded as both positive and strong. As a type of evangelical doctrine, it is plain and exact in its definitions, clear in its principles, thorough in inference, and uncompromising in deduction: careful and methodical in structure, and symmetrical and substantial and decisive in its completed form. As a type of organization, it exhibits similar characteristics: and, in its practical development as a system, it is seen to be in vital harmony with these peculiar qualities in its belief and order. It therefore both requires from those who study it serious and diligent attention, and commends itself strongly to those to whom ability and grace are given to receive it. Wherever it is embraced, it is tenaciously, ardently held: the reason, the judgment, the heart, alike accepting, revering, loving it. And such accept-

¹ See, also, the suggestive note on "Toleration in the British Isles," Introduction, lxxii-lxxv. Hetherington, "History of the Westminster Assembly," chap. v., *passim*. Stoughton, "Church of the Civil Wars," vol. i. chap. xx.

ance bears its legitimate fruit, not merely in an earnest loyalty, but also in zealous and retentive, and sometimes extreme devotion. That Presbyterians have been as ready as any other class of disciples to put forth effort, to make large sacrifices, and even to suffer or to die for their cherished system, is a fact sufficiently verified in their history. And it is certainly natural that such devotion as this should, in occasional instances, incite to tempers and acts out of harmony with, if not quite contrary to, true Christian catholicity. The adherents of such a system are always in danger of exalting the system unduly, even in comparison with other forms of evangelical faith or polity. They may place overmuch stress on what is really valuable in the system : they may magnify its points of difference, and extol these as primary excellences : they may become blind to its remaining weaknesses or imperfections. And, from this experience, the descent is gradual and easy to narrowness, to intolerance, to partisanship and dogmatism, and all the other errors into which undue denominational zeal, under whatever system, may plunge even sincere and earnest and thoughtful minds.

And if one glances with candor at the actual career of Presbyterianism from 1648 to the present time, in the different countries where it has been planted, and in the numerous varieties it has assumed, he will find some things which give an air of reasonableness to the impression, somewhat current, that this is hardly a catholic or even a tolerant type of Christianity. He who looks with honest vision through the records of any single branch of the Presbyterian family, whether American or European, will surely find occasion for confessing that a narrower spirit, a temper far from moderate or generous, has sometimes prevailed. Nor is the prospect brightened, if the eye be turned toward the historic relations of one branch in that family to another, toward the controversies which have divided and subdivided those who bear the common name, toward the parted and fragmentary condition of the Presbyterian churches throughout the world. Nor will the inquirer be greatly relieved, if he begins to consider the actual relationship of these churches, from the seventeenth century onward, to those other churches of various names which, together with these, have

constituted the broader household of evangelical Protestantism. In whatever direction the honest student may turn, in the field either of history or of present observation, he will be confronted by some facts which are unpleasant to contemplate, and are somewhat trying to his Christian feeling: and he may even be led to ask what has become of the moderation and the catholicity which, according to Professor Mitchell, were inscribed at first on the Presbyterian banner, and which manifested themselves so decisively—as he affirms—in the heart of the labors of the Westminster divines?

Notwithstanding such tendencies and such historic developments, the CATHOLICITY of PRESBYTERIANISM is a grand and central fact, proven by a careful consideration of what Presbyterianism really is, in both its doctrinal and its ecclesiastical structure, and by a closer survey of its actual history and position as a branch of the common Protestantism. The elucidation and illustration of this fact will be the aim of the present article.

Turning, at the outset, to the Westminster symbols, one may find several marked exhibitions of the moderate and catholic spirit, whose existence has been affirmed. Underneath all the rest, as a granite foundation for the entire structure, whether of doctrine or of order, lies *the broad Protestant principle of Christian liberty*. The enunciation of that principle is not to be traced primarily to the deliberations of the Jerusalem Chamber. The doctrine of liberty of conscience, in the special form of the right of private judgment, had been proclaimed, from the time of Luther, as the “formal principle” of the Reformation. It had been strongly maintained, not only against the assumptions of Rome, but even against the undue assertion of authority by the various Protestant churches. It had been perverted by the Socinians and others, as a justification of destructive license in both thought and interpretation: yet even in the face of such perversion, it had been defended as an essential basis of both the Protestant doctrine and the Protestant life. But on the other hand, the strong churchly sentiment which still pervaded all parties, and possibly some remnant of reverence for that very authority, *ex cathedrâ*, against which they had revolted, led the continental reformers too often

to repress the spirit of Christian liberty, and even to hesitate in the full and bold enunciation of the abstract doctrine. To the British Protestants that doctrine was specially dear : their attachment to it was instinctive and ardent : and their loyalty had grown with every struggle and every sacrifice they had encountered in its behalf. And in the long contest of parties and tendencies which extended from the days of Knox onward to the downfall of Charles and the rise of Presbytery, the Presbyterians especially had been taught, through many a painful lesson, the priceless value of the principle of religious freedom, and the necessity of incorporating it as a cardinal element in their creed. That principle had been their support and their defence, when they were struggling with a dominant and arrogant episcopacy : and they were both too loyal and too logical to foreswear it in the period of their temporary triumph. Hence they made Christian liberty and liberty of conscience the theme of a special chapter in their noble confession : and while explaining such liberty, on the spiritual side, as an outgrowth and consequence of true fellowship with Christ, and therefore as forever opposed to all spiritual licentiousness, they declared it on its outward and temporal side, in terms whose emphasis has never been surpassed, to be a heritage and a right of which no believer ought ever to be deprived. GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE, are their heroic words : God alone is Lord of the conscience : and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in any thing contrary to his Word, or beside it, in matters of faith or worship. Nor did they hesitate to present the doctrine in its preceptive and mandatory forms, or to indicate the perils to which this liberty of conscience is always exposed. To believe such doctrines or to obey such commandments, out of conscience, they declare, is to betray true liberty of conscience : and the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, they add, is to destroy liberty of conscience and reason also !

It should be readily admitted that, following the opinions and usages of their times, the Assembly failed to carry out the principle thus boldly announced. They sometimes shrank from the actual granting to all men, of whatever religious belief, of the liberty which they had themselves proclaimed. The desire

for uniformity and the dream of an established church, under the Presbyterian name, led them even to exercise undue restraint upon the freedom guaranteed to all by their own magna charta.¹ It was their especial weakness that they granted to the civil magistracy so large a measure of control in church affairs, and even in the formulating of the legalized belief. It is painful to read the title which, with their own hands, they prefixed to the Confession they had prepared: *The humble advice of the Assembly of Divines, now by authority of Parliament sitting at Westminster, concerning a Confession of Faith.* It is even more painful to know that the authority first standing behind the Confession, and giving it national validity, was not the Church of Christ, but the civil magistracy: and that the Confession was first described as containing the *Articles of Christian Religion, approved and passed by both Houses of Parliament, after advice had with the Assembly of Divines, by authority of Parliament sitting at Westminster.* It was left to another age, and to a type of Presbyterianism nurtured under other influences, to correct this inconsistency, and to eliminate from the creed all recognition of State authority or jurisdiction within the Church of Jesus Christ. But it should be gratefully recognized as a decisive step taken in the path of true spiritual progress, when the Assembly thus stated and defined a principle which can nowhere be put into practice without involving the exercise of the broadest Christian catholicity. The declar-

¹ One of these departures from the catholic principle announced by the Assembly may be seen in the record (*Minutes*, p. 111-116) of their action in the case of a certain volume, written to prove that *God is the author of sin*. As the writer, "a man of some note," was already dead, the book itself, apart from its author, was reported by the Assembly to Parliament, with the suggestion that so dangerous a publication be suppressed, by seizing and burning all the copies. Parliament, it is added, "concurs in the damning of the book:" orders it to be burned by the public hangman at five conspicuous places in the city of London, and requests the Assembly to be present at this interesting exercise. That body "did account it a very acceptable service:" and accordingly appointed five committees, of four members each, to discharge this remarkable duty. One of the places selected for the ceremony was Westminster itself: and surely it must have been a strange and lurid glare which, from those ascending flames, shot through the magnificent painted window fronting northward, into the stately Chamber where the remainder of the Assembly, "in black coats and bands," sat unmoved in high debate!

ation that God alone is Lord of the conscience, and that liberty of conscience must be neither betrayed nor destroyed, carries with it, by inevitable inference, not only a mutual recognition of liberty on the part of all believers, but also the living sentiment of brotherhood, binding and uniting all by the closest spiritual ties. Toleration, forbearance, confidence, the sense of unity amid diversities not fundamental, the consciousness of a common fealty to Christ,—all flow resistlessly from this divine fountain. Of such liberty, properly apprehended, a holy catholicity is the essential outgrowth.

There is another of these illustrations of the temper of the Westminster Presbyterianism in *the conception of the Church, especially as catholic and universal*. That conception was not, indeed, new : it had been stated and defended by Luther and Calvin, and the larger part of the Reformers ; it had been incorporated into most of the continental Confessions, and had become a current and prominent article in the Protestant belief. The conception was requisite to Protestantism, on one side, as a high spiritual antithesis to the papal notion of the Church as being one vast, visible, and material organism ; and, on the other side, as a preservative of that sentiment of spiritual oneness to which the Protestants, notwithstanding their many diversities, tenaciously and tenderly clung. It also had its historic genesis in the earliest Christian creed, where this one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church is placed in direct succession after the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, as if that Church were the immediate outgrowth of his restorative processes in the heart of humanity. And it was natural, therefore, that even the Confession of Augsburg should define the Church as the *congregatio sanctorum* : and that the Reformers generally should declare with the Confession of Basle : We believe in one holy Christian Church : that is, the fellowship of the saints, the congregation of spiritual believers, which is holy and the bride of Christ : in which all are citizens who confess truly that Jesus is Christ, the Lamb of God.

But there are none among the Protestant symbols which bring out this conception so fully and vividly as the Creed of Westminster. That creed describes this Church universal as consisting of the whole number of the elect that have been, are,

or shall be gathered into one under Christ, the head thereof. So far as this Church is visible or organic, it is defined as consisting of all those throughout the world who profess the true religion, together with their children, and who constitute among men the kingdom of the Lord Jesus, the one house and family of God. The creed further recognizes this visible Church catholic, as divided into particular churches, which may be, in themselves, more or less pure, but which nevertheless are to be viewed as parts of the one grand Church of Christ. All varieties of evangelical Protestantism are, at least by implication, included in this common household of faith; and even the Papacy is cast out, only on the theory that it had become a synagogue of Satan, and was the Antichrist foretold in apostolic prophecy. It may be, as has been suggested, that these broad and catholic definitions grew, in part, out of the peculiar position of English Presbyterianism in relation both to other religious parties and to the State. It was certainly natural that those who were laboring to make the national church Presbyterian should have endeavored so to broaden their statement on this subject as to make it inclusive of all varieties of evangelical belief. Stoughton, in his "Church of the Civil Wars," says, with niggardly praise, that the Assembly aimed to "build a huge cathedral for the nation, with small side chapels here and there for the use of certain crotchety people, who might privately pass in and out if they would but always enter through the great door and walk up the main aisle." It may easily be that considerations of policy, growing out of the very peculiar juncture of affairs, led Westminster divines to lay more stress than they would otherwise have laid on this attribute of universality in the Church. But it would do them great injustice to suppose them to have been actuated by motives of policy only. This broad conception was one which they had derived directly from the Scriptures and the Apostolic Creed, and which had been made real and precious to their apprehension by the teachings and conflicts of the Reformation. It had found its way, as a grand spiritual truth, into their deepest convictions; and, therefore, while they adhered strongly to their own view of what the Church of Christ should be in outward form, they cordially admitted the more generic truth, and wrought it, with

all the consequences involved, into their accepted system of belief. Westminster Presbyterianism was, consequently, by its own definition of the Church, tolerant, generous, catholic. However widely other evangelical bodies might differ from it in either doctrine or order, it was prepared, by its own tenet and conviction, to give them a place with itself in the *multitudo fidelium*, and to regard them as parts with itself in the one Church of Christ on earth. It thus obligated itself to carry this high doctrine into practice ; and to cherish toward all other church organisms that consequent brotherly feeling, that comprehensive charity, that sweet temper of union and communion, of which the term catholicity is, perhaps, the happiest expression. That amid the conflicts of opinions and parties, this obligation was always effectual and prevalent with all the adherents of this symbol, history forbids us to affirm ; but that, even amid such scenes, that obligation was still deeply felt, and was obeyed to a degree quite unexampled in that age of sectarian animosities, even the enemies of Presbyterianism have not hesitated to admit.

It is easy to pass from this conception of the church to the doctrine of *the communion of saints*, as furnishing a kindred illustration of the temper under consideration. As the doctrine of the Church, as one and universal, flows directly out of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, so the affirmation of the Confession concerning the fellowship of believers, like that of the Apostolic Creed, is directly consequent upon its teaching respecting the one Church of Christ on earth. If that Church be ONE, then it follows, inevitably, that all saints, being united first to their Lord by faith, and having fellowship with Him, are also united to one another in love, have mutual communion in gifts and graces, and are obliged to the performance of such duties, public and private, as may conduce to their mutual good, both in the inward and outward man. It is properly denied that such communion should include individual possessions, or be regarded as subverting any of those natural and just distinctions which exist in human society, even among believers. But so far as religious fellowship and true sympathy and fraternal aid are concerned, each believer rests under holy obligations to every other, and is bound to maintain this spir-

itual union in love while life lasts. This communion is said to be unlimited by any view of party, or race, or interest ; but is, "as God offereth opportunity, to be extended unto all those who, in every place, call upon the name of the Lord Jesus." It has its basis in a common oneness in Christ ; its impulses are such as the Holy Ghost inspires ; its law is revealed directly in the Scriptures ; and its objects are found wherever true disciples exist.

Such is the Westminster doctrine as to the Communion of Saints—the most full, the most elaborate, the most practical and precious statement on this subject to be found in the entire series of Protestant symbols. It is an utterance from the very heart of Christianity, fragrant with the spirit of Jesus. And it may be accepted as a conclusive vindication, not merely of the theoretical judgment, but also of the broad and loving temper of the Westminster Assembly. It shows them to have been men of too large and noble structure to expend themselves in labor for their own sect or party merely—men who loved the Christian people of the British Isles, whatever the differences which might superficially or temporarily divide them—men who loved the entire Protestant Church, whether Reformed or Lutheran, and who were ready to lay down a platform on which the broadest Christian fellowship might be enjoyed by all. To their perpetual credit, it should be remembered that, in an age when Protestantism had been widely divided and separate, and in a land where the fiercest sectarian strifes were raging, they dared to set forth so thoroughly the law, and the only law, of spiritual fellowship for all lands and ages—the rule, and the only rule, requisite to the ultimate realization in the Church of that oneness for which the Saviour prayed, and which every true disciple must desire to see, like some century flower long waited for, blooming into its promised and glorious consummation. And if they sometimes fell below the full embodiment of their own doctrine—if, in the commotions of the times, they yielded too much to the spirit of party, and were more ambitious for themselves than for the Church at large, and hesitated to extend such fellowship to all, as God gave them opportunity, yet their chapter on the Communion of Saints stands unchallenged in the Confession they framed as an enduring tes-

timonial to the divine origin and the divine estimate of a true Christian catholicity.

Passing from these specific chapters in the Confession to consider what may be described as *the general mode and temper of its doctrinal deliverances*, further evidences of tolerance and of moderation will be discovered. Every student who has compared the Westminster symbols with the canons of Dort, promulgated in 1619, must be impressed with the difference between these representative creeds—a difference less marked in language and definition and tenet than in tone and spirit. The canons originated in the midst of the fiercest ecclesiastical strife that had occurred since the Reformation dawned. They were written in answer to, and in refutation of the great Arminian heresy which had suddenly risen in Holland, and which was casting its portentous shadows over the whole of Protestant Europe. They were therefore polemical and intense, for they stated the truth in its sharpest, most positive, most dogmatic form. They were not intended to win adherents, or even to confirm the inquirer, so much as to refute and overwhelm the gainsayer. In this fact lay both their strength and their weakness. And it is safe to presume that, had the canons of Dort been left to stand forth as the latest, most complete and authoritative exposition of Calvinism, the subsequent progress of Arminianism in Europe would have been far easier, and the name of Calvin have occupied a considerably lower place on the roll of Protestant teachers.

Instead of following this conspicuous example, so near in time, and, to partisan minds, so full of incitement, the Assembly pursued a course widely opposite. To them it was given to rescue the Calvinistic system from the exposures under which the Synod of Dort had left it—to state that system in more moderate and considerate forms, with less of extreme inference, less of extra-scriptural affirmation, less of speculative dogmatism; to breathe into the system more of the Christian temper, more of sympathy with honest doubt and error, more of desire to win over, or at least to conciliate the Arminian antagonist. There were two motives which incited the Assembly to such a course, and which together were strong enough to overcome the force of the Hollandish example. The first of these mo-

tives was the ardent desire to harmonize and unify the various tendencies in British thought, ranging from an extreme Calvinism down to a more or less conscious Arminian revulsion from the popular belief, within the broad boundaries of one national Church and in allegiance to one generic creed. The *Thirty-nine Articles*, in whose consideration the Assembly spent the first months of their sessions, and which, in part at least, had received their formal indorsement, were in this respect quite as much their norm and model as either the earlier Irish Confession or the Creed of John Knox. The Calvinism of these Articles was generic and sincere, and in substance sound, even if it was cautious in inference, guarded in affirmation, and occasionally weak or uncertain in expression. As a pattern, it was evidently imperfect, and in need of improvement; yet its moderate position and its catholic temper could not fail to secure both notice and imitation, especially as the Assembly were aiming to introduce a substitute for it, to which they trusted that even positive prelatists would prove loyal. They knew that the unqualified canons of Dort would never answer the purposes of a creed for the British mind; and that none but a generic Calvinism, strong in its principles, precise in definition, symmetrical and commanding in structure, yet considerate in its presentation of the truth, and conciliatory rather than polemic in tone, could take captive and firmly hold the British heart.

The second motive appears in the constituent elements of the Assembly itself. Not to speak of the prelatists, whose connection with the body was but slight, and whose influence was small, the Independent party, headed by Goodwin and Nye, were decidedly averse to all intolerance, as well in doctrine as in ecclesiastical organization; and while they were soundly Calvinistic, were none the less unwilling to incorporate in the creed any type of Calvinism which might be characterized as one-sided or extreme. Among the Presbyterians themselves, there were wide diversities in doctrinal tendency; there were many who sympathized in this respect with the Independents, and were equally strenuous in the effort to eliminate from the symbols all that had looked forbidding or extreme in the *decreta* of Dordrecht. Outside of the Assembly, in England at least, a similar spirit prevailed, if not in the majority, still in a

minority strong enough in numbers and character to influence not only the public sentiment, but also the deliberations and decisions of the Assembly itself.¹ There is consequently found in the confession and catechisms, what the reader frequently discovers in the *Minutes*, traces of the conflict of this liberal spirit with a more positive and rigorous tendency in ecclesiastical statement, and evidences of final compromise upon a more mediate position, where all could be agreed. While neither party was disposed to abandon, or even to state weakly or inadequately, any of the essentials of Calvinism, neither party was able or inclined to win triumphs over the other; both were agreed in such presentation of these essentials as would best set forth the system itself, and would win general acquiescence. It is also obvious that the spirit of conciliation was habitually prevalent in the Assembly, even in the height of the famous debate concerning the *jus divinum*, and during the exciting period when Presbyterianism as a polity was assuming for a brief period the dangerous sceptre of politico-ecclesiastical supremacy. History has at least preserved but few memoranda of such undignified wranglings, such disputatious strifes, such conflicts of feeling and of interest, as, ever since the robber synod of Ephesus, have so often dishonored the deliberations of religious

¹ Stoughton is disposed to divide the credit for the establishment of the principle of toleration in England chiefly between the Independent party, led by the noted John Goodwin, and the more liberal element among the prelatists, represented by Chillingworth and Hales and Jeremy Taylor. He gives considerable prominence also to Cudworth and Henry More, and especially to John Locke, who, as he says, "brought the doctrine of toleration out of the domain of theology, and placed it on the basis of political righteousness." In describing the efforts of the Presbyterian party to prevent toleration from disintegrating into license, and thus making room for the wildest excesses in religious thought, he apparently misinterprets such effort as indicative of want of sympathy with toleration itself. The obvious fact is, that that party were as tolerant as they were conservative, and that they believed that nothing could be more destructive of true liberty than indiscriminate and irresponsible license. It is simply absurd in Hallam to describe them as "a countless brood of fanatical sectaries, nursed in the lap of Presbyterianism, and fed with the stimulating aliment she furnished, till their intoxicating fancies could neither be restrained within the limits of her creed, nor those of her discipline." A true historical spirit could never have dictated the sentences that follow: "*The Presbyterian zealots were systematically intolerant: a common cause made toleration the doctrine of the sectaries.*"—"Const. Hist. of England," chap. x.

assemblages. It may be that the fervent spirit which so largely pervaded the body, and which is exhibited in the record of their frequent religious services, not only saved them from such manifestations of differences, but also did much to harmonize their conceptions of the truth, and to assist in formulating their common belief.

Under such conditions, it was natural that the Westminster symbols should assume, not the form and tone of partisanship, resounding like a trumpet-blast that summons warriors to battle, but rather the calm temper, the stately aspect and movement, the measured and quiet utterance which ought always to characterize such authoritative statements of the truth as it is in Jesus. Deliberation marks every chapter, almost every section. By no Protestant council was so much of time given to the consideration of what was to be stated ; by none was each paragraph, each sentence, each word, so carefully weighed. If the spirit of contention broke out in the debates, it was carefully eliminated from the final definition of the doctrines discussed. Hence, while there are no compromises in the symbols, there is much of tolerance and of conciliation. Though Arminianism receives no countenance, yet no legitimate variety of Calvinism is trodden under foot. Speculative questions are either set aside, or stated in their more moderate forms. It is the grand facts, the essential truths of the common system, which elicit the chief interest, and are made most central and prominent. The abstinence of these symbols, it should be specially observed, is as remarkable as their utterances are ; there is as much of wisdom often in their silence as in what they actually express. The dogmatizing literalist is generally disappointed in his search for the very word which would give authority to his private and patented dogma ; and if, perchance, he finds the desired indorsement somewhere, he is perplexed to discover suddenly, at another point, some balancing word or phrase which cuts down his conceit, and teaches him that the confession was made for no class of mere sectaries, for no differentiating school of theorists, but for all who receive, in good faith, the truths essential to the Calvinistic system. It is, consequently, no perversion of language, or of fact, to speak of the symbols of Westminster as moderate and generous, tolerant and catholic, in their main features

as well as in certain specified chapters. Although they sometimes fail, they still are seen to be remarkably such, if we take due account of the times, the circumstances, the conditions, amid which they were prepared. Embodying at least the purest catholicity of their age, they may justly be ranked as among the best Protestant affirmations of the broad principle, as old and as sacred as Christianity, that Christ is equally the head of all his saints, and that in him all his saints are vitally and eternally one.¹

Turning, at this point, from the doctrine and the ecclesiastical structure of Presbyterianism, to consider its actual career as a section of the common Protestantism, we shall find, notwithstanding some specific contradictions, a second series of convincing signs of catholicity. Such proof might legitimately be introduced by a reference to the historic attitude assumed by the Westminster Assembly towards other churches and polities in Britain, and toward the various branches, especially of Reformed Protestantism on the continent. The Assembly were substantially true, from the beginning, to the broad doctrine of their own chapter on *Synods and Councils*. Having affirmed that, since apostolic times, all such synods or councils may err, and that many such have erred—and, consequently, that these are not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but are to be used simply as helps in both—they were bound not only to refrain from assuming to themselves the infallibility which they denied to others, but also to accord to all parties the liberty of estimating the symbols they had prepared, and even to submit their aspirations for ecclesiastical supremacy to the popular judgment. While, therefore, they claimed a certain

¹ Some further illustrations of the fact under examination might readily be drawn from the "Form of Government," and from the "Directory for Worship," regarded as expressions of the current feeling of the Westminster divines. It is surprising how little of the more rigid *jus divinum* theory of the Church, or of the prescriptive theory of worship, so common in that age among all classes, has wrought itself into the firm texture of these documents. Broader and juster views of authority and of discipline can be nowhere found; and the tone as well as the precepts of the Directory are simply unsurpassed. FREEDOM, such as is vested inherently in every true child of God: and ORDER, such as ought to prevail in every true household of faith, are here most exquisitely blended.

measure of divine right for the polity they had framed, they neither could nor did assume the attitude of exclusive intolerance toward either the Prelatist or the Independent. While, during the brief period of their exaltation, they did insist upon uniformity in matters of usage and worship, as the delusive conception of a State Church constrained them to do, they did even this in no arrogant or exclusive temper, as if they were the sole inheritors of truth and grace. And when Presbyterianism yielded the sceptre of civil control to the rising party of Owen and Cromwell: and when, again, at the Restoration, it gave way irretrievably to the restored and dominant prelacy, the Presbyterian leaders could justly claim the benefits of their own good antecedents. As they had asserted the principle of liberty of conscience, they could now assert freely their own right to the liberty they had accorded to others. The more resolutely they had affirmed the full communion of saints and the universality of the Church, the more effectively could they now resist the assumptions of prelacy, and stand forth as advocates of a just and generous toleration. It is probably true that, in consequence of being thus thrown into the minority, they contributed more decisively to such toleration, and especially to the culture of a generous and catholic disposition in the British mind, than they could or would have done, had they still retained in their grasp the dangerous sceptre of civil supremacy.

But the efforts of the Assembly, and of the Presbyterian party, to establish a closer fellowship with their brethren of like faith on the continent, furnish a still more striking illustration of their true temper. Hetherington¹ has briefly described a movement for the combination of the various Reformed churches, on the basis of the Westminster symbols, which deserves a fuller examination and a more conspicuous place in denominational history than it has as yet received. He asserts that the Assembly entertained "the idea of a Protestant union throughout Christendom, not merely for the purpose of counterbalancing Popery, but in order to purify, strengthen, and unite all true Christian churches: so that, with combined

¹ "History of the Westminster Assembly." Amer. ed. p. 290. Also, "Bicentenary of the Westminster Assembly." Amer. ed. p. 92.

energy and zeal, they might go forth in glad compliance with the Redeemer's commands, teaching all nations, and preaching the everlasting Gospel to every creature under heaven." Baillie, in his "Letters," alludes to the same sublime idea in the words: "We are thinking of a new work *over the sea*, if this church were settled. The times of Antichrist's fall are approaching. The very outward providence of God seems to be disposing the continent for the receiving of the Gospel. And when the curtains of the Lord's tabernacle are thus far and much further enlarged, *by the means which yet appear not*, how shall our mouth be filled with laughter, our tongue with praise, and our heart with rejoicing." It is well known that, with this object in view, the Scotch Commissioners, under the leadership of Alexander Henderson, petitioned Parliament to authorize the Assembly to enter into correspondence with the Protestant churches in Holland and elsewhere: and that copies of the League and Covenant were sent with such correspondence, for the consideration of these continental churches. It is also known that the leading divines in the church of the Netherlands responded heartily to the proposal of such fraternal union, and sent letters approving the Covenant, and expressing their desire to be associated with British Presbyterianism under it. The conception of such fellowship was not new, in either ecclesiastical or political circles. Eighty years before, Calvin, in a letter to Cranmer, with that remarkable prescience which he so frequently exhibited, had advocated the calling together of a "godly synod" representing all parties, in order to promote both harmony in teaching and concert in ecclesiastical action. For nearly twenty years the eminent John Duræus had been inspired by the declaration of Godemann, one of the councillors of Gustavus Adolphus, that whoever should bring about a reconciliation between the great parties into which Protestantism was divided, would be the greatest of peacemakers.¹ Oxenstiern, the distinguished Chancellor of

¹ The name of John Dury, "the unchanged and single-hearted peacemaker," as he was styled, deserves, like that of George Calixtus, to be lifted in this age of catholicity into higher and worthier remembrance. Born in Edinburgh, educated at Leyden, sometime a student at Oxford, and afterwards pastor of an English congregation in Prussia, he gave himself at length, for life, to the work

Sweden, had already taken a vow, Lightfoot tells us, to "prosecute a reconciliation between Protestants in points of religion." And it was not surprising that the Assembly of Westminster should have hoped that, on the basis of the creed and polity they had framed, the whole of Protestantism, continental as well as insular, might ultimately be joined together in one broad and grand compact around the essentials of the common faith. If the spirit of the age was hostile to such a movement—if political interests and provincial differences, and the small jealousies of men and parties were too influential to permit such a consummation, it still must ever redound to the credit of British Presbyterianism that it had the mind to appreciate such a conception, and the heart to attempt its realization. Nor does it detract from that credit to recognize the fact that it was their own symbols which they hoped to make the basis of this broader fellowship; for those symbols were not in contrast with the preceding creeds, especially of the Reformed churches, but were rather the completest exposition extant of the faith equally dear to all of these churches, and as such were cordially appreciated and approved by all.

It must be frankly admitted that the British Presbyterianism of the seventeenth century was not on a level with the standard which it had itself set up, and that the spirit of the age was not sufficiently cultured to permit the exercise of a catholicity so high and inclusive. Both in England and in Scotland, denominational zeal and political scheming, and especially the desire for State supremacy and patronage, constantly tended to repress the more generous impulse; and instead of persisting in the scheme proposed by Henderson, and cultivating a truly ecumenical feeling, British Presbyterians fell into the narrownesses of sect, and lost something of both dignity and force. They became provincial rather than continental, and so re-

of pacifying and uniting Protestant Christendom. From 1630, till his death at Cassel in 1680, by journeys, by conferences, by letters, and publications, he was assiduous and absorbed in this single task. He visited successively Sweden, Denmark, the Palatinate, Germany, Prussia, Poland, Switzerland, and France, as well as the British Isles, in the prosecution of his high purpose. And futile though that purpose was, so far as the immediate results were concerned, it may well be held in grateful remembrance by all who believe in the one church of Christ on earth.

mained. Nor is there reason to suppose that the various churches across the channel, which were Calvinistic in doctrine and Presbyterian in form, would have been able to respond effectively to the British overtures. Each monarch, each petty prince, from Denmark to Switzerland, desired to have his own Church, with creed, and usage, and ceremony, such as pleased himself. The lines drawn by the bloody hand of civil power could not well be crossed, even by the Church of Christ. Protestantism was thus disintegrated by being provincialized, and on every side the avenues to a broad and helpful catholicity were closed. Protestantism became, under such influences, blind to some of its own grandest conceptions, and deaf to the voice of some among its ablest founders and defenders. And, consequently, the failure of Henderson, like that of Duræus and of Calixtus, was rendered inevitable. The spirit of the times was not equal to the realization of so grand an idea, and the Antichrist, whose end seemed to Baillie so nigh, only laughed to scorn a discordant and belligerent Protestantism, and went on his way to conquer again the continent which had once so nearly been delivered from his grasp.

It has sometimes been supposed that the catholicity infused by the Westminster symbols into British Presbyterianism was dangerous as well as unfruitful, and that it should be recognized as one among the remoter causes of that moderatism which afterwards became the occasion of so many ecclesiastical convulsions in Scotland ; and which, degenerating into latitudinarianism finally, in the following century, corrupted and well-nigh destroyed the Presbyterian Church in England. It is true that an indiscriminating catholicity may lead on to indifference, not only to things unimportant, but even to essential truth. It is true that fellowship with loose men may incite to looseness in faith, as in conduct ; that mere generosity may easily degenerate into careless acquiescence in error ; that the moderate man may insensibly change into a latitudinarian, culpably negligent of matters sacred and vital. But true catholicity bears no such fruit ; and it may well be questioned whether this tendency, as it subsequently developed itself in both the English and Scotch churches, should not rather be attributed to reaction from the prevalence of a spirit directly oppo-

site to such catholicity. As a highly dogmatical type of Calvinism in Holland aroused in Arminianism a strong reaction against itself, it is probable that a similar type of Calvinism, becoming prominent in Britain, and associating with itself an excessively rigid and sometimes tyrannical interpretation of polity and usage, was rather one chief cause and source of moderatism, whether north or south of the Tweed. The historian of British Presbyterianism is indeed bound to give some account of a fact so marked, and in many aspects so painful. The rise of moderatism in the very heart of a system so positive, compact, and vigorous, was certainly no accident ; it must have been the outgrowth either of forces inherent in the system, or of efficient causes acting upon the system from without, and compelling structural changes within it. But there is certainly nothing in the Calvinistic conception of Christianity which could directly produce such a phenomenon as the cold and dry Arianism that came like a blight upon the churches which the fathers of the Assembly had once planted and nourished into fruitfulness ; nothing that could directly have originated such men as the Scotch Moderates, "latitudinarian in doctrine, Erastian in policy, and worldly in life." Still less was this probably so much an abnormal development of Christian catholicity as it was a revolt of sinful human nature, under the guise of Christianity, against a rigidity which allowed no departure from the stiffest dogma, and a spirit which admitted no sort of compromise with imperfection. The very strength, firmness, cogency of the system, in the view of many, only increased the liability to such revolt, and made it more dreadful when it came. And it is not improbable that this liability was rendered the more serious by the dogmatic temper which men so often exhibit in dealing with sacred things, by the hair-splitting narrowness and harsh censoriousness, which betrays itself, ever and anon, even in the most orthodox who "preach Christ of contention." The Gospel itself may be preached, even by earnest minds, in a tone so denunciatory, or in proportions so distorted, as to produce nothing but a brood of errorists and of bold transgressors.

If moderatism was not so much the child as the parent of an excessive or inconsiderate catholicity, it should be admitted,

on the other hand, that the frequent and disastrous subdivisions of insular Presbyterianism especially, around mere ecclesiastical *differentiæ*, prove true catholicity to have been sadly defective in its practical influence. While the existence of a series of Presbyterian churches, national or provincial, is no clear indication of the absence of such a spirit, the wranglings, the splits, the secessions, the disruptions, the multiplied belligerencies occurring within the Presbyterian family itself, show too clearly that the temper of the Confession was far higher, purer, than that of many who thought they received, or professed to receive, it. The history of the divisions of the Presbyterianism of Scotland, for example, illustrates any and every other quality in the Christian apprehension and character rather than this. From the period of the formation, in 1733, under Ebenezer Erskine, of the associate Presbytery, and its speedy subdivision, in 1739, into Burghers and Anti-Burghers, onward through the subsequent conflicts and divisions represented in the Relief, the Old Lights and the New, and other seceding organizations, till the historic disruption of 1843, there is apparently a series of centrifugal forces warring against the coherencies of the Presbyterian system, and whirling into perpetual separation and antagonism those whom a true, warm catholicity would have held together in happy union. Stanley has, with very slight exaggeration, pointed out "the littleness and the minuteness of the points on which these religious divisions have taken place;" and he quotes the celebrated Lord Eldon as saying, in his judgment on the Craigdallie case, which involved the questions at issue between the Old Lights and the New: I hope I may be permitted, without offence to you, to say, that there may be some doubt whether we understand this subject, not only because the Court of Session is much more likely to understand it than we are, but because I have had the mortification, many times over, to endeavor myself to understand what these principles were, and whether the parties have, or have not, deviated from them; *and I have made the attempt till I find it, at least on my part, to be quite hopeless.*¹ It is but just to record the fact that most of these issues have occurred around the generic and still unsettled question as to the rela-

¹ Stanley, "History of the Church of Scotland." Lect. II.

tions between the Church and the State ; and that some others have involved important differences in doctrine, wherein the truth could be brought out in its completeness only through the strenuous, and even belligerent, advocacy for a time of its antithetic phases. Yet it is to be confessed that these antagonisms have played altogether too conspicuous a part in the history of Scottish Presbyterianism ; and with all possible allowance for diversity around the issue of patronage, or for variety in judgment on other points, it still must be regarded as a poor illustration of the catholicity of the symbols that four Presbyterian bodies, so largely one in faith and order, should be occupying their present position and relations in the small territory between the Firth of Solway and the Orkney Isles.¹

On a broader scale, it must also be confessed that European Presbyterianism, generally, has shared largely in the uncatholic spirit and habit which have so sadly marred Protestantism, in general, for the past two centuries. It was, perhaps, inevitable that that Protestantism, divided as it was by geographic and political lines, and by diversities of language and culture, should have come, before the close of the seventeenth century, to exist

¹ One cannot refrain from sympathizing with the pathos with which Dr. Norman Macleod, on assuming, in 1869, the Moderatorship of the General Assembly in the Established Church, quoted, with reference to these divisions, the touching lines from Christabel :

" Alas ! they had been friends in youth ;
But whispering tongues can poison truth ;
And constancy lives in realms above ;
And life is thorny ; and youth is vain ;
And to be wroth with one we love
Doth work like madness in the brain.

* * * * *

Each spake words of high disdain
And insult to his heart's best brother.
They parted—ne'er to meet again !
But never either found another
To free the hollow heart from paining.—
They stood aloof, the scars remaining,
Like cliffs which had been rent asunder :
A dreary sea now flows between ;
But neither heat, nor frost, nor thunder,
Shall wholly do away, I ween,
The marks of that which once hath been."

in a series of separate organizations, each keenly alive to its own peculiarities, and all too little conscious of the deep underlying unity which made them branches in the one Church of Christ. It was perhaps inevitable that even those which were substantially alike in their Calvinistic faith and their Presbyterian ardor, should pass into a similar state of isolation, and should even become mutually suspicious and antagonistic. As a fact, Continental Presbyterianism, like other varieties of Protestantism, so far as it has retained its primitive quality, has for the most part existed in this separate, isolated, unsympathetic condition: provincial rather than ecumenical in opinion, in feeling, in fellowship. One looks in vain for the beautiful dawning of that fair day of unity, and of consequent bloom and vigor, for which Calvin prayed, and which Henderson and Dury, and their compeers, labored to introduce. The rivalries of theological schools and teachers, the ambitions of princes and of states, the divisive influence of secular interests and institutions, and other kindred causes, have pushed and held apart those whom the strong bond of oneness in faith and ardor should have drawn indissolubly together. Against such forces the spirit of catholicity thus far has been too slight, too weak, to press its sacred claim; and European Presbyterianism, like European Protestantism generally, has had to bow in humiliation before the famous taunt of Bossuet, and to confess itself wanting, if not in that absolute, at least in that manifested unity which, as he fairly claimed, ought ever to distinguish the true Church of Christ.

The future historian of American Presbyterianism, as he traces its successive implantations, organizations, developments, conflicts from the beginning to the present hour, will be constrained to make some similar confession. As, with supreme fidelity to truth, he describes the career of its six or eight existing varieties, he will be compelled not merely to note their painful isolation one from another, but also to recognize a series of positive antagonisms and divisions among them, which he must regard as sadly at variance with the spirit of the symbols of Westminster. Granting the reality and the temporary importance of some, at least, among the occasions of such diversity, he will also realize that these *differentiæ* have had far

too much prominence, and have passed away far too slowly ; and he will confess that much of the influence which these bodies might have exerted on American life, and much of their inherent dignity and worth as churches of Christ, has in this way been impaired. He will not, indeed, have occasion to admit that Presbyterianism is, above other types of faith, weak or delinquent in this respect ; for among the evangelical sects of this land, none has done more to defend Christian liberty, or to maintain the common Christian doctrine, or to cultivate the temper of Christian confidence and love. If the crown of catholicity were to be set on any brow, it may justly be doubted whether any branch of the Church of Christ in this land would be pronounced worthier to wear it. But the hour for that grand coronation has not yet come !

With these proper admissions in regard to the imperfect realizations, historically, of the catholic spirit expressed in the Westminster Symbols, it may still be claimed, with entire fidelity to truth and fact, that this spirit is in a high degree characteristic of existing Presbyterianism, both European and American, and that especially on this continent it is rapidly becoming a conspicuous and dominant force in our denominational life. While that Presbyterianism sees no occasion to forswear or belittle its doctrines, or to surrender any essential feature of its polity, it still feels itself to be pledged, by the unaltered teaching of its ancient Confession, to the culture and the manifestation of a true Christian catholicity. That obligation it cordially confesses and assumes. It holds not less, but rather more firmly than of old, to the sacred affirmations of the fathers concerning Christian liberty and liberty of conscience : affirmations which have been maintained by former Presbyterians in the face of a thousand perils, and which are growing more significant and more precious, as the centuries go on. It still believes in the scriptural doctrine of the One Church of Christ, catholic and universal, in which all true churches are constituent parts, and in whose growth and triumph all believers may rejoice together. It still maintains, and seeks all proper occasions to make manifest, the apostolic teaching respecting the communion of saints : the vital oneness of all, in all lands and times, who are spiritually united to Christ, the

divine Head. It still breathes, as native air, the spirit of biblical moderation, of generous forbearance, of brotherly love and "sweet reasonableness," which flows off upon the Church from both the precepts and the example of the men who, like Henderson and Baillie, labored and prayed for the closer union of Protestant Christianity throughout the world. To all this, existing Presbyterianism, here and elsewhere, is forever pledged alike by principle and instinct, by position and by interest : and from that supreme obligation it is not likely to swerve, on the one hand, or to betray its own distinctive principles, on the other.

It is also obvious that existing Presbyterianism, especially in this country, is constrained to such exercise of catholicity, internally, in view of the considerable varieties in opinion, usage, tendency among those who agree in their generic acceptance of the common symbols. The Presbyterian who sings the psalms in the version of Rouse, and regards all other forms of social praise as illicit :—the Presbyterian who condemns all secret orders as inimical to Christianity, or who fences the table of the Lord around with tests of whatever sort, excluding true Christians :—the Presbyterian who believes in civil establishments, and claims the *regium donum* as a vested right of the Church : these, and all other Presbyterians who are differentiated from their brethren by cherished but non-essential peculiarities of any kind, are yet compelled, by their loyalty to the common system, to hold such peculiarities in reserve, and not only to tolerate, but also to respect all who rally with them around the one catholic banner. The tendency of the communion already established between these various bodies is to bring about the retirement of such differences, and to press into new prominence whatever is generic and universal. And as such communion is extended, this result will become more and more apparent : isolation and division will decrease : provincial peculiarities fall off : and the Presbyterianism of the world will become more and more unified, as well in spirit and action as in ardor and belief.

Existing Presbyterianism is also constrained to such exercise of catholicity, externally, in view of its peculiar relations to other sections of Protestantism, and of its special responsibility

with regard to the ultimate unification of Protestant Christianity. Already the Presbyterian churches of the world are coming to realize, not merely that they are under most sacred obligation to respect and to cherish each other, but also that they have broader duties, which include within their sweep every true church of Christ on earth. Presbyterianism is not indeed called to ignore or undervalue its own distinctive marks and principles, or to sweep aside any such marks or principles cherished by other denominations:—to reduce the aggregate of evangelical Christianity to that pulpy indifferentism, which has been fitly described as “a mush of sects.” Yet that Presbyterianism, as we believe, has been called of God to a special mission toward all Protestant bodies: a mission to proclaim and to exemplify before all its own true catholicity, in order to bring all into closer, more loving and fruitful fellowship around the central verities of the common Gospel. Set, providentially, in a central position among these churches, more widely diffused than any, strong enough to command attention and regard, pledged by its symbols and its history to charity toward all, and itself largely animated by the true temper of scriptural brotherhood, how grand an opportunity is now given to that Presbyterianism, and how sublime the mission on which it has already, half unconsciously, entered!

Presbyterianism provides for truth in requiring its ministers to be furnished for aptness in teaching, and to be true, in that teaching, to its standards—not in all minute *ipsissima verba*, but as containing the system taught in the Scriptures; for catholicity in opening the communion-tables to all who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity; for government by the people in the representative character of its polity and the parity of its ministry. It sets up no wall of exclusivism by denying the validity of the sacraments and ordinations as administered by other denominations, or fencing away their members from its communion, or their ministers from the courtesy of occasional pulpit exchanges. It provides for unity by a system of government in which the parts are subject, in the Lord, to the whole, and each to all; not as lording over their faith, but helpers of their joy. It is prepared to take a leading place in promoting

genuine catholicity by those marked provisions for securing truth, purity, charity, and unity in its constitution.

The sessions of the Westminster Assembly were held chiefly in the Jerusalem Chamber, in that famous abbey where so many of the illustrious dead of Britain are sleeping, and which Dean Stanley has recently characterized in fitting words as "a consecrated temple of reconciled ecclesiastical enmities." That chamber was not only "a faire roome," as Baillie in his *Letters* describes it, and one already made venerable by centuries of religious use; it was also memorable for its association with some significant events in English political history. It was here, for example, that Henry IV. was carried after his swoon in the adjacent chapel; and it was here that, lying on a low pallet before the fire, that haughty founder of the royal house of Lancaster yielded up his life. Shakespeare, with some poetic license, has made the room famous by associating it with the death-scene which closes the fourth act in his familiar tragedy:

King Henry.—Doth any name particular belong
Unto the lodging where I first did swoon?

Warwick.—'Tis called Jerusalem, my noble lord.

King Henry.—Laud be to God! even there my life must end.
It hath been prophesied to me many years,
I should not die but in Jerusalem,
Which vainly I supposed the Holy Land.
But, bear me to that chamber: there I'll lie:
In that Jerusalem shall Harry die!

In the middle of one of the longer sides in this room, and opposite the two long and narrow windows facing westward, stands the ancient fire-place where, during many of the sessions of the Assembly, a good fire blazed on the hearth, which, says Baillie, in his quaint account, "was some dainties at London." Spanning this hearth there is a curiously carved chimney-piece, which was placed there by Williams, Dean of Westminster in the days of Laud. It has recently been restored through the agency of the present Dean, and decorated with a series of Scripture texts in gold, suggested by the name given to the chamber itself. On the pilaster to the left are recorded the familiar words of the psalmist: PRAY FOR THE PEACE OF JERUSALEM: words which, studied in their connection, are seen to

express the strong and the absorbing love for one Church of God, that throbs like a passion in all pious hearts, in all dispensations. On the right pilaster are written the kindred words : BUILD THOU THE WALLS OF JERUSALEM ; words wherein the psalmist, even out of his deep humiliation, pours forth not simply his personal desire for the welfare of Zion, but a prayer in which the people of God throughout the earth may continually join, as the consummation of all possible pleading at the throne of the heavenly grace. On the broad facing above, the visitor reads that triumphal utterance of the great apostle to the Gentiles : JERUSALEM, WHICH IS ABOVE, IS FREE. In these words, both the fraternal exhortation to prayer, on the one hand, and the trustful prayer itself, on the other, are transmuted into a prophecy and a hope, and all are invited to look forward by faith to a period when the divided churches shall be gathered, and all separating differences forever lost, in the fellowship and glory of the Jerusalem which is above. Well will it be for Presbyterianism, present and future, throughout the world, as it looks back to that chamber where its symbols were prepared, if it shall read afresh the psalmist hymn, the Messianic desire, and the apostolic prediction there recorded ; and if, under the influence of the better spirit breathed upon it from that hallowed place, it shall go forth to bear, century after century, some conspicuous part in the realizing of these inspired declarations. And unto God be all the praise !

EDWARD D. MORRIS.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN ITS VITAL FORM AND POSITIVE ATTITUDE.

CHRISTIAN theology is not merely apologetic, but is especially positive ; it is not a mere system, but a vital, spiritual organism.

A few primary considerations, without in the least exhausting the subject, will establish the truth of these propositions.

Christian theology, in its broadest classification, includes the doctrines concerning God, and man, and the God-man—or, the divine, the human, and the divine-human.

Theology must be constructed, not from philosophy and science, but, from divine revelation in the works and in the Word of God ; “and Christ himself is best seen in the Scriptures.”

Christian theology depends, especially, on an historic real Christ or Redeemer ; on an historic real Scriptures or written revelation, referring to and including Christ. It will not be contradictory to sound philosophy and right reason, but may transcend either.

The progress of theology, of which so much is said in some quarters, is in degree, not in kind—in degree as the divine Teacher himself, coming from heaven, tells more definitely and more fully of God and of heavenly things, and in himself exemplifies the great truths of theology. “He who gave the Bible built the universe.” Therefore, for its data, Christian theology ranges the entire kosmos, material and mental, and the whole Scriptures, from the first divine fiat recorded in Genesis, and the first promise in Paradise, announcing to fallen man a dispensation in mercy : “The seed of the woman shall bruise

the serpent's head," until, at last, this dispensation culminates in completed redemption.

Theology, as the term signifies, is a science—even the science of God. "Of the truth with which it is concerned, God is the Supreme Author and the Supreme Object." It was, indeed, objected in the eighth century by John of Damascus (the great authority then, and now, in the Greek Church), that theology cannot be the science of God, because we do not absolutely know what God is. And this objection is revived by the scientific know-nothingism of the present day. This objection, Thomas Aquinas of the thirteenth century, and others since his time, have scientifically refuted. These refutations cannot here be repeated. A fit reply may be made in the words of Zophar to Job, emphasized as they were by an interrogation—"We cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection." You cannot comprehend the infinite Being, nor bring him within the limits of the finite; but you may apprehend him as he reveals himself to the finite. In the language of Paul, "We know in part," and this is real knowledge. Men know, so far as God has revealed himself, and as they have been attentive to the revelation. Indeed, nothing is known absolutely unto perfection. So the objection refutes itself. It proves too much. If valid, it would destroy all science, even the science of the scientist, the science of the objector.

Theology as a science begins with the supreme truths of God's being, his nature and attributes, his plan and purpose, his works and government,—in a word, with what we may know of God, as the highest possible knowledge which can concern us. Hence, it is the study of the Divine—of the Supreme.

At the very outstart, we inquire, What are our data? how can we know? It is at once evident into what vast fields of research these questions are the introduction. We may search the universe of worlds, physical and spiritual. The study leads us into the realms of matter and of mind, to trace the order of creation and the order of Providence.

At every step are met accumulating, positive evidences. Theology undertakes to trace these evidences, to arrange and classify them. It is only necessary to recall this process, to see that theology is a science, and, as such, how trustworthy it is.

Science is accurate, self-consistent knowledge, arranged and classified, if possible, into a complete system. Not that men have really attained this completeness in any science, but they seek it.

The data for science, in general, are all facts or evidences that come from any and every direction. This, no one will deny, be he a gnostic or an agnostic—a knower or a know-nothing.

Now, the corporeal senses give facts or evidences ; self-consciousness gives facts or evidences ; reason or intuition gives facts or evidences ; divine revelation, wherever made, gives facts or evidences. These facts or evidences are of a steadily ascending grade, both in importance and in trustworthiness. No reasonable man will deny that his reason is more trustworthy than his corporeal senses.

Can certainty be attained for science ? Men are made certain by their corporeal senses, as of things around them. This would be readily admitted by the most of mankind. Men are made certain by self-consciousness, as of their own mental existence. This will be readily admitted by the most of mankind. They are made certain by sound reasoning, as in business, and law, and literature. This, perhaps, none will deny. They are made certain by reason or intuition, as in the case of axioms and first principles. This, no one can deny ; or, if any one should, we could only pity and pass him by as mentally deficient. Men are made certain by credible testimony everywhere that credible testimony can reach, as in civil courts, even in cases of life and death. This, the very term, credible, necessitates. Assuredly, and *à fortiori*, they are made certain by a combination of all these ; and all these are combined in theological science. So that, as desired, and as should be expected in this higher science which supremely concerns men, they have superior and combined proofs. This needs illustration only in outline.

By the corporeal senses, we look out upon the universe of material things. By our self-consciousness we look in upon the mind. In each direction effects appear ; and these we reasonably and rightly trace back to some original cause.

Again, we observe mutual adaptation in the material things around us, small and great, so that the worlds great and small

make a universe. More than this, we see such mutual adaptation between our minds and the universe of things, that for each and every mind it is the same universe. And the argument, reasonable and right, is that the original cause is intelligent and wise—and wisely ordered this marvellous adaptation.

Again, in individuals and in society, there is a moral consciousness which reveals moral agency and moral responsibility ; and the argument is, reasonable and right, that the original cause is not only intelligent author, but also moral governor.

Reason, the highest mental faculty, affirms that there must be a first cause or eternal source of all other things and phenomena ; and that this original cause must be an adequate cause of all other things and phenomena—that is, “ the eternal power and Godhead.” This, reason affirms. So that the idea of God is native to the rational soul. Hence, as soon as reason begins to be developed, the idea of God appears in proportion to that development,—divinely inwrought into the very constitution of every rational soul ; and from which the soul, while it remains rational, cannot probably (not to say, possibly) divest itself. There may be errors as to who, or what, God is ; yet there is, nevertheless, the idea that God is.

Thus there is a fourfold certainty. Now, if even one of these, as Paul intimates, Rom. 1 : 20, leaves men without excuse, what shall be said of this fourfold combination ? And the entire combination is not yet reached. There is, yet, the crowning credible testimony of prophets and apostles, and, above all, of Christ Jesus the Lord. All these are confirmed by the common belief of the human race in the supernatural ; while each proof is capable of almost limitless amplification.

It should not fail to be noted, in passing, that Christian theology does not exclude science ; for, as already shown, it is itself a science. Christian theology has no hostility to other sciences. It is itself a science. All true sciences harmonize ; and, when properly understood, are seen to harmonize. Christian theology does not teach other sciences. It is itself a science—the science of divine things—and every science teaches but itself. This is the divine order. Geology does not teach astronomy ; botany does not teach chemistry. Yet, if all are properly understood, there is no conflict between them. If a

scientist should raise the cry of hostility among these sciences, he would demonstrate, only, his ignorance of one or the other of them. The application is evident.

On the one hand, then, Christian theology does not exclude or condemn science ; on the other hand, as already shown, it does include positive knowledge. Knowledge is positive and real, however gained—whether by observation, by personal experience, by reasoning, by intuition, or from history. To restrict this term positive to knowledge gained by the corporeal senses—sight, hearing, touch, etc.,—as is sometimes done by a pretentious school of modern sciolists, is sheer and shameless assumption, without warrant and without wisdom.

It follows that theology is a positive science, while skepticism is only doubt or negation. Theology is positive, not merely apologetic. Christian theology is especially positive. As such, it has a positive historical origin, in Christ ; a positive historical revelation ; a positive Christian history ; positive prophecies fulfilled ; positive Christian doctrines ; a positive Christian experience for each ; a positive Christian future for all, with its rewards and penalties.

But, farther, every science has a central principle by which it would bring its truths into mutual coherence and arrange them into a system. Christian theology forms about Christ, in whom revelation culminates. Christ, not as excluding nature and Scripture, but as being chief. To him gave all the prophets witness. We would not, as some do, confine Christian theology to the specific words of Christ ; but we would include all that Christ indorsed and authorized. Yet his teaching must be paramount, for he declares : “ As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father.” “ No man knoweth the Son, but the Father ; neither knoweth any man the Father, but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.” As “ God manifest in the flesh,” he appeals to human sense, and thought, and emotion, and will ; and thus evokes and stimulates the intuitive idea of God, and in himself combines and completes all the evidences.

And here it will not be inappropriate to consider, briefly, the bearing of the modern theory of evolution, and survival of the fittest, upon the old theistic argument from design.

In the first place, it is obvious to remark, this theory is not demonstrated. Scientists have a scientific right to wait for scientific demonstration. The prudent would, probably, regard this not only as a right, but also a duty. Here the case might rest.

But, in the second place, if the theory were demonstrated, it would strengthen this theistic argument, rather than invalidate it. It would furnish evidence of marvellous adaptation—a most exact, and far-reaching, and unfailing adjustment of internal and external relations to the best results. Who but God, the omniscient, can decide what is fittest or best? Who but God, the omnipotent, can secure, in the on-going future, that the fittest and best shall survive? So, if development in this direction—survival of the fittest—were scientifically demonstrated in an evolution divinely originated and divinely controlled, no damage could result to the argument from design, or to Christian theology. This theory would account only for the historic changes, not for the ultimate causality; for the process, not for the principle of things; for the on-going, not for the origin of the world. To this origin of the world, physical science cannot reach. Its sphere is the natural. Within that sphere, it cannot, of course, find the supernatural. Comte, though he made his confession maliciously, confessed simply the truth (which is quite as well known with or without his confession), that “science”—physical science—“can find no first cause.” Certainly not; for, if it could, it would find the cause in the effect—that is, the two distinct things would be identically one and the same thing; the maker and the thing made would be the same thing, which would be absurd.

Science—physical science, such as is meant by Comte and some other noisy scientists of this day—physical science studies the created, not the Creator: “the things that are made,” not the Maker. And it is a truth for to-day and for all the years to come—a truth which ought to exclude all fear in regard to science: that no demonstrated natural science will—can ever—disprove the divine authorship of nature. As an indication, after all the parade and bluster by the materialists over molecular grouping and molecular motion, even Prof. Tyndall admits that “it explains nothing. The problem even of the connec-

tion of soul and body is," he says, "as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the pre-scientific ages."

But there is stronger ground than this. If the natural history of things were demonstrated to be one of development or evolution, as it is not yet, it would strongly, perhaps more strongly than ever, display the wisdom and power of God in originating and guiding it.

Might not such an evolution, originated and controlled of God so as to admit of supernatural intervention by him, crown the argument from design with unwonted force? And further, might it not supplement the proofs for some of the most important Calvinistic doctrines in Christian theology? Here, as elsewhere, Christian theology is in accord with true science. All it asks for, is scientific demonstration. It is prompt to recognize any discovery in the republic of thought, or in the realm of nature. It does—it should despise hasty, unwarranted inferences from unauthorized theories. With such feeling it must regard the crude creed lately proposed by the apostle of "the new faith :"

"The new faith rests upon evolution. It is persuaded that things have been working themselves gradually into intelligent forms, into beautiful shapes, into varied use, loveliness, and power. It discards miracles, rejects every thing like supernatural imposition, considers as obsolete the popular theory of revelation. It has no inspired books, distinguished in character and content from the world's best literature. It sets up no teachers and prophets, as proclaiming an infallible word. It expects no infallible word from any source."

In regard to the first truth—God's existence, essential as it is, and fundamental to all other truths in Christian theology, it is noticeable that Christ and the Scriptures assume it as already taught : inlaid as it is in nature, pervading universal providence, and inwrought into man's very rational constitution. So that with difficulty, if at all, can the rational soul divest itself of this truth. So that providence cannot dispense with God. So that material nature, with voices accumulating throughout the universe, with one accord testifies of God. Hence, neither does Christ, nor do the Scriptures, offer syllogistic arguments to demonstrate the existence of God. These, abundant as they are, lie within the field of natural theology—a field which every

rational soul must traverse, or at least touch in his pathway through time. As Tertullian beautifully observes : " God hath sent nature before as an instructress, purposing to send revelation afterward, in order that, as disciples of nature, we may more easily hearken to revelation."

But Christ and the Scriptures everywhere recognize this primary and paramount truth—God's existence. The first utterance of inspired revelation is : " In the beginning, God—" And the first recorded declaration of Jesus is, of the Father : " Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"

Christian theology organically incorporates this truth, and positively and forever excludes theoretical atheism. While to practical atheism—the atheism of choice and not of conviction—it addresses this withering condemnation : " The fool hath said in his heart, there is no-God." And this fatal moral heresy it strives to correct—strives with the moral means, human and divine, which God has ordained.

But what is the nature and what are the attributes of God? These great questions, Christian theology distinctly, formally, and repeatedly answers. As an instance, it declares the Divine Spirituality. Christ announced to the woman of Samaria, and to all the world : " God is Spirit." Even the article is omitted, and *πνεῦμα* placed first, as if to challenge attention and emphasize the thought that God is Spirit. What a pure and peerless conception of God is this? Yet this is Christ's conception—the perfect conception.

And this at once positively and forever excludes materialism. But, as in the case of atheism, so here, in excluding theoretic materialism, there is the attendant condemnation of practical errors, formalism, and hypocrisy—which forever threaten the spiritual life. " Worship God," says the Saviour, " in spirit and in truth."

With every new view of Christian theology, it appears not merely as theoretic and logical, but, more distinctly, as organized and vital; and, in its positive attitude, appears more and more instinct with spiritual life.

The divine personality is everywhere manifest in the Scriptures. With emphatic repetition, Christ inculcated this essential truth. The very prayer which he taught opens with the

recognition of this truth : " Our Father which art in Heaven." His commission to the Apostles finds its special significance in this higher truth : " As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you." His promise of the Spirit involves this truth. " The Comforter is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name. . . . He will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment." Here is a positive exclusion at once, both of pantheism and materialism. Pantheism would confound the creature and the Creator, nature and God—making every thing God—and thus destroy all personality.

Materialism would confound God and nature, the Creator and the creature—making God every thing, and thus destroy all personality. These errors, materialistic and pantheistic, revived in this day, logically deny all individuality, all Christian worship, all moral obligation, all morality ; and, with baleful communistic frenzy, would invade the very sanctuary of the soul's devotion, and strike down religion itself—leaving the heart desolate, the domestic altar desolate, the Christian temple desolate, the soul desolate for time and eternity. However these errors may for a while prevail, they cannot abide. Repeatedly rejected as alien by science and philosophy, they are excluded by Christian theology, and condemned by the soul's consciousness and the soul's want as alien and abhorrent.

But there is no need to recount the divine attributes. The existence of God, his spirituality and personality, include and secure the infinite perfection of his attributes.

But, Christian theology makes especial mention of the sacred Scriptures as a human need and a divine gift. In regard to the need of revelation it may be asked, Did the world by wisdom find out God ? Did it understand the mysteries of providence, of life and of death—the mystery of the soul's origin and destiny, the present and the hereafter—the mystery of conscience and sin and penalty ? Where law and life seemed in irreconcilable conflict, could it, unaided, answer the solemn questions which ceaselessly clamored for reply ? If not, then there was human need profound, persistent : then the desire and the expectation of the most thoughtful, like Socrates, that light should be given and a divine teacher should come ; or the anxious inquiry of the soul, " If a man die, shall he live

again?" or of Paul, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" or of the philosopher, "Whence am I, and whither am I going?"—then, we say, these inquiries express the need of common humanity, groping in the darkness, looking for the light, longing for deliverance. The human need is evident, is even oppressive.

Are the Scriptures a divine gift?

There is no need to dwell upon the perfect character and the divine life which are given in Christ, which no human mind could fabricate, and which no human life can equal. Even Renan said, Whoever could originate such a story must be greater than the hero himself.

There is no need to dwell upon the doctrines taught, the prophecies fulfilled, the miracles wrought, the precepts, and the promises, and the provisions revealed in these Scriptures. It is enough for the present purpose, enough for the argument, to say that Christ recognized the Scriptures as divine; and the Apostles declared them to be the gift of God.

The forcible argument, Good men could not have written thus without divine aid; and bad men would not, if they could, have written such a book—this brief argument, so often substantially repeated, is, at least in this statement of it, conclusive.

The divine authority and inspiration of the holy Scriptures is another essential positive truth included in Christian theology.

And this great truth, at once and forever, excludes the ancient heresy of gnosticism which has reappeared in the modern garb of rationalism. Against this arrogance of ambitious reason, Christian theology would carefully guard, while it everywhere recognizes the nobility and value of the human soul, declaring its unequalled estimate in the suggestive words of the Saviour, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Holy Scripture does, indeed, recognize the strength and superiority of reason as the crowning faculty of the human soul; and as a revelation addresses itself to human reason, yet it is evermore the infinite reason addressing the finite, and by its divine presence revealing the weakness and dependence

of the human reason. As before, so here, while Christian theology excludes the vain error of gnosticism and rationalism, and includes, as essential, the divine authority and inspiration of the Scriptures, it makes this truth vital and spiritual, recognizing the Scriptures as the rule of faith and life—in the words of Jesus saying, “Search the Scriptures, . . . they testify of me ;” repeating, at all times and everywhere, this divine injunction, as if with utmost deliberation guarding the interests both of God and man : “To the law and the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them ;” enforcing the injunction by the prayer of the Redeemer, “Sanctify them through the truth ; thy word is truth.” Without recounting all the evidences, internal and external, experimental and collateral, enough has been given, and more than enough, to substantiate the divine authority of the Scriptures.

Henceforth men may take the written Word of God as their inspired guide, secure in its guidance, and secure only in this. By this theopneustic test they are to try all doctrines, all revealings, all revealers—to try even the spirits. By this they are to distinguish between the false and the true ; by this, to identify the very Christ himself.

The Scriptures testify of Christ—whence he is, who and what he is, why he came, his lineage, his life, his death—with specific attendant circumstances ; men cannot be mistaken when he cometh, for Christ the living Word will verify the written Word of God. And, as they seek and listen, they hear one speak as never man spake : “I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of Him that sent me.” “The Word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s, which sent me.”

Is this, then, the Son of God ? His first public discourse opens with benedictions, such as the human race had never before, has never since heard. Is it Jesus who speaks ? His public reading in the synagogue is from the prophecy of Isaiah, uttered 700 years before, involving an historical observance established 1500 years before, which God ordained as a type of the Gospel that should be proclaimed by the Messiah. The Scriptural type and prophecy, he said to the people, is this day

fulfilled in your ears. The prophecy mentioned in Luke, 4th chap., is retraced to the 61st chap. in the Book of Esaias, and the type is retraced to the 25th chap. of Leviticus. Is he, then, the Christ? He invites the all-important question. He points to the inspired record, saying to the people then, and to all the world evermore, "Search the Scriptures. In them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me." Has Immanuel come? Long ago, in the distant centuries, the Scriptures foretold that Immanuel, the divine man, should be born in Bethlehem, the city of David. And so the angels sang at the birth of Christ: "This day is born in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord." But the prediction was that Christ should be born of a virgin, and Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary. But the prophecy was that there should be a forerunner of the Messiah. And John the Baptist, the harbinger, said: "He that cometh after me is preferred before me, for he was before me;" and, pointing to Jesus, he said: "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." But the prophecy was that Christ should perform miracles, and Christ pointed the people then, and all the world, to his miracles, saying: "If I do not the works of God, believe me not." "The works that I do, they bear witness of me."

The argument is cumulative. More than the limits assigned would be filled in recounting his miracles and in showing the prophecies fulfilled, which referred to the particulars in his life, in his sufferings, in his death, in his resurrection and ascension.

But enough. According to the Scriptures, this is the Christ. And with this record the Christian may challenge the attention, the scrutiny, the faith of the world.

But while he is Immanuel—God incarnate—is he also the Man divine? Christian theology replies with multiplied repetition, He is the Son of Man; fourscore times repeating, He is the Son of Man. It carefully calls men to behold him in the likeness of man. He was a child born. He grew in wisdom and in stature—was baptized in the Jordan. He hungered, and ate. He walked, and was weary. He rested, and slept. He was tempted—was a man of sorrows. He wept as he stood by the grave of Lazarus, and as he beheld Jerusalem. He prayed on the Mount, in the garden, on the cross. He was

crucified, dead, and buried. He rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures, and showed himself alive openly, pointing to the print of the spear in his side, and of the nails in his hands and feet.

While he was truly the Son of God, he was also truly the Son of Man.

In Christ, then, we find the Divine-human, the God-man, the Mediator into whose hands all things are ordained. Now we have the key to the highest problems of earth or heaven. Now we have the centre to the system of Christian theology ; and this is a centre of essential personal life and light. It is not a mere system, but a vital spiritual organism. We can conceive of a possible theology without a Christ ! But Christian theology without Christ is impossible. Without him the system would be without a centre—would be a chaos, with darkness resting upon the great deep, for time and eternity. But with him, we have the true light to enlighten every man. Without him, it were a lifeless form ; but with him, it is the form divine, in which is life, and the life is the light of men.

Now the Scriptures may be interpreted. The enigmas of life and time, of death and eternity, begin to be understood. The very doctrines find their best explanation and arrangement in Christ. Mysteries hidden for ages begin to be revealed in the light of this great presence—the God-man. The Lion of the tribe of Judah hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof. And backward and forward along the line of human history—aye, along the line of human thought—and more than this, along the line of God's eternal purpose, there streams the light of this revealing in Christ.

Whatever else may be included in Christian theology, this doctrine of the Christ is essential. Of whatever else the Christian Church has been tolerant, of this she has been tenacious. However the humanitarian error of the Ebionites may have occasionally revived into spasmodic growth, it has been disowned by the Church of Christ, and excluded from the Christian system. Christian consciousness and Christian theology spurn indignantly the weak and wicked heresy of a merely human redemption, and a merely human redeemer. This statement should be emphasized the more strongly, because of

the modern rationalistic tendency in philosophizing and theologizing, which would see nothing supernatural or divine in Christ, or in the Scriptures. But while Christian theology does reverently hold, and loyally and fearlessly maintain, the great truth of Christ's divinity, it would by no means surrender the truth of Christ's humanity. To the Docetism of the second century, and, no less, to its modern modifications, this is evermore the inspired reply: "Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an Antichrist." Christian theology as positively excludes, and calls men to guard against the early error revived, which denies not only that Christ is divine and human; but which also denies that he is divine or human, and asserts that he is only superhuman or superangelic, but neither truly God nor man. This error, so recondite, so insinuating, and so industriously inculcated by Arius, though confronted by the Christian intellect and Christian piety of the fourth century, and for 1500 years condemned by the Christian Church, has, with kindred errors, reappeared substantially in the present century. And, again, both Christian courage and Christian zeal, like that of young Athanasius, are summoned to the defence of the truth.

In the system of revealed religion, these are the three great points of attack: the Divine existence; the Divine authority of the Scriptures; and the Divine Incarnation—because they are vital to the system.

In Christian theology, Christ, the Divine-human, the God-man, is the essential and central doctrine. Luther was wont to say that justification by faith is the doctrine by which the Church stands or falls. Should we not rather say that this doctrine of Christ's divinity and humanity is the doctrine of the standing or the falling Church; better still, the doctrine of the standing Church?

"Whom say ye that I am?" was the Master's question to the disciples. Peter replied, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." Never did human reply receive such approval as Christ gave to this: "Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed this unto thee, but my Father, which is in heaven." "On this rock will I build my

church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." How important to the Christian Church, Christ considered this doctrine, is henceforth unmistakable.

And now the doctrines of Christian theology readily form into systematic order around Christ, the central sun. The Old Testament promises, and symbols, and types, and prophecies find their fulfilment in Him, and glow with divine significance. In this great light, God is revealed with distinctness as never before, in the tri-personality of his being; for he that was born of the Virgin Mary is the Son of the Father, conceived of the Holy Ghost: and, lo! the Divine Trinity now appears—God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Wherefore did he come? "To seek and save that which was lost." "God so loved the world—" The doctrines of God's grace and of man's salvation take their place in the enlarging system. Why did the Sovereign become obedient unto the law, and suffer and die? "That God might be just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus." "That as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." These doctrines of sin, of man's first disobedience, of atonement, and of justification by faith, take their place in the Christian system. But how many were involved in the ruin of sin? The answer is twofold: "Death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." "Christ became a propitiation for our sins, and for the sins of the whole world." Was this necessary? The answer is twofold: "Without shedding of blood is no remission." "While we were without strength, . . . Christ died for the ungodly." In this twofold direction—the divine and the human—it must needs be. Therefore the cup of suffering could not pass by the Son of God—the Saviour. The doctrines of universal depravity and the need of a divine redemption take their place in the Christian system. How, then, shall any be saved in this kingdom of grace? "Ye must be born again." "Not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." The doctrine of regeneration, with the need and the mode both clearly indicated, takes its place in the Christian system. Who, then, can be saved? This is the answer from Christ himself: "He that believeth on me *hath* eternal life;

he that believeth not, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." Far out into the system do these great doctrines lead. Thus Christian theology, as it sweeps out from Christ, the living, divine centre, reaches to the final judgment, and has the compass of eternity, both in its rewards and in its penalties. These great doctrines, and others which spring from the relations of God, and man, and the Mediator, are all included in Christian theology.

From this very outline of the system which centres in Christ, it is evident what is necessarily excluded. Now, Christian theology gathers up all into a higher unity—in Christ Jesus, who is "God manifest in the flesh." Thus, Christ is the Divine Revealer; and Christian theology is the highest type of any and of all theology. As a crowning characteristic of his fulness, the apostle Paul declares that Christ, as the Divine-human, is the Reconciler. The grandest possible description of Christ concludes with these inspired words: "For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell; and having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself."

The perfect system, ensphered around the divine Christ, becomes aglow with knowledge, and life, and love. And so Christian theology, pervaded by the informing presence of this divine personality, and interpenetrated by this divine life, becomes a science both living and divine; to be enjoyed as well as to be believed—convincing to the intellect, satisfying to the soul, "the power of God, and the wisdom of God, unto salvation"—at once most positive in its attitude, most vital in its form.

RANSOM B. WELCH.

GENUINENESS OF THE PENTATEUCH.

THEY who deny the reality of supernatural religion are under an antecedent necessity of denying the genuineness and truth of the Pentateuch. If it be, as it claims and has always been believed to be, the work of Moses, the stupendous miracles which it recounts were recorded by a contemporary and eyewitness, and its prophecies were uttered and reduced to writing ages before their fulfilment. Unbelieving critics are here constrained either to desert their principles or in some way to set this formidable antagonist aside. The attempt has been made to do this without invalidating the stringent considerations which connect the Pentateuch with the great lawgiver, by explaining away its miracles and prophecies or reducing them to the level of marvellous occurrences and strange coincidences, which, however unique and unaccountable, are nevertheless not absolutely supernatural. But this requires such evident forcing of the language and perverting it from its plain intent, that this method of escape, once so popular, is now rarely resorted to. It seems easier to deny the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and to allege that, instead of being the genuine production of Moses or of his age, its histories were not written for many centuries after his death, when legends that are wholly untrustworthy and fictitious had gathered about the facts related, even if any historic base is to be assumed whatever; and the alleged prophecies are affirmed to be either sanguine anticipations which were never realized, or history clothed in the garb of prediction after the events had actually taken place.

But this is, after all, not so easy a task as it might appear. All

the subsequent history of Israel, all their poetic and prophetic scriptures, are full of incidental confirmations of the Pentateuch, and necessarily imply or presuppose its truth and its Mosaic origin, even where they do not expressly refer to it. There is an unbroken chain of evidence reaching back to the very days of Moses ; this must be severed or pronounced untrustworthy. To maintain his point with any show of plausibility, the critic must reconstruct the whole history of the people of Israel from the beginning, and he must declare a large portion of their well-accredited writings to be spurious and untrustworthy. He cannot rid himself of Moses without at the same time making havoc of Joshua, and Samuel, and David, and Solomon, and later kings and prophets. If Moses did not do and teach what is recorded of him, the accounts which we have of subsequent times must be similarly untrue. The historians, and prophets, and sacred writers among the Jews must have been deliberate falsifiers from first to last ; not only when they record the miraculous, but in narratives in which there is no trace of the supernatural, and where the most obstinate prejudice can suggest no motive for misrepresentation.

But if the critics are successful in proving the Hebrew records to be as untrustworthy and misleading as they would have us believe, the result is as fatal to themselves as to their antagonists. In undermining accredited beliefs they have left no ground for their own card structures to stand upon, which they are at such pains to build. They propose to set aside the history consistently taught in the sacred writings for an entirely new conception of the matter presented by themselves. No two of the critics are agreed, to be sure, in what shall be substituted for old opinions ; they concur only in this, that the old must be abandoned ; as to the rest, each is sublimely satisfied with his own infallible dictum, and can afford to look down superciliously on all the rest. He discredits every thing in the gross that does not accord with his theory ; he suffers that only to stand which can be so wrested or garbled as to lend it a seeming support. But their alleged foundations are, after all, found in the records which have been pronounced untrustworthy and unhistorical. And if the torture might be overlooked,

to which they are put to wring deductions from them that they do not sanction, there is nothing but the unsupported word of the critic to show that these passages are any more trustworthy than the rest which he has summarily swept away.

But, even thus, when the Hebrew history and the Hebrew writings have been tinkered without stint to suit themselves, the critics can still find no place for the introduction of the Pentateuch at any one time, or in any one age, and its imposition on the people as the work of Moses. They can only insinuate it piecemeal. It is accordingly broken up into parts and parcelled amongst different imaginary writers belonging to distinct ages. The work of each is supposed to have been taken up by his successor and altered, interpolated or added to, *ad libitum*, until finally, by a process of successive accretions which confessedly has no parallel in all literary history, the work was evolved. We are here in a region of unlimited and baseless conjecture, with nothing to rest upon but the good pleasure of the critic, and no external authority whatever to verify or check his hypothesis. Here, again, there is no agreement among the critics, who affect an independence of thought ; and no one succeeds even in framing a hypothesis that proves to be throughout consistent with itself, and that does not impinge against that modicum of facts which he has suffered to remain amidst the general wreck or has conjured into being as necessary to his scheme.

In these card structures, which the critics rear and overthrow at will, a conspicuous place is of course assigned to those difficulties and seeming discrepancies of a superficial nature which are to be expected in a work of such high antiquity as the Pentateuch, belonging to a period with which we are so imperfectly acquainted and which is in many respects so foreign to our habits of thought and action. These have always been recognized by believers in its Mosaic origin, and attempts have been made, with more or less success, to account for and explain them. Every conscientious student of writings that have come down to us from a remote period has a similar task to perform in regard to them. Adjustments are necessary to bring into harmony statements that, at first view, seem discrepant and conflicting. And when such reconciliation can be

effected by any fair dealing, an apparent diversity with a real substantial agreement is by candid minds reckoned as lending confirmation to the truth of a narrative. Not so the critics of the Pentateuch. They make it their deliberate aim to hunt up and exaggerate difficulties and create apparent discrepancies by a perverted ingenuity where none exist. The books of Moses have been searched over with microscopic minuteness and with an immense expenditure of philological and varied learning; points hitherto unobserved have been raised and familiar matters have been put into ingenious and unexpected relations and a clamor created, as though the old traditional notion that Moses wrote them must be given up before advanced thought and progressive ideas.

This aspect of affairs has created very needless alarm in some of the friends of the Bible, as though its defence were really in straits, and there were much in it for which no successful stand could be made. But in truth there is no occasion for any unseemly agitation. This reckless and presumptuous criticism is in fact but the scourge of a tardy and inadequate Biblical scholarship, and a stinging but effective stimulus to thorough and exhaustive investigation on the part of those who would defend and maintain sound views. Enigmas carelessly left unsolved, and difficulties not sifted to the bottom, or which are slurred over by plausible but inadequate explanations, are thus avenged. Hurts healed slightly, instead of being faithfully probed to the quick by skilful and tender hands, and thus brought to a perfect cure, are detected by the rudeness of unfriendly handling. Artillery left unguarded, that should have been stored in our own arsenals, or put in position on our own defences, is turned against us, compelling us to retake it from the foe. The temptation to rest content with superficial solutions when no danger is apprehended, or to put down an adversary by inconclusive arguments when the sympathy of the public can be relied upon to overlook the deficiency, or to sit at ease in insecure entrenchments so long as the roar of the conflict is away beyond the seas, is summarily dispelled when, by some turn of affairs, the neglected point is found to involve important issues; or a less reverent spirit is abroad which looks serenely upon the upheaving of the old founda-

tions ; or the legions of doubt and critical excesses with which Germany has been swarming, pour in upon our own shores and are gaining victories with weapons long since discredited at home. This is but the providential method of compelling the lovers of God's word to a deeper and more careful study of its contents. They must spoil the Egyptians. They must take the learning of their foes and their results elaborated with hostile intent, and build them into secure defences, or gather from them what shall contribute to a more complete elucidation or a more vivid presentation of heavenly truth.

"Deuteronomy, the People's Book, its Origin and Nature," is one of the welcome fruits of the conflict thus thrust upon those who mean to stand by the Bible. It is a vigorous and able defence of the genuineness of Deuteronomy, written in lucid style, and well calculated for popular effect. While evincing profound scholarship and a mastery of the whole subject, it does not pursue the controversy into all its details, but skillfully selects a few leading points which are decisive of the whole question, and presents them with a force and directness which must work conviction in candid minds.

There are two principal sources of attack upon the genuineness of Deuteronomy ; one is drawn from its relation to the other books of Moses, the other from its relation to subsequent books of the Bible. It is a repetition of the law by Moses in the plains of Moab, under new circumstances, as the people were about to enter the land of Canaan. In his oral recapitulation of the facts of their past experience, made with the definite purpose of impressing the minds of the people and engaging them to steadfastness in the service of God, it is altogether natural that some things should be passed over in silence which are recorded in the more detailed histories of Exodus and Numbers, while others are stated with greater fulness or with the addition of particulars not before mentioned ; or that the order of narration should be varied or facts set in different relations ; or that motives or results of actions should be brought into view which had not been so distinctly stated before. So in regard to the recapitulation of the Mosaic enactments ; in this final review some are not explicitly mentioned because taken for granted and needing no change ; others are

altered or added to as occasion had required in the interval, or are modified with a view to the change then imminent from wandering in the wilderness to settled abodes in Canaan.

These differences of law or fact as presented in Deuteronomy, as compared with the statements of the three preceding books, clearly grow out of the circumstances of the case, and are really an argument of genuineness and identity of authorship; since a later writer, designing to impose his work on Israel and the world as the genuine production of Moses, would have been solicitous to guard against any appearance of discrepancy. And yet these have been eagerly seized upon by the critics and magnified into inconsistencies, and made a pretext for assigning Deuteronomy to a different author and a different date from the rest of the Pentateuch. The thorough correction of these misrepresentations would involve an amount of detail that could not well be attempted in a volume of the size and with the aim of that before us. Except as these points are incidentally involved in other parts of the discussion, they are touched lightly; only there is a very telling chapter on the style of Deuteronomy as compared with that of the other books of Moses.

The line of defence pursued in this volume relates chiefly to the other branch of the subject, viz., disposing of the objections to the antiquity and Mosaic origin of Deuteronomy which have been drawn from the later books of the Bible. The finding of the copy of the law in the temple, in the time of Josiah, long since furnished occasion for the shameless allegation that the high priest and others had themselves concocted the book that they pretended to find, which was no other than Deuteronomy, and which they now imposed on the unsuspecting king and people. But if Deuteronomy, why not the whole Pentateuch, which has been one work from the beginning, and of whose prior existence there are numerous and manifest proofs? The fraud alleged is directly in the face of the narrative; its admission would so far undermine the authority of the books of Kings as to destroy all credit for the incident itself. Such a fraud is insupposable in the case of a work which breathes such a spirit of purity, integrity, and devout fear of God; and it could never have been successfully perpetrated on the nation at

large, who certainly knew whether such a book of laws had previously existed and formed the code under which they had been living. The suggestion that such frauds were at that time thought to be consistent with honesty and piety, and that history as written in Israel was not a record of facts but a series of romances designed to incorporate or give currency to certain ideas, is not only a baseless and unproved slander, but an outrageous absurdity.

Instances in which the law of Moses was neglected, or in which particular statutes were transgressed, have also been fastened upon as indicating that those laws did not then exist. And, by a most extraordinary perversion, these violations of law are held to set forth the true and normal condition of things in the periods when they occurred; and it is insisted that all the representations of the Hebrew historians must be revolutionized accordingly. Cavils from these sources, as well as those based upon the Mosaic regulations respecting the future king, the central sanctuary, and the priests and Levites, are considered at some length, and shown to be devoid of force. On the other hand, the positive testimony not only of the Old Testament but of the New, is presented and shown to be unequivocally on the side of the Mosaic authorship; and this with those who reverence our Lord as a divine teacher must be conclusive of the question.

Apart from all argument, there is in most minds a spontaneous and irresistible conviction that the purest religion, and the only one really worthy of God in the whole world, cannot have sprung from a series of forgeries. Whence came these elevated views of truth and duty, so unique in the whole ancient world? How came they to spring up amongst a people not distinguished for learning and philosophy, and whose very institutions secluded them from free intercourse with other nations? a people charged with narrowness and bigotry, and yet whose views were broad enough to make their God the God of the whole human race, to teach them the original brotherhood of all mankind, and to create the expectation that all should ultimately share the richest blessings of God's grace?

WILLIAM HENRY GREEN.

EVOLUTIONISM RESPECTING MAN, AND THE BIBLE.

I N discussing the relations of Science and Religion, it is frequently said that Evolutionism is not inconsistent with either Theism or Revealed Religion. That it does not necessarily exclude the idea of a personal Creator of the universe may be admitted. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the hypothesis was originally proposed by old Greek atheists; and within the past century it was revived in the interest of atheism; and at the present day, as stated and defended by many of its most prominent advocates, it is avowedly atheistic. This historical attitude of Evolutionism cannot be wholly accidental, and deserves the consideration of those who may be disposed to regard the hypothesis as a harmless scientific speculation.

That it may be held in consistency with Theism is, however, a matter of comparatively little moment. The important question is its relation to Revealed Religion.

It is sometimes said that it is not necessarily inconsistent with the Scriptures, or hostile to the system of truth therein revealed. This is maintained by Mivart, a devout Romanist, in his work on "The Genesis of Species;" it is distinctly intimated by Professor Gray, a devout Protestant, in the Introduction to "Darwiniana;" and is avowed by some eminent believers in and even defenders of the inspiration of the Scriptures who are not Evolutionists. It is, moreover, implied in the admonition nowadays frequently given, that believers in revelation should treat the truth or falsity of Evolutionism as an open question, assured that, however it may be ultimately

determined, the Scriptures can be interpreted in accordance with the result.

It will scarcely be denied that, if this opinion is erroneous, it is a serious error, and none the less but all the more dangerous, when avowed by those who accept and defend the inspiration of the Scriptures. Nor are the consequences of the error—if it be an error—avoided or mitigated by maintaining, as most of those referred to do, that Evolutionism is as yet an unproved hypothesis. The assertion in question has really nothing to do with the truth or falsity of Evolutionism. It has respect to the teaching of the Scriptures, and asserts that, whether the hypothesis be true or false, it is not inconsistent with the Bible. The question is therefore one of present interest and of vital importance, affecting, as it does, what men are to believe, and what the Christian ministry is to teach concerning the origin of man, his nature, and his destiny.

Believing that Evolutionism, however it may in other respects be harmonized with the Scriptures, is in direct conflict with Biblical Anthropology, and the entire system of truth connected therewith, in the Word of God, we feel that the opinion referred to ought not to be permitted to pass unchallenged. We propose, therefore, for consideration, *Is Evolutionism, as it respects man, consistent with the Bible?*

It is proper here to state that we recognize it as a just and important principle, in interpreting Scripture, to avoid, as far as possible, collision—or the liability to collision—with scientists. At the same time, in contracting the lines, to present as few vulnerable points as possible, care should be taken not to abandon a position that may command the citadel. Whether the Anthropology of the Bible is such a position will appear in the progress of the discussion.

We deem it proper also to say, we have no sympathy with those who are disposed to magnify the so-called conflict between Science and Revealed Religion. Between believers in the Scriptures and scientists not avowedly atheistic, the only subjects that need occasion serious controversy are, the one proposed for discussion and the order of creation. This latter subject, moreover, apart from its bearing on the question of inspiration,

is comparatively unimportant, as it in no way affects the system of spiritual truth taught in the Word of God.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the question proposed, it is proper to define what is here meant by Evolutionism. This is the more necessary from the fact that in discussing the relation of Evolutionism to Religion, the precise issue is frequently obscured by an ambiguous use of the term *evolution*. It is asserted that the growth of every thing that lives—plant, tree, insect, animal, man—is an *evolution*; that the development of man's intellectual and moral faculties is an *evolution*; that there is an *evolution* in history, operating on men in the mass, elevating them from a lower to a higher state of civilization, developing a more and more completely organized social and national life; that there is *evolution* in the kingdom of grace, both in the spiritual growth of the individual Christian and in the development of doctrine and spiritual power in the Church—"first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." Now if any one sees fit to designate every form of progressive development in nature, providence, and grace, as an *evolution*, he may, of course, so far as the etymology of the word is concerned, do so without any serious impropriety; yet, in view of the real question at issue in existing controversies concerning *evolution*, such language is misleading. As to the truth of evolution in any of the senses above mentioned, there is, and has been, no dispute. In any issues that have been raised between theologians and evolutionists, the term is used in an entirely different sense. It has been technically appropriated to designate *a certain scientific hypothesis as to the genesis of the universe*, namely, that out of an original mass of nebulous, amorphous matter all the various forms of inorganic matter and living organisms—including all the properties of such organisms—were evolved by pre-established physical laws. The term is frequently used with particular reference to that part of the hypothesis which relates to *the origin of species*, namely, that out of an original germ or germs of life in its lowest form—however they may have originated—higher and still higher forms were evolved by "natural selection," or some other physical law or laws, and that thus all the different forms, varieties, and species of vegetable and animal life—man in-

cluded—that have existed or now exist, originated. As mentioned above, some evolutionists accept, while others reject, the doctrine of a personal Creator of the original material of the universe, the source of the original physical forces, and the author of the laws of their action. Between atheistic evolutionists and believers in the Scriptures, the issue is, of course, radical and irreconcilable. Between theistic evolutionists and believers in revelation, the main issue has respect to *the Origin of Man*, and what is involved therein, as to his nature and his destiny. Darwin's first work on "The Origin of Species" was not generally regarded as involving any serious or irreconcilable conflict with the Scriptures. Intimations as to the extent to which the hypothesis might be pressed did incite some apprehension, but it was not until these intimations were distinctly avowed and laboriously advocated in his subsequent work on "The Descent of Man," that the great mass of believers in revelation and the entire mass of unbelievers felt that the Scriptures were assailed, and that Evolutionism had become a religious question, and one of vital importance.

The proposed inquiry has reference to the issue just mentioned: *Is Evolutionism as it respects Man*—asserting as it does that man was not created by immediate divine agency, but was evolved out of an ape—*consistent with the Bible?*

It should be observed that the question here proposed is not—immediately at least—a scientific question. It does not require for its intelligent discussion an investigation of, or even a knowledge of, the alleged scientific facts on which the hypothesis is based. It has to do simply and solely with the teaching of Scripture.

Nor is the question proposed—immediately at least—a philosophical question. It cannot be decided by first premising certain general principles as to the respective domains of Science and Religion, the authority of each within its own sphere, and their mutual relations to each other, and then—by an application of these principles—determining what the Scriptures do teach, or at least what they must be interpreted as teaching, if their infallibility is to be maintained. The question is simply one of hermeneutics, of exegesis, of the interpretation of the language of Scripture. It is to be determined just

as one would determine whether the doctrine of metempsychosis is consistent with the Scriptures, or whether the Copernican theory of the universe is consistent with the Vedas, or whether the issue of legal-tender notes is consistent with the Federal Constitution—questions evidently to be determined in each case in no other way than by an examination of the document referred to. To this inquiry attention is now invited.

The Origin of Man, as stated in Genesis 2 : 7, is in these words, "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living soul."

Were this the entire Scriptural record on the subject—as many seem to assume—there would be no serious difficulty in interpreting it in harmony with the hypothesis of evolution. The Divine Creator of all things was not only originally the author of the universe, but has continuously been the upholder and controller of the various forces in nature, acting ceaselessly, according to the laws which he has established. Accordingly, phenomena which are immediately the result of these forces, operating it may be through long periods of time, are in the Scriptures frequently attributed to God, and in terms that might at first sight seem to imply the direct divine agency. The declaration, "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light," would undoubtedly at first sight seem to imply—and yet it does not necessarily imply—that the production of light was by the immediate divine agency, and was instantaneous. Moreover, as with the Eternal One "a thousand years are as one day," in interpreting the record of his creative work, we should be careful not to impose limitations of time and mode of operation that are not explicitly asserted. The passage above quoted as to the origin of man contains no such limitations. It simply asserts the important fact that "God formed man of the dust of the earth," but contains no intimation as to the mode of this creative act, or the duration of the process. There is nothing therefore, in this language, *taken by itself*, that is necessarily inconsistent with the hypothesis of evolution.

But the passage referred to by no means exhausts the teaching of the Scriptures concerning the origin of man. This

general statement of the seventh verse is followed at the eighteenth verse by the more specific, and as respects the question under consideration, the far more important declaration, "And the Lord God said, It is not good for man to be alone," thus limiting the reference in the seventh verse to the creation of the individual *man*, Adam. "And God said, I will make a helpmeet for him. And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof. And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of man." Gen. 2: 21-23.

This account of the creation of *woman*—that is, of the first woman, Eve—"the mother of all living," as she is subsequently called (3: 20)—has a most important bearing on the question at issue. Unlike the former passage, its statements are specific and unambiguous. It asserts distinctly, first, that the creation of *woman* was not synchronous with, but subsequent to, the creation of *man*; and, secondly, it asserts with a particularity of detail which precludes all doubt as to the meaning intended, that the creation of woman was not by the ordinary mode of generation, but was strictly supernatural, miraculous, wrought by immediate Divine agency. Now it will scarcely be denied that, if this language is to be taken as a literal record of an historical fact, it is utterly irreconcilable with Evolutionism. To assert the contrary would be simply to assert a contradiction in terms. Evolutionists, with scarce an exception, not only acknowledge the inconsistency, but insist upon it, and accordingly reject—often with ridicule—the scriptural account of the origin of the race.

To those who receive the Scriptures as the Word of God, and yet maintain that Evolutionism is not inconsistent with Revealed Religion, the language above quoted undoubtedly presents a most serious difficulty. In the preface to his work on "Religion and Science," President Le Conte says, "It is an earnest attempt to reconcile the truths of Scripture with those revealed in nature." As might be anticipated from the character of the eminent author—an authority in science, an

accomplished writer and logician, at the same time a believer—his work is a valuable contribution to the discussion of the relations of Science and Religion; and on many of the points involved in controversy he has, in the defence of revealed truth, rendered most important service. And yet—as remarked by Professor Gray in his notice of the work—“one or two topics that would naturally come in his way—such, especially, as the relation of evolution to the human race—are somewhat conspicuously absent.”

Professor Gray, in several articles in “*Darwiniana*,” maintains that Evolutionism is not necessarily inconsistent with *Natural* Religion—and successfully, if Natural Religion included nothing more than belief in an intelligent, personal Creator of the universe. How he would harmonize the Scriptures with the hypothesis, he does not intimate—unless we except the single incidental remark, that Dr. Hodge makes “the implicit assumption that the Bible must needs teach true science.”

To remove the difficulty of harmonizing the Scriptural account of the origin of man with Evolutionism, two theories have been suggested. One is, that the Scriptures were not given to reveal truths of physical science, but spiritual and divine truths, to a knowledge of which men could not have attained by the light of reason or nature; that in regard to the former class of truths, the sacred writers accepted the belief and used the language current in the age in which they lived; that consequently on such subjects they are not to be regarded as infallible. It is alleged that as a matter of fact, their opinions on matters of science were often erroneous—as, for example, Job’s allusion to the want of maternal affection in the ostrich, Solomon’s reference to the foresight of ants in making provision for the winter, and Joshua’s belief that the sun revolved about the earth. On this theory, the Biblical account of the origin of man is simply the opinion which prevailed at the time the Book was written, and is not to be regarded as infallible.

It is not necessary to show, as might be done, that these alleged errors of the sacred writers furnish no basis for the theory referred to. For the present purpose it is sufficient to

reply, *first*, this theory does not deny, but was framed for the very purpose of accounting for (therein acknowledging) the fact, that Evolutionism and the Scriptural account of the origin of man are irreconcilable. This is the precise point of the present inquiry. *Secondly*, if the alleged errors of the sacred writers were admitted, it is a palpable fallacy to deduce a principle of interpretation from certain *incidental allusions* in the Scriptures to scientific truths, and then apply this principle to the interpretation of an extended, detailed, and explicit statement, recorded evidently for no other purpose than to communicate truth on the subject treated of—truth moreover, of which, from its very nature, man could not have any knowledge except by revelation. *Thirdly*, while it is true that the Bible was not given to teach men science, it is just as true, that as incidental to its main object—in regard to the subject in question we may even say as *necessary* to its main object—it does contain the distinct statement of certain scientific facts. Now so far as the Bible professes to teach such facts, it cannot be maintained that its teaching is untrustworthy without admitting a principle which vitiates the authority of the Scriptures on all other subjects. On this point Principal Dawson, in his “Nature and Religion”—a work which admirably exposes how inconclusive is the alleged scientific evidence in favor of evolution—maintains, “I wish to enforce the important principle that with respect to the history of creation and the subsequent reference to it, we cannot rest in the general statement that the Bible is not intended to teach science any more than we can excuse inaccuracy as to historical facts by the notion that the Bible was not intended to teach history.” *Fourthly*, it is impossible so to define the boundaries of the respective domains of Science and Revealed Religion that they shall not at certain points overlap each other. From the very nature of the case, there is unavoidably a common ground covered by truths which in one aspect are scientific and in another aspect are religious—it may be, religious truths of the highest importance. Now if the teaching of the Scriptures on such subjects be distinct and unequivocal, are we at liberty to treat it as obscure or erroneous, because forsooth, it is in conflict with some current scientific speculation? Certain scientists maintain that miracles are im-

possible with as much confidence and for precisely the same scientific reason that they deny the Scriptural account of the origin of man—namely, the invariability of the laws of nature. Is the meaning or the authority, therefore, of all that is miraculous in the Scriptures to be regarded as an open question? Moreover, the distinction between scientific truths and spiritual truths, however just in reference to other subjects, is wholly inapplicable to the particular subject in question. The important bearing of the doctrine of evolution on the spiritual truths revealed in the word of God will be made manifest in the progress of this discussion. *Fifthly*, the theory in question is in direct conflict with the teaching of the Apostle, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God."

The other theory referred to is that the Biblical account of the creation and fall of man is not to be regarded as history, but a myth or allegory—to be interpreted, not literally, but figuratively. This theory has the advantage of the preceding in that it recognizes the plenary inspiration of the Mosaic record. And as the Scriptures do undoubtedly contain parables and allegories, it is not necessarily inadmissible. The question is simply an exegetical one. In view of the connection in which the language occurs, is the reader at liberty to treat it as a myth or an allegory? In answer to this question, we reply, the language referred to is inseparably joined to the record which follows, reaching down to persons and events that are beyond all question historical. The genealogical links which connect the Israelites in Egypt with Adam and Eve in Eden are explicitly given. The children of Adam are mentioned in language identical with that used in reference to the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Now unless it be assumed that allegorical parents can beget historical children, the theory would seem to be untenable.

But further—in reference to both the theories referred to—throughout the Scriptures there are repeated references to the Mosaic account of the origin of the race, and not only is there no intimation that the record in question is either mythical or untrustworthy, but it is uniformly regarded as veritable history, and its literal interpretation both assumed and asserted.

In the First Book of Chronicles the descent of the historical

nations of that day is traced back to Noah and through him to Adam—the writer evidently regarding the narrative in Genesis as the literal record of an historical fact.

The genealogy of the Saviour, given in the third chapter of Luke is, that he was, “as was supposed, the son of Joseph, who was the son of Heli,” and so backward through David, and Abraham, and Noah to “Seth, who was the son of Adam, who was,” according to the Evangelist, not the son of an ape, but “*the Son of God.*”

In the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul assumes the historical character and the infallible truth of the record in Genesis concerning the origin and fall of man, and makes it the basis of one of the most important doctrines of Scripture—in fact, a fundamental doctrine in the evangelical system of religion. “By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.” “Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression, who is the figure of him who was to come.” “If through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.” If the record in Genesis is not veritable history, then Paul has misapprehended its meaning, and his argument is a fallacy.

Again, in his notable argument in defence of the doctrine of the resurrection, in the 15th chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul assumes the literality and the truth of the Mosaic record. “By man came death, by man came also the resurrection from the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.” “And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit.” “The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven.”

Again, in the 11th chapter of this same Epistle, Paul accepts as literally true that portion of the Mosaic record most troublesome to those who would harmonize Evolutionism and revelation—the account of the supernatural creation of *woman*, and the priority of the creation of man. “The man,” says he, “is not of the woman, but the woman of the man; neither

was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man." So also in 1st Tim. 2:12-15. "I suffer not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man. For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression." Now again, it should be observed, if the Mosaic account of the creation and fall of Adam and Eve is not to be regarded as veritable history, then not only has the Apostle misapprehended its meaning, but his argument, based upon the literal truth of the record, is fallacious.

Once more, when Jude refers to Enoch as an historical character, "the seventh from Adam," he evidently regards the entire record in Genesis as veritable history.

From the above quotations it is evident that the question as to the consistency of Evolutionism and revelation involves not the Mosaic record alone, as many seem to assume—the Scriptures just referred to are equally entitled to consideration. And further it should be observed, these Scriptures have a twofold bearing on the question at issue—first, as an inspired interpretation of the Mosaic record; and secondly, as independent Scriptural teaching concerning the origin of man—teaching, moreover, in regard to which no believer in the inspiration of the Scriptures will maintain that either the mythical theory, or the theory that the sacred writers are not to be regarded as infallible when treating of matters of science, is applicable.

The conclusion seems inevitable that whether the doctrine of the Scriptures concerning the origin of man be true or false, there can be no reasonable doubt as to what that doctrine is, and that it is not consistent with the hypothesis of evolution. If the teaching of the Bible on this subject can be regarded as an open question, then none can assert with confidence what it teaches on any subject. The doctrine of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, the Personality of the Spirit, the true theory of the Church, of the Christian ministry, of the Christian Sabbath, the subjects and mode of baptism, and other important doctrines that might be mentioned, are not taught in the Scriptures more distinctly and conclusively than is the doctrine that the human race is descended from a single pair—not *evolved* by "natural selection," or any other physical law or laws, out of

apes, but *created* supernaturally, by immediate Divine agency. The teaching of the Scriptures concerning the other doctrines above mentioned has for ages been, and continues to be, controverted. The Scriptural teaching as to the origin of man has not until recently been called in question, and doubtless would not now be, were it not for the supposed exigency in consequence of recent scientific speculations. However urgent the exigency, unless the speculations of scientists, or even the logic of facts, can alter the language of a written document, it would seem to be impossible to harmonize Evolutionism as it respects the origin of man, with revelation.

The discussion has thus far been restricted to an examination of the direct teaching of the Scriptures as to *the origin of man*. A more serious conflict, if possible, between Evolutionism and the Bible remains to be considered.

Whatever question may be raised as to the authority of Scripture on scientific subjects in general or the interpretation of the language of Scripture on the particular subject above mentioned, all who accept the Bible as a revelation from God agree that it teaches important truths concerning spiritual and divine things, and that on such subjects its authority is supreme and final. Now Evolutionism is not only inconsistent with the direct Biblical teaching concerning *the origin of man*, but is utterly irreconcilable with all that is taught in the Word of God concerning *man's nature, the nature of sin, the way of man's salvation, and his destiny*—in a word, the entire system of spiritual truths for the revelation of which the Scriptures were given.

First, the hypothesis is in conflict with the teaching of the Scriptures concerning *man's spiritual nature*, both as to what it was originally, and what it subsequently became—in the language of the Catechism, “the estate in which man was created,” and “the estate into which he fell.”

It might be fairly urged that the idea of a spiritual nature in man, in any proper sense of the expression—certainly in the ordinary sense of the expression—is excluded by the hypothesis as defined and defended by many of its prominent advocates. With them, Evolutionism is Materialism. It maintains as a prime principle the correlation, not of physical forces

merely, but of all forces, physical, vital, intellectual, emotional, moral and (if there may be any thing so called) spiritual. It regards beliefs and disbeliefs, likes and dislikes, the emotions of love and of patriotism, the perception of beauty and the sense of duty, as in their ultimate analysis, phenomena of matter, secreted by the brain as the liver secretes bile. It makes Psychology to be but a department of Physiology. The volition of the murderer in pulling the trigger, and the explosion of the powder and velocity of the bullet, are alike due to the operation of fixed, invariable, physical laws. Whether disposed to accept Professor Tyndall as a leader in scientific speculation or not, all must admit that no higher authority can be quoted as to what Evolutionism is. In his "Fragments of Science" he asks: "What are the core and essence of this hypothesis?" And he answers, "Strip it naked, and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular and animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself, emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena, were once latent in a fiery cloud." "I do not think that any holder of the evolution hypothesis will say that I overstate it or overstrain it in any way. I simply bring before you, unclothed and unvarnished, the notions by which it must stand or fall." After maturer thought, he subsequently utters the same sentiment *ex cathedra*, as President of the British Association, in the memorable sentence in which his elaborate discussion of the relations of Science and Religion—or, as he would probably prefer to state it, their conflicts—culminates. "Abandoning," says he, "all disguise, the confession I feel bound to make before you is, that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that Matter which we, in our ignorance, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its creation, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and quality of life." True, he subsequently uses language that seems intended to disclaim the inference to be legitimately drawn from this formal, deliberate, and carefully-worded avowal of his belief. It is, however, with this avowal, and not with his

consistency, that we have to do. Now the distinctive characteristic of *matter* is, that its phenomena are determined by physical forces acting in accordance with uniform, inflexible physical laws. The distinctive characteristic of *spirit* is, that it is self-determining, and its actions voluntary. If there is in matter "the potency of every form and quality of life"—spiritual life included—then there is no such thing as volition, and what is called man's spiritual nature is but a name for a certain class of physical phenomena.

In his Belfast Address in 1874, on the question, "Are Animals Automats?" Professor Huxley, after endeavoring to establish the affirmative, adds, "Undoubtedly, I do hold that the view I have taken of the relations between the physical and mental faculties of brutes applies in its fulness and entirety to man." It need scarcely be said that this theory—that the activity of man's spiritual nature is determined by physical law and not by volition—is inconsistent with human freedom and therein with human responsibility.

In reply to the objection to Materialism, that it destroys human freedom and responsibility, the *argumentum ad hominem* is sometimes presented—that the same objection may, with equal propriety, be urged against the orthodox doctrine of predestination. To this Professor Huxley refers in connection with the passage above quoted, and says in reference to the "logical consequences" of his theory, "If for preaching such doctrine I am to be cited to the bar of public opinion, I shall not stand there alone. On the one hand, I shall have St. Augustine, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards."

Now, the *certainty* of the occurrence of a future event is one thing; the *nature of the agency* by which it occurs is an entirely different thing. By noting this distinction, the fallacy of the reply referred to will be manifest. Materialism and the doctrine of predestination may be said to agree, as to the *certainty* of the occurrence of the actions of men as predetermined. But they differ, *toto cælo*, as to the *nature of the agency* by which they occur. According to Materialism, the *certainty* is due to the fact that the action is the result of the operation of physical forces acting in accordance with physical laws, which

are fixed and invariable. The idea of the volition of a free agent is excluded.

According to the doctrine of predestination, events occur as predetermined, "yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Conf. of Faith, Chap. III., Sec. 1. The fact of human freedom is asserted just as distinctly as the fact of divine fore-ordination. As regards the agency, therefore, by which human actions occur as pre-determined, Materialism and the doctrine of predestination are in direct conflict. Now the objectionable "logical consequences" referred to, have respect *to the point on which Materialism differs from the doctrine of predestination*, and not on any point on which they may be said to agree.

Edwards does indeed speak of the actions of men occurring by "necessity," but he is careful to state that he means "a moral or metaphysical necessity," and not "a natural or physical necessity." "As to the objection," says he, "against the doctrine which I have endeavored to prove, *that it makes men no more than machines*, I would say, that notwithstanding this doctrine, *man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from a mere machine*, in that he has reason and understanding, with a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition and choice." So far from holding with Huxley that man is "an automaton," he explicitly repudiates the doctrine, and teaches the very opposite.

It may be proper to say, that Calvinistic theologians at the present day discard the term "necessity" in this connection—even as explained and qualified by Edwards—in consequence of its liability to misinterpretation.

But doubtless, that class of evolutionists—or apologists for evolution—who would be interested in the present discussion would disclaim the bald Materialism avowed by many prominent advocates of the hypothesis. We proceed, therefore, to remark, that in the least objectionable form in which it can be stated, the hypothesis would seem to be irreconcilable with what the Scriptures teach as to man's original and present spiritual condition. According to the hypothesis, out of an

assumed original germ—or germs—of life in its lowest form, higher and still higher forms, terminating for the present at least, in man, were evolved. In “The Descent of Man,” the attempt is ingeniously made to trace the genesis of the faculties of man’s spiritual nature out of the irrational impulses and instincts of the lower orders of the animal creation.

According to this theory, that *being* to which—or to whom—the term *man* might for the first time be appropriately applied was, undoubtedly, man at his very lowest estate, intellectually, morally, spiritually—at the very bottom, so to speak, of the scale of humanity. Moreover, according to this theory, whatever might be called *sinful* in man’s nature or conduct, whether when in his original lowest estate, or at any subsequent stage of his ascent, was but a necessary incident to a condition of progressive and hence incomplete development. This condition, and whatever in connection therewith that might be called *sin*, is not, if the hypothesis be true, any thing abnormal, but *normal*—the legitimate result of the law of his being—just as much so as rectitude would be when, by the same law of his being, he had attained to a higher state of development. On this point, Principal Tulloch—whom no one will accuse of illiberal prejudice against either the *advanced* science or thinking of the present day—in his “Christian Doctrine of Sin,” says, “The favorite conceptions of modern science involve, if they do not start from, a definite view of human nature at variance with the old Biblical or spiritual view.” “It leaves, for example, no room for the idea of sin. For that which is solely a growth of nature cannot contain any thing that is at variance with its own higher laws. If the individual and social man alike are merely the outcome of natural forces working endlessly forward toward higher and more complex forms, then, whatever man is, he is not and cannot be a sinner. The mixed product of internal and external forces—of what is called *organism* and *environment*—he may, at certain stages of his progress, be very defective. But he has not fallen below any ideal he might have reached. He is only at any point what the sum of natural factors which enter into his being have made him. The two conceptions of sin and of development, in this naturalistic sense, cannot coexist. I cannot be the outcome of natural law,

and yet accountable for the fact that I am no better than I am." Such, then, is the theory of man's original and present spiritual condition involved in the development hypothesis. A simple statement of the Scriptural theory will exhibit how the two are not only not consistent, but at every point directly antagonistic.

With respect to other living creatures, the Biblical record is, "And God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life." (Gen. 1 : 20.) "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind." (Gen. 1 : 24.) This command to "the waters" to bring forth "the moving creature," and to "the earth" to bring forth "the living creature," may be intended—we do not say that it certainly was intended—to intimate, that the generation of the lower orders of animals was in accordance with pre-existing physical laws. The language in regard to the creation of *man* differs entirely from that just referred to, and this difference was doubtless not without design and significance. The record here is, "And the LORD GOD"—not "the earth," or "the waters," or any other pre-existing thing or creature, but "the LORD GOD—JEHOVAH ELOHIM—formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living soul." (Gen. 2 : 7.) Further, according to the Scriptures, not only was the manner of man's creation thus peculiar, but a fact of even greater importance in its bearing on the point immediately under consideration is asserted. It is taught that in pursuance of a special divine purpose, man was made in *the image of God*. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." Then follows the record, "So God made man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." (Gen. 1 : 26, 27.) Now is it credible that by this language the sacred writer intended to assert that man as originally created—made in the image of God—his spiritual nature directly inbreathed by Jehovah—was but one remove above the brute ? Is it credible that the writer of this record intended to teach, that within the limits of the variation of an animal from the typical form and faculties of the parent, the son of one of the highest orders of apes was superior to its—or his—immediate progenitor, and that in virtue of this

variation, it—or he—became a human soul—made in God's image? And yet this must be accepted as the teaching of the inspired record, to harmonize the Scriptures with the hypothesis of evolution.

Still further, the Scriptures teach that the original progenitors of the human race, made in the image of God and left to the freedom of their own will, fell from the estate in which they were created, by the voluntary transgression of the divine law; that this transgression of God's law was *sin*; that this sin was culpable, and by the just judgment of God its penalty was death; that, in consequence of the fall of man from the estate in which he was originally created, the moral history of the race, *apart from supernatural influence*, has been constantly and only a retrogression and not a progression, a descent and not an ascent. That this is the teaching of the Scriptures, no extended quotation is needed to prove. Let a single reference suffice. In the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul gives what may be called the Scriptural theory as to the degradation of so large a portion of the human race. He declares of the heathen, that "when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God gave them up to uncleanness and vile affections." "They did not like to retain God in their knowledge, therefore God gave them over to a reprobate mind." Moreover, Paul did not regard the idolatry and debasing vices of the heathen as excusable because the necessary outgrowth of an imperfectly developed condition, but expressly declares that, "in the judgment of God, they who do such things are worthy of death." Now mark—the immediate inquiry is not whether the Bible doctrine concerning man's original and present spiritual condition concerning sin and the moral history of the race is true, but, is this doctrine consistent with the development hypothesis on these subjects?

Again, Evolutionism is not only inconsistent with the Scriptures as to man's origin, the nature of sin, and man's

original and present spiritual condition ; its teaching as to *the future of the human race* is alike irreconcilable with the teaching of the Scriptures as to the way of man's salvation, its nature, and man's destiny.

To show that the hypothesis, as it respects the future, "is not necessarily hostile to our religious faith," it has been said, "Were we constrained to trace our descent from apes, or frogs, or infusoria, we could look with no little complacency on our humble origin, from which we might anticipate further development in a posterity of angels and archangels, as far superior to ourselves as we are to the brutes or the animalcula from which we sprang. When we compare the alleged beginnings of our race with its present condition, there is no limit to what it may become, and the brightest visions of prophecy may be transcended by the history that shall yet be written."

The first thought suggested by this language is, that the progressive development which, according to the hypothesis, men are permitted to anticipate, is one with which *moral character and conduct* have nothing to do. Its occurrence is predetermined by the very constitution of man's being, by a law of his nature. Any connection between the performance of present duty and future destiny is excluded, and has no more place in the development of angels out of men, than it had in the development of men out of apes. Is this Scriptural?

But further, by the evolution of the human race out of apes, frogs, and infusoria, is not meant that all individuals of the lower races were, or are to be, developed into men, but simply this, that through exceptional individuals of each lower race—especially favored by "natural selection"—higher and still higher orders of animals, in a gradually ascending series, terminating for the present in man, have been evolved. According then to the hypothesis, the further development which men are permitted to "anticipate," is not that of *individual* angels and archangels out of *individual* men, but a race of angels out of the human race, and this through a long succession of intervening races in a gradually ascending scale, and after countless ages—the only connection between immediately succeeding races in the series being the exceptionally favored individuals of each race, the elect by "natural selection."

Now, it is respectfully submitted, in such an anticipation, have we any special reason for "complacency"? The same and no more than had the great mass of apes, and frogs, and infusoria of past ages reason for complacency, because forsooth, through certain individuals of their respective races, as links in a long series, the human race was, after millions of years, to be evolved. Or whatever complacency such an anticipation may afford, does it in any measure satisfy the wants of man's spiritual nature? Can it be made the substitute for a religious hope? What our immortal spirits crave is the prospect of a future higher, happier, holier state, not for certain individuals merely—of the human race—much less for another and entirely distinct race of beings, but for ourselves. Little reason is there for complacency in the prospect of the development of higher orders of beings out of the human race, if men individually, at death, are to become like "the beasts that perish"—or as Professor Tyndall more poetically, but with no more satisfaction to the cravings of our spiritual nature, expresses it—"shall have melted like streaks of morning cloud into the infinite azure of the past."

As if appreciating that the development above mentioned would not be regarded as justifying the statement it was made to establish, that Evolutionism "is not necessarily hostile to our religious faith," the writer adds, "When we are told that the individual human being actually passes through the various forms of his lower ancestry, why may he not in his own person pass successively through all the higher forms of which finite being is susceptible?" The physiological fact to which we understand this language to refer is, that the human being, in its embryonic development, assumes successively certain forms resembling the forms of certain of the lower orders of animals at the same stages of development. On this ground, it is not indeed asserted, but after the manner of the author of "The Origin of Species," when he would intimate what he does not feel at liberty to assert, it is asked, "Why may he not"—that is, why may not each individual of the human race—"pass successively through all the higher forms of which finite being is susceptible?" Our first remark in reply is, that the statement as to "what we are told," is inaccurate, and the

inference intimated is based on the inaccuracy. "The individual human being" does not "actually pass" through the forms of the lower orders of animals. The simple fact referred to is this, and nothing more, that in the elementary stages of foetal development, the human embryo *closely resembles* the embryo of the lower orders of animals at the same stage of development. Darwin himself, in "The Descent of Man," states the physiological fact with scientific precision. He says, "The (human) embryo at a very early period *can hardly be distinguished* from that of other members of the vertebrate kingdom." Again, "The embryo of man *closely resembles* that of other mammals." He gives drawings of the human and of the canine embryo, in which the points of resemblance, and at the same time of unlikeness, are distinctly exhibited. The precise fact, therefore, is a very different thing from that which is asserted, when it is said that "the human being actually passes" through the forms of the lower orders of animals. Close resemblance is not identity. Were the resemblance so exact and entire that under the microscope of highest power the two embryos were absolutely indistinguishable, it would prove nothing as to the point in question. For that which differentiates a living organism in embryo, makes it to be what it is in kind and nature distinguished from other living organisms in embryo, is not the external form or even the apparent physical features of the ovule, but the *quality of the life* which animates it—that mysterious principle in the ovule (which no microscopic power can discern), that determines the form and character of the subsequent developmet. Now this plastic principle—this *nisus formativus*—is as to kind or nature just as peculiar, distinct, and definite a thing, in the germ *ab initio*, as in the developed living being. Whatever be the seeming resemblance in the early stages of embryonic development, the ovules of animals of different orders or species—man included—invariably develop into beings after their kind, and this unquestionably in virtue of their distinct and peculiar nature *ab initio*. In the physiological fact accurately stated, there is nothing to justify the confidence with which evolutionists refer to it as well-nigh conclusive in favor of their hypothesis. As an argument to prove that individuals of the human race may

hope for development into beings of a higher order, it is certainly wholly irrelevant.

To exhibit this still more conclusively, if possible, let the inquiry above quoted be put in this form: "We are told that the individual *ape* actually passes through the various forms of his lower ancestry; why may he not in his own person pass successively through all the higher forms of which finite being is susceptible? There is no apparent reason why the argument is not just as good for monkey as for man.

Still further, by way of reply to the above inquiry, it may be asked, Were the existing orders of finite beings higher than man—"angels and archangels"—evolved out of the human race by "natural selection," or in any other way? If not, is there any reason to believe that such beings will ever be thus evolved?

We confess our inability to see how the doctrine of the *immortality of the individual man* can in any way be reconciled with the development hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, out of an original germ of animal life in its lowest form, higher and still higher forms terminating in man have been evolved by *slight gradations*—such as are possible within the limits of the variation of the offspring of an animal from the parent type. This idea of *gradual* development is so marked a feature of the hypothesis, that by some of its recent advocates evolution has been designated "the law of Continuity." Now, with respect to all the forms of animal life preceding man, we presume *the immortality of the individual* will not be maintained. And we presume none will maintain that the human spirit has become immortal by the gradual approach to immortality in the spirits of the different orders of animals preceding man in the ascending scale. If then, man be now immortal, the only other alternative, as it would seem, is that the wide—not to say impassable—gulf between mortality and immortality of spirit must have been crossed *per saltum*; and yet this, regarded scientifically, would be fatal to the hypothesis, and theologically, would justify, if it did not indeed demand, the supposition of direct divine intervention.

In the development intimated in the inquiries above quoted, there is presented all that man is permitted to anticipate according to the hypothesis of evolution. The immediate inquiry

is not, whether this is the truth, but is this only hope set before us in the Gospel of Science, the "hope set before us in the Gospel" of Revelation? Or is not such teaching not only inconsistent with, but directly antagonistic to, the whole system of spiritual truth taught in the Word of God, concerning the nature and the way of man's salvation?

According to the Scriptures, there is for every individual of the human race an immortality of blessedness or woe, and this determined not by the operation of physical law, but "we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to be judged according to the deeds done in the body." According to the Scriptures, for fallen man salvation is possible in no other way than by *supernatural* agency—by direct divine intervention. Men, by nature, "are dead in trespasses and sins"—a state from which there is in man no more inherent power of development into a higher and holier state of being than there is power in a corpse to develop into a living soul. The central idea of the religion of the Bible—not taught obscurely in some doubtful passages, but asserted or implied on every page—is man's salvation through the incarnation, obedience, death, and resurrection of a *supernatural* Redeemer. "God was manifest in the flesh," "It must needs be that Christ should suffer," "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." For such a development as Evolutionism promises, whence the necessity for, or where the possibility of, the intervention of a supernatural Redeemer? Moreover, if Jesus of Nazareth was, as the Scriptures declare, born of a virgin by the power of the Holy Ghost, then in human history an act of creation by immediate divine agency has occurred; and if it occurred some eighteen hundred years ago, in the creation of the second Adam, is it incredible—is it improbable—that it occurred some six thousand years ago, in the creation of the first Adam?

And so it may be asked in regard to the *resurrection* of Christ, Was the reanimation of the lifeless form that for three days lay in Joseph's tomb without corruption an evolution by a law of nature? Or was it not by God's immediate agency—in the language of Scripture, "according to his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead"? And if here—when the occasion called for it—there

was direct divine intervention, is it impossible—is it improbable—that there was direct divine intervention in the creation of the progenitors of that race for whose salvation the Son of God became incarnate, died, and was raised again?

So it may be asked in regard to the other miracles recorded in the Scriptures, Were they but phenomena of the laws of nature, or were they not wrought by immediate divine agency? However some may speculate as to the possibility of explaining certain miracles on the hypothesis of the existence of a higher class of laws of nature, of which we have no knowledge, there are other miracles of which the explanation by any such hypothesis would seem to be inconceivable. And in any case, does not the *Biblical* idea of a miracle exclude such an hypothesis?

But further, the salvation of the Gospel involves not only the incarnation, death, and resurrection of a supernatural Saviour, but the continual intervention of another supernatural agent—the Holy Spirit. To be saved, man “must be born again,”—not from within, but from above—not by any law in his nature, but by the Holy Ghost. Evolutionism rejects alike the necessity for, or the possibility of, any such supernatural intervention.

And once more, the Bible teaches that the salvation of the Gospel is a *redemption*—a restoration of man to a former state of happiness and holiness—the state in which he was originally created. The Saviour of men is not merely a benefactor but a redeemer. The representation in the Scriptures of the consummation of the plan of redemption—whether it is to be understood literally or figuratively—is the earth redeemed from the effects of the curse restored to man redeemed from the effects of the fall. To any such conception, it need scarcely be said, the development hypothesis is directly antagonistic.

In answer, then, to the question proposed for discussion, we feel justified in replying, that Evolutionism is irreconcilable with the direct teaching of the Scriptures as to the origin of man—not only in the opening chapters of Genesis, but repeatedly, distinctly, and uniformly throughout the Bible; that important Biblical doctrines are based on the Mosaic account of the creation and fall of man, interpreted as the literal record of historical facts, and if this interpretation be incorrect, the argu-

ment is fallacious ; that the hypothesis is irreconcilable with the teaching of the Scriptures as to man's nature, his original and present spiritual condition, the nature of sin, the nature and the way of man's salvation, and his future destiny—in short, with the whole system of truth, for the revelation of which the Scriptures were given to men. The late Professor Tayler Lewis did not exaggerate, when, in reference to “ the doctrine of a *primus homo*, a first man made man by the fiat of God,” he said, “ Between Darwinism and Biblical truth there is a *polar* opposition. Adamity and Christianity (if the use of such words may be pardoned for the sake of the parallelism they so briefly present) go together. Here is to be an end of concession to science or any thing else. It is the idea *stantis vel cadentis Christianitatis*. The rejection of it makes havoc of the whole Bible, opening a chasm which no exegetical or theological device can close.”

If this conclusion be well founded, it follows :

First. That in weighing the evidence for and against Evolutionism as it respects man, the evidence that the Bible is from God, and not “ a cunningly devised fable,” must be taken into account. To prove that man is descended from an ape, it is not enough that certain facts of science may seem to favor such a conclusion. When the evidence in its favor becomes more conclusive than the evidence that the Scriptures were “ given by the inspiration of God,” then, and not till then, will the candid seeker after truth accept the hypothesis.

Although the consideration of the scientific evidence on the subject is aside from the present inquiry, it may be proper here to remark, that many whose opinions are entitled to respect, including prominent evolutionists—most notably Wallace, who shares with Darwin the honor of having reintroduced the hypothesis to favor—maintain on scientific grounds, that the origin of man is *sui generis*, and not to be accounted for by the hypothesis. At a meeting of the German naturalists at Munich in September last, Virchow—an authority not inferior to Haeckel—maintained, that “ anthropological investigations directly contradict the doctrine of evolution.”

Secondly. From the argument above presented we think it must be evident how short-sighted, unreasonable, and utterly

impracticable is the admonition frequently given by timid apologists for the Scriptures, that in view of past controversies between scientists and theologians, Christians ought not to commit themselves or the Scriptures to either side in this controversy, but should treat the subject as an open question; assured that whatever be the ultimate verdict of science, it will be found that the Bible can be interpreted in accordance therewith. This language affords some justification for Professor Huxley's sneer at "the marvellous flexibility" of the original Scriptures. Every reader of the Bible must acknowledge that its teaching concerning man's origin, nature, and destiny is, as to extent, explicitness, and importance, wholly different from its teaching concerning the structure of the solar system, or the length of a creative day. To assume that principles of interpretation based on the teaching of Scripture and the history of doctrine on these latter subjects, are applicable to the former, is—to say the least—illogical. As well might one maintain that, because we may treat as an open question, whether negroes are descendants of Canaan, we may therefore treat as an open question, whether the Jews are descendants of Abraham. If we receive the Scriptures as a revelation from God, are we at liberty to treat as an open question, whether man was evolved out of an ape by natural law, or was created by immediate divine agency and in "the image of God"? Can we treat the doctrine of the fall of man as an open question? Can we treat the doctrine of a supernatural salvation by a supernatural Saviour as an open question? Can we treat the doctrine, that the resurrection of Christ and the other miracles recorded in Scripture were supernatural, as an open question? Can we treat the doctrine of the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit in regenerating and sanctifying believers as an open question? Can we treat the doctrine of immortality—the eternal blessedness of the righteous and the eternal punishment of the wicked—as an open question? On such subjects as these, can a genuine faith be provisional? If such doctrines are to be treated as open questions, or to be accepted provisionally until science has settled their truth or falsity, then is the Bible the most useless of books, the occupation of the Gospel minister is gone, and "Lay Sermons" from distinguished scientists are

“the only infallible rule to direct us what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man.”

But some may be ready to ask, Suppose that science should hereafter prove that man was descended from an ape, what then becomes of the Bible and evangelical religion? This question may be answered by asking another. Suppose that, hereafter, it should be discovered that two and two make five, what then becomes of our Mathematics? Suppose that, in the progress of science, it should hereafter be found that matter does not attract but repels matter, what then becomes of our Physics? Suppose that, in the progress of Physiology, it should hereafter be proved that thought, and affection, and emotion, are nothing but secretions of the brain—determined by the proportions present of oxygen, and hydrogen, and nitrogen, and carbon, and especially phosphorus (as it already is said, “no phosphorus, no thought”), what then becomes of our Metaphysics and our Ethics? The answer to these questions—as to the question which suggested them—is, that science can never prove that which is not true, and there is little interest and no profit in speculating as to the possible conclusions that may be drawn from an impossible premise.

If this reply be unsatisfactory to the inquirer, still another question may be ventured. Suppose that science should ultimately prove that the Biblical account of the origin of man is true—what then becomes of those who, in the mean time, accept the false hypothesis and reject the Bible?—or of those who, awaiting the final verdict of science, treat the inspiration of the Bible as an open question? The Scriptures answer this question when they declare that “if the Gospel be hid”—whether through ignorance or the conceit of knowledge, whether through false philosophy or the speculations of “science falsely so-called”—they to whom it is hid “are lost.” There is one doctrine which science and revelation agree in teaching—the responsibility of man for his belief. The violation of moral as well as of physical law—whether done wilfully or ignorantly—will be followed by its legitimate consequences. If the Scriptures be but “a cunningly devised fable,” and faith in them a delusion, then at death believers in the Bible, together with those who reject it, will—it may be—“melt away like a

morning cloud into the infinite azure of the past." If the development theory of the origin of man shall in a little while take its place—as we doubt not it will—with other exploded scientific speculations, then they who accept it with its proper logical consequences will, in the life to come, have their portion with those who, in this life, "know not God and obey not the gospel of his Son."

This discussion may appropriately be concluded with the confirming words of Principal Dawson: "What we know of primitive man from geological investigation presents no contradiction to the history of his origin in the Bible, but rather gives such corroboration as warrants the expectation that, as our knowledge of pre-historic man increases, it will more and more fully bring out the force of those few and bold touches with which it has pleased God to enable his ancient prophets to sketch the early history of our species. Truth and divinity are stamped on every line of the early chapters of Genesis, alike in their archaic simplicity, and in that accuracy as to facts which enables them not only to stand unharmed amid the discoveries of modern science, but to display new beauties as we are able more and more fully to compare them with the records stored up from of old in the recesses of the earth. Those who base their hopes for the future on the glorious revelations of the Bible need not be ashamed of its story of the past."

JOHN T. DUFFIELD.

CONDITIONS OF SUCCESSFUL PRAYER.

PRAYER is natural to man. It springs out of that sense of dependence which, if it be not, as Schleiermacher affirmed, the essence of all religion, is at least one of the essential conditions of any religion. The soul that is entirely self-centred and self-sufficing may contrive to exist without one ejaculation for existence. But man, who is constantly feeling himself hampered and hindered by the pressure upon him of difficulties from without and by the consciousness of his inability to meet and overcome them, cannot help falling back upon the bosom of God. With an instinct as real as that which impels the infant to cry for its appropriate food, and an impulse as strong as that which drives the child in the hour of danger to its mother's knee, men are led in their times of helplessness to call upon God. So long as they are at ease and comfortable, they may contrive to get along without any appeal to the Most High ; but when trouble comes, which no human brother can remove, the carelessness is thrown aside, and human theories are forgotten, as they sob out the words which agony always presses first to the lips, " My God ! My God !" Man cannot help himself here. He cannot, if he would, destroy the feeling which thus powerfully asserts itself. Nor will it do to say that all this is the effect of education ; for even among heathen nations there are indications of the fact that prayer has existed from the beginning ; while if there be any, which may be gravely doubted, who have lost the idea, their very readiness to receive the truth of the existence of God to whom they may appeal, demonstrates the naturalness of such a thing as prayer. This, then, is one of the answers which, without opening the

Bible at all, may be given to those who cast reproach on prayer. They are ignoring the yearnings of the human heart. In their investigation of nature everywhere else, they have forgotten the nature which is within themselves and their fellow-men. They have swept the material universe with their telescopic examination, but they have neglected to take note of the observatory on which they stood, and to make allowance for the "personal equation;" so it may be said to them, that either the nature within them is a lie, and in that an exception to nature everywhere else, or it is a right thing to pray; that either men's hearts are misled by their deepest, holiest, and most constant instincts, or there is One above, able and willing to help, and to whom man may cry in his times of need.

But while seeming to assent to all this, there are some who say, "It is, of course, a right thing to pray, but you must not expect to receive the material blessing for which you ask; all the benefit you will receive will be subjective in the bringing of your own heart into a better and more peaceful state." Thus they make the reflex influence of supplication on the petitioner the only good result of prayer. Now, it is not denied that prayer has such an effect upon the soul. Every real suppliant has experienced it to such a degree that he can appropriate the words of Trench :

"Lord ! what a change within us one short hour,
Spent in thy presence, will prevail to make !

* * * * *

We kneel, and all around us seems to lower ;
We kneel, how weak ! we rise, how full of power !"

But when have men received such benefits from their prayers? It has been when they were most simple and sincere in the belief that God could and would give them the very things which they were seeking. Thus the subjective benefits of prayer depend on the belief in its objective power. How long will men continue to ask blessings, if they suppose that the only good they are to derive is, that they shall be brought to resignation and peace? They will not make requests at all unless they have faith that their petitions shall be answered. They cannot make believe to ask things which, at the very time they are asking, they know they will not receive. They cannot

seek for moral blessings at the expense of their intelligence and common-sense. They may mock others, but they do not usually make fools of themselves thus. It follows, therefore, that the very continuance of prayer among men is a witness to the constancy of the belief that God does send objective answers to prayer.

But what, if in so believing, men are believing error? Is it possible for prayer to be thus answered? The question is put by those who have given themselves to the investigation of the material universe and who announce their discovery that law is everywhere. They affirm that effects, or, as they call them, consequents, are bound to their antecedents by fixed and unalterable laws with which it would require a miracle to interfere: and that, therefore, requests for such blessings as daily bread, or bountiful harvests, or the like, are the merest superstitions: since these things will come only when the necessary conditions and antecedents are present.

Now we cannot deny the constancy of the operations of nature, for that is not only an irrefutable inference from the observation of the facts of the universe, but also an indispensable pre-requisite to our own moral training. As one has well said: "Without a reliable universe no moral character could grow. A fickle world admits only of a lawless race; no obedience could be required from those who are planted among shifting conditions, to whom foresight is denied, and whose wisdom is as likely to go astray as their folly. All human habits are formed by a mutual understanding between man and nature. Who could be temperate, if the food that simply nourishes to-day were to intoxicate to-morrow? Who would put away sloth to be in his field betimes, but in faith that the sun would not forget to rise?" It would be absolutely impossible to train a character in a state of things where there is no certainty and where the result of action is a mere peradventure. So the constancy, or, if you will, the uniformity of the operations of nature, is a thing of as much importance to the moralist as it is to the physical philosopher. It is not only a condition which must be accepted, but it is also an indispensable factor in the formation of character.

But, admitting all that, what is it that is meant by a law?

If we regard it simply as a blind force, grinding remorselessly on in its unending revolutions, then of course there is no room for prayer ; which in these circumstances would seem to be as absurd as it would be for a man overboard to call upon the paddle-wheel. But, if this is the only conception, then let it be also observed that there is no room in it for God, and thus it runs counter to the intuitions of the human soul ; for God is as much the postulate of man's dependence as of his conscience since the entreaty of the former is, without him, as inexplicable as is the supremacy of the latter. We cannot, therefore, accept such a view of law. But even as employed by philosophers themselves, the term signifies, not a force, but the generalized expression of the workings of a force, as these have been observed by human investigators. Now no one can study these operations without coming to the conclusion that behind the force there are intelligence and will, choosing to employ it in one direction rather than in another. But if law thus be the observed manner in which Intelligent Force—or, say rather, God—chooses to work in the government of the universe, then these two things are possible ; first, he may will to vary his action in special and individual instances whenever a sufficient reason for his doing so presents itself ; and second, he may in his fixed laws have selected such modes of operation that he can, through their ordinary working, meet the emergencies of his creatures when they call upon him. Laws, rightly understood, are the servants of God, and not his masters ; the channels through which he has chosen ordinarily to communicate material blessings to his creatures, and not the chains which bind him from coming to their assistance. Even the will and intelligence of a man can, within certain limits, employ the laws of nature in granting the requests which his friend may make ; and if that be so, is there any absurdity in supposing that the will of the highest Intelligence, to whom all things are subservient, may employ these laws in answering his people's prayers ? Thus, the whole question about the possibility of the answering of prayer resolves itself into one as to the existence of God. If there be no God ; or if, as seems to be the case with many in these days, that term is merely employed as “a fine name for the universe,” which they speak of as *He*, only by

courtesy, then prayer is vanity. But if there be one omnipotent and gracious being who is God over all, and to whom men can come as to a Father, then prayer to him is as appropriate as are children's requests to their parents, and God is as able to answer petitions as the human father is to give good things to the prattler that sits upon his knee.

It is impossible to enter upon any section of the great subject of prayer, without pausing a little on the threshold to take the measure of the objections which have been made in these days to offering it at all. But our purpose is to look particularly at the conditions which in the Word of God have been laid down as essential to the success of our petitions. In that passage which may be called the Christian's Prayer Charter, we are struck with the unqualified universality of the terms involved. It is as follows: "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: for every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened." ¹ Nor does it stand alone in this respect; for in his farewell address to his followers, the Lord said, "And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it." ²

But many say, "We have asked, and we have not received; we have sought, and we have not found; we have knocked, and it has not been opened to us." What shall be answered to that? Must it be admitted that God has been unfaithful to his promise? Is it so, that *He* has not kept his word? Nay, for these are not the only words which he has spoken on this subject; and, to have a comprehensive view of the case, we must take in all his other utterances concerning it. The recognized rule in the explanation of a statute is, that "we should expound it all, in the light of what is called the interpretation clause, and whenever we have a universal term by itself in one place, and have it repeated in the same connection, with certain qualifications, in other places, we are to understand it as being always so conditioned in that connection." Now, to the universal term here employed, there are some very important con-

¹ Matthew 7: 7, 8.

² John 14: 13, 14.

ditions attached elsewhere, and in the light of them this promise must be interpreted. Thus it is said by James, "Ye ask, and ye receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it upon your lusts," ¹ and again, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering : for he that wavereth is as a wave of the sea, driven by the wind and tossed." ² To the same effect are the Saviour's own words, "Therefore I say unto you, what things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them." More important still is the qualification in the words, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." And again, in the Old Testament, "Delight thyself also in the Lord, and he shall give thee the desires of thine heart." And in the immediate neighborhood of one of the universal passages already quoted is the following, "And when ye stand praying, forgive if ye have aught against any : that your Father also who is in heaven may forgive your trespasses ; but if ye do not forgive, neither will your Father which is in heaven forgive your trespasses." Moreover, it must not be forgotten that in the Bible itself we have mention of prayers offered for certain things which the suppliants did not receive : thus David fasted and wept and prayed for the life of his little child, and the child died after all ; while Paul desired that his thorn in the flesh might be taken from him, and received an answer indeed, but yet not the very thing which he requested. From all this, then, it is evident that the universal promise is to be understood as qualified by some indispensable conditions which connect themselves with the character of the suppliant, with the nature of the thing requested, and with the purpose and prerogative of God himself. A little attention to each of these will make manifest their importance.

In the first place, the success of prayer is conditioned by the character of the suppliant. Not every kind of asking is acceptable prayer. That which men desire simply for the gratification of malice, or the pampering of appetite, or the satisfying of ambition, or the aggrandizing of selfishness, God has nowhere promised to bestow ; and unless there be in them

¹ James 4 : 3.

² Idem 1 : 6.

the spirit to subordinate every thing to the honor of Jehovah, they have no warrant to expect an answer. Beneath every genuine prayer there must be evermore the disposition which is expressed in the doxology, "for Thine is the glory;" otherwise, the reproof of James will come in with fearful pungency, "Ye ask, and ye receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it upon your lusts."

Again, the desire that simply flits across the soul, as the shadow of the cloud glides over the summer grass, is no true prayer. It must take hold of the spirit, and gather into itself all the energy and earnestness of the suppliant. The popular idea, indeed, is that prayer is a very simple matter; but, in reality, it is the highest exercise of the soul, and requires for its presentation the concentration of all its powers. The English prelate was right when he said, that "no man was likely to do much good in prayer who did not begin by looking upon it in the light of a work to be prepared for, and persevered in, with all the earnestness which we bring to bear upon subjects which are, in our opinion, at once most interesting and most necessary."¹ So much as this must be evident from the phraseology of the Scriptures themselves. Observe the gradation in the terms, "asking," "seeking," "knocking." The "asking" is the lower form of requesting; but the "seeking" implies the activity of one who puts himself to the labor of a search: and the "knocking" refers to the continued importunity that repeats its application, until it is satisfied that there is no one in, or until the door is actually opened. Here, too, come in those parables spoken by the Lord, to the end that men ought always to pray and not to faint. The true suppliant is importunate. Like Jacob, he wrestles with the angel, if need be, until the dawning of the day; or like the Syro-Phœnician woman, he renews his entreaties in the face of seeming rebuff, and, from an apparent refusal, draws a plea which in the end prevails. No mere sluggard's formalism, therefore, will suffice. That is not prayer. That is but the husk of appearance—the true suppliant will "continue instant in prayer;" and, when he is over, the exhaustion of his spirit will convince him that he has been

¹ Bishop Hamilton, quoted by Lyddon—in "Some Elements of Religion," p. 172.

laboring indeed. "Believe me," said Coleridge to his nephew two years before his death, "to pray with all your heart and strength, with the reason and the will, to believe vividly that God will listen to your voice through Christ, and verily do the thing that pleaseth him at last—this is the last, the greatest achievement of the Christian's warfare on earth. Teach us to pray, Lord."

But, no one can long persist in such prayer without faith; and so, at this point, the Saviour's qualifying word, "believing, ye shall receive," is appropriate. The earnest petitioner knows that he is not beating the air. His faith is not in his prayer, but in his God; and the stronger that faith is, the more earnest will be his importunity. Even though he know that the blessing is sure to come, nay, just because he knows it is coming, he will, like Elijah on Mount Carmel, go again and again, until in the little cloud he sees the beginning of the answer.

But more important even than any of these conditions in the character of the suppliant is that laid down by Jesus, when he says, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." The man who is abiding in Christ has his eye purified so that he clearly perceives what things he ought to ask; while at the same time he is in that state of receptivity which renders the granting of his prayers a blessing to him, and not a curse. We need, therefore, to be in a high condition of holiness before we can have fulfilled to us, the promise, "Ye shall ask what you will, and it shall be done unto you." We must not take the first part of that declaration and divorce it from the second; for it is only in the measure in which we are abiding in Christ, and his words are abiding in us, that we have any right to expect that our prayers shall be answered. Behold, how this was seen in Abraham when he took it upon him to speak unto the Lord. It was the meeting of friend with friend. On the one hand Jehovah said, "Shall I hide from Abraham that thing which I do?" and, on the other, Abraham said unto the Lord, "Peradventure ten shall be found there," and the answer came, "I will not destroy it for ten's sake." We are apt to imagine, at first thought, that all this was the manifestation of mere earnestness; but out of what did that earnestness

spring? It sprung out of the closeness of Abraham's walk with God: that is, out of his abiding in God, and of God's words abiding in him. So it was with all the others spoken of in the Bible as successful suppliants. Daniel had revelations given to him in answer to his prayers, because he was the man greatly beloved; and he who saw the great apocalypse was the disciple who had leaned upon the Master's breast at supper, and had drunk in most of his spirit. Success in prayer is thus the attendant on a holy character; and it is only when men delight themselves in God, that they can calculate upon receiving the desires of their hearts. It is thus, indeed, a great thing to pray; and, when all these things are taken into consideration, we need not be surprised that so few, comparatively, of their requests are answered. The cause is not in God, but in ourselves; for, tried by these tests, the best of us must confess that we have rarely prayed at all.

But a second class of conditions connect themselves with the nature of the thing requested. "That which we ask must be in accordance with God's will." Beneath every genuine supplication, there is the spirit of resignation breathed by Jesus himself in his Gethsemane anguish. "Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." We are ignorant and short-sighted, and very often ask for things which would be hurtful to us. We cannot see the end from the beginning, and so, frequently, that which at present seems to us desirable would ultimately prove injurious. When, therefore, we ask for such a thing, God does with us precisely as we do with our own children, and keeps it from us for our good. There are many instances of this in Scripture, and it is so common in human experience that even Shakespeare has referred to it in these lines:

"We, ignorant of ourselves,
Beg often our own harms, which the wise powers
Deny us for our good; so find we profit
By losing of our prayers."

Nor is this ignorance only partial and confined to certain petitions. "Ye know not what ye ask," is true, in a very deep sense, even of the simplest request which we present to God. Who can tell all that is involved in the granting of a single desire? It seemed a little thing to the sons of Zebedee to ask

that they should sit, the one on the right hand, and the other on the left hand, of the Master in his kingdom—a thing to be granted as easily as one sets a chair for another in his room ; but, in reality, it involved in it the drinking of a cup of agony, and the submitting to a baptism of fire, of which at the moment the two apostles did not dream. Now, the very same ignorance which James and John manifested regarding the meaning of their prayer, exists in all men regarding the effect which the granting to them of the very thing they ask would have upon them. They cannot tell what bearing on themselves, or on their households, or on their churches, or on their neighborhood, the giving to them of the every thing they ask may have. They ask for worldly prosperity ; but perhaps it is denied them, because God sees that, if they had it, they should become full and deny him. They ask for deliverance from that physical weakness which makes to them, it may be, every work a burden—but no strength comes ; perhaps because God sees that only by some such chronic disability he can keep them at his feet. And so with other things. God is no mere blind, indulgent father, who gives his children every thing they ask. He is wise and kind, and has, withal, the discrimination of omniscience ; so he gives only that which will be best ; and, if we were to view the matter rightly, we would see as much reason to be thankful to him for a refusal as for an answer to our prayers.

But this condition, connecting itself with the nature of the thing asked, is nearly akin to the third class of conditions which springs out of the purpose and prerogative of God himself. This is a view of the case which has not been sufficiently attended to by Christians themselves ; and they cannot wonder, therefore, that it has been quite overlooked by others. “ The hearer of prayer,” is not the only relationship in which God stands to his people. He is their father as well ; and he is, besides, the moral governor of the intelligent universe. Therefore he uses his prerogative in answering prayer for moral purposes ; and the action which he takes on the petitions of his children, is a portion of that discipline to which he subjects them, and by which he trains them into strength and holiness of character. Or, it may be, that the kind of answers which he

gives is determined by the influence which the suppliant's example may have on others. He may give what is asked, in order that they who ask it may be convinced of the folly of their request. He may deny that which is besought, in order that by the denial he may open the suppliant's eyes to the need of higher blessings, and stimulate him to ask for them. Or he may give something else than that which is craved, because, while it will be equally valuable to the petitioner, it will be an encouragement and assistance to many others.

There are illustrations of all these in the Word of God. When the children of Israel in the wilderness cried for supplies, it is said that "he gave them their request, but sent leanness into their soul."¹ So, again, when the tribes desired a king, he gave them Saul : that through the infliction of that monarch's arbitrary and capricious tyranny, they might be convinced of the wickedness of their desire. Never was there a more devout and sincere suppliant than he with whom God talked, face to face ; and yet, when he pressed his suit to be permitted to enter Canaan, Jehovah answered : " Let it suffice thee ! speak no more to me of this matter,"² in order that all the people might know from this denial, even to Moses, how dreadful a thing sin is in the sight of the Lord. For a similar reason, probably, it was that David's prayer for the life of his child was not granted. And, when Paul thrice besought the Lord for the removal of his thorn, the answer came not in the healing of his body, but in the strengthening of his spirit ; that believers in every age might be able to appropriate the promise, " My grace is sufficient for thee ; my strength is made perfect in weakness."

It is thus apparent that the promise of answer to prayer, though given in universal terms in some passages, is qualified by the wisdom and love of Him who gave it, and that he will keep it, only in so far as it shall be for the highest welfare of his people that he should. While declaring, in general phrase, that he will give what his children ask, God yet, to speak after the manner of men, reserves to himself a certain discretionary power, so that he may either deny that which is requested, or

¹ Psalm 106 : 15.

² Deuteronomy 3 : 26.

bestow something else, according as he sees what shall be best in all the circumstances of each case. His great design, in the administration of his moral government, is to advance the interests of the Gospel, and through that to promote holiness and happiness among men. Now, the hearing of prayer by Him is only a means to that end. It is not an end in itself. God does not exist simply and only to answer prayer. He is the governor of the world and the Father of his people, and his hearing of prayer is only one among many means which he employs for the discipline of his people and the training of them into holiness.

Now, if these views are sound and scriptural, then there may be deduced from them three inferences of great practical value. In the first place, it may be seen how impossible it is for men to discover the results of prayer, by any merely human test. How, for example, shall they determine when a true prayer is offered? If so much depends on the character and spirit of the suppliant, how can any one, who is unable to read the heart, tell when the request, which a seeker presents, is such as God can approve? How, again, can any external observer take cognizance of such spiritual considerations as those which must enter into the determination of the questions whether, and in what form, a prayer shall be answered? Where are the delicate instruments which shall indicate or measure the results, on the character of the suppliant, which are produced sometimes by the denial and sometimes by the granting of his requests? Therefore, you cannot classify results here, and argue from them as you do in statistical investigations; and the demand which was made some years ago, for a scientific test of prayer, betrays on the part of those who made it ignorance of the fact that prayer lies not in the plane of physical science, but in that of moral and spiritual things, and indicates a spirit not unlike that of the Israelites of old, when they tempted God, and said, "Is the Lord among us or no?" In the wards of the hospital, the physician deals with each patient according to his disease, his temperament, his constitution, and his history. He does not give each what he requests. He may even give to one the very thing which he has just denied to the patient next him. And he does all this from

considerations altogether beyond their knowledge, and perhaps, also, above their comprehension. He is there, not simply to grant their requests, but to heal their diseases. So with God and his people. He treats each one as he requires, and grants his prayer, or refuses to grant it, according as it will best promote his spiritual welfare. But how can men, who look only on the outward appearance, take cognizance of considerations which are patent only to the eye of God? No mere human test can distinguish a true prayer from a false one; and if it cannot judge of the cry which comes out of the lips of a man, how can it analyze the answer which comes out of the heart of God?

But, as a second inference from this whole subject, it may be seen that to be successful suppliants, we must be holy men. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him, and he will show them his covenant." Character, as God sees it, gives its quality to prayer, and they who are nearest akin to God in holiness, get the most frequent answers to their requests. Yet this is the consequence of their holiness, and not the reward of it. Their purity of heart has clarified their spiritual perception, so that they see plainly what they should ask for, and asking that they are not disappointed. Thus the prevailing prayer of the closet is that of the "righteous man," and the measure of personal holiness is the measure also of the power of petition. We hear of the great things that have been wrought by prayer, in the history of men and institutions; and few more striking things are written anywhere on that subject than those to be found in "Praying and Working," by Mr. Stephenson, of Dublin; but we must beware of supposing that nothing but asking is involved in such successes. The asking was of a peculiar kind; it was that of men who lived much with God and were doing much for God, and whose characters, in the life of every day, illustrated the gospel of the Lord Jesus. It was that, moreover, of men who were diligently seeking, by the use of appropriate means, to answer their own prayers; and not by one spasmodic leap can we vault into their privilege. It belongs only to their holiness and activity; and through growth in these alone shall we grow into their success. But if we seek it only for the success's sake, or only to be like those who have

been successful, we shall ignominiously fail. They sought it from God, that they might give it to God; and those who would imitate them must do the same.

As a final inference from these considerations, it may be noted how necessary it is that prayers should be characterized by entire submission to the will of God. The undertone of every supplication should be, "Thy will be done." There is a warrant for stretching earnestness up to this point, "Father, if it be possible," but that must always be combined with the "nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." That is a prayer that is always answered, and the answer to it can bring ultimately nothing but blessing to him who breathes it sincerely, though in the immediate future there may be betrayal and crucifixion. So let the Christian go his way, undistracted alike by the objections which so-called philosophers have raised against prayer, and by the unguarded things which spiritual enthusiasts have said about the power of it; and, having faith in God, let him leave every request with him, sure that in the end he shall either get that which he seeks or something better. We may sum up our argument in the words of the good Leighton, "True prayers never come weeping home;" and again, "This is the excellent advantage of the prayer of faith, that it quiets and establishes the heart in God. Whatsoever be its estate and desire, when once he hath put his petition into God's hand, he rests content in holy security and assurance concerning the answer, refers it to the wisdom and love of God how and when he will answer; not doubting that whatsoever it be, and whensoever, it shall both be gracious and seasonable. But the reason why so few of us find that sweetness and comfort that is in prayer, is because the true nature and use of it are so little known."

WILLIAM M. TAYLOR.

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY : HISTORICAL.

PHILOSOPHY, or rather the teaching of philosophy, is at present running very strongly in one or other of two directions—these very different from its tendencies the first half of this century. There is now little disposition, even in Deutschland, to construct new ideal philosophies. People are sick, as well they may be, of the systems which speculators draw out of their brains like the webs, as Bacon characterizes it, which “spiders spin out of their bowels.” The acknowledged failure of the great thinkers of Germany to fashion a reasonable philosophy *à priori* has discouraged youths from attempting to construct the universe *de novo*, by intuition like Schelling, or by transcendental logic like Hegel, or by mathematical formulæ like Herbart. And, it must be added, that the Scottish school and the Scottish-American school of philosophy, which seek to unfold the revelations of consciousness, are not able to collect around them any great amount of enthusiasm since the glow, left behind for a time by the sun of Hamilton as it set, has faded into shadow. In Germany, and latterly in France and even in Scotland, the young life runs in two streams ; towards history and criticism on the one hand, and towards physiological psychology on the other.

In the October number of *Mind*, Prof. Wundt has given the number of courses of lectures delivered the last three years in the German-speaking universities, German, Austrian, Swiss, and the Russian university at Dorpat.

	HIST. OF PHIL.	LOGIC.	PSYCH.	METAPH.	ETHICS.
Winter.... 1874-1875	34	21	17	7	6
Summer..... 1875	39	22	23	5	3
Winter.... 1875-1876	37	27	18	8	9
Summer..... 1876	35	17	23	6	3
Winter.... 1876-1877	39	24	22	8	9
Summer..... 1877	32	20	17	5	2
	216	131	120	39	32

It will be noticed that the number of courses in ethics is small, and seems to be diminishing. The number in metaphysics is also small compared with what it used to be. Logic and psychology have still a considerable place, but the two together amount to little more than the number in the history of philosophy, which is predominant throughout. In Great Britain, in Oxford and Cambridge, philosophy is discussed historically, with criticisms of special systems. In Edinburgh, Prof. Fraser is expounding Berkeley; and Sterling is extra-academically criticising Hamilton, and opening to us the *sécet* of Hegel. In Glasgow, Prof. Caird is looking down upon and criticising the philosophy of Kant from the higher level of Hegelianism. In Dublin, where Locke reigned for a century and a quarter, Mr. Mahaffy is recommending Kant to the Irish youths. The subject of historical philosophy, which is exercising so many scholarly (but by no means profound) minds in the universities of Europe, will form the basis of discussion in the present paper; the subjects of Mind and Body, and Materialism, so attractive to the scientific men of Great Britain and the United States, must be deferred for subsequent treatment.

Defects of the Historico-Critical Method.—This method, when it is used exclusively, has its evils. It should always be preceded by a careful inductive inquiry into the operations and laws of the human mind—just as the study of the history of astronomy should proceed on a knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. When this is omitted, the historical investigation will tend to take the student away from the soul and its mode of operation. It is noticeable that those who are trained simply in historical disquisitions are often superlatively ignorant of human nature, and may be led to follow the most absurd theories.

All histories of philosophy worthy of the name will contain less or more of criticism, or at least of critical remark. But there can be no criticism without a standard. Thus the valuable dissertation of Dugald Stewart in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, on metaphysical science, proceeds on the principles of the Scottish school. Ritter's and Schweigler's histories measure all things by the transcendental forms of Hegel. Almost all the later German histories of philosophy in general, or of special

schools, explain and examine all systems after the principles and commonly in the very nomenclature of Kant. Students, before they are aware of it, are thus led into a labyrinth of artificial forms without a clue to take them out of it, and have to remain there with no means of escape. A select body of students are thus committed, without knowing it, to lines that have been laid for them, and, as they move on, find themselves carried into the most extreme positions. But the great body of the young men thus drilled go away from their colleges into the various walks of life with a sort of general impression that, of all things, the theories of metaphysicians are the most ridiculous, and not a few reach the conclusion that truth cannot be found. This threatens to be the fruit of the historico-philosophical method of teaching both in Europe and in America. The present fashion has reached its height, and is seen in a very considerable interest taken in philosophical discussion with scarcely any positive belief or convictions of any kind. In a few years there will be a terrible reaction against the search which has been so vain; and this will take the shape either of utter indifference towards all philosophical inquiry, with a settled idea that nothing has been settled, that nothing can be settled, or a rushing towards a physiological psychology conducted by chloroform experiments on pigeons, rabbits, dogs, and monkeys, as more likely to throw some light on the mental structure of man.

While it appears necessary to utter this warning against the teaching of mental philosophy exclusively by a critical summary of opinions, it is still true that an historical exposition should accompany and follow an inductive psychology which has first made the student acquainted with the operation of the cognitive, the motive, and the moral powers of the mind. There are several recent important works constructed in the historical and critical spirit.

Bowen's "Modern Philosophy."—Professor Bowen and President Porter may be taken as the highest representatives of American philosophy in the present day. The former has for many years taught "Natural Religion and Moral Philosophy" in Harvard University. He gives his religious confession in his preface, "I accept with unhesitating conviction and belief the

doctrine of the being of one personal God, the creator and governor of the world, and of one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; and I have found nothing whatever in the literature of modern infidelity which, to my mind, casts even the slightest doubt upon that belief." This suggests the remark that the old Unitarianism of the school of Channing (from which Prof. Bowen has sprung, though he does not now belong to it) was always favorable to a high philosophy, which was used by them to defend what religion they were pleased to receive out of the Bible. Now, when Unitarianism has ceased to be a power in Boston, many are tremblingly anxious to find what form the young philosophy is to take in Harvard; some fearing that catching, as that university is wont, the spirit of the times, it may descend to a refined materialism, which will speedily become gross and unrefined in its practical influence.

Prof. Bowen, in a work published almost a generation since, had a judicious defence of Locke from the misrepresentations of him by the German and French critics, who at that time (they have since learned better) called him *Lockè*, and described him as a mere sensationalist; whereas he gives a high place to reflection as a source of ideas, and calls in, consistently or inconsistently, a power of intuition and reason, and thus became a favorite with the rationalistic school of Great Britain and America. Mr. Bowen is known favorably as the author of an able philosophical work on logic, in which he has unfortunately adopted Hamilton's doctrine of the thorough quantification of the predicate of propositions. Logicians should always be ready to quantify the predicate when required; but we can, and usually do, reason without such a process.

The work is called "*Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann.*" But he does not purpose to write a complete history of modern philosophy. There is no formal account of Hobbes, or Locke, or Hume, or Hartley, or Reid, or Stewart, or Hamilton, or the two Mills. But he treats fully of metaphysicians less known to English-speaking students: of Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Pascal, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann, with shorter criticisms of Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptu-

alism, of Berkeleyanism and Positivism. He has evidently mastered all these philosophies, and has furnished a clear and accurate exposition of them. His criticisms, characterized by American shrewdness, are always candid and commonly just.

His account of the philosophies of Leibnitz and Kant, of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, is specially commendable. He has brought out with great felicity some of the highest aspects of the grand system of Leibnitz, the most comprehensive of all the German thinkers, and worthy to be placed in the same rank with Plato and Aristotle. He has given a full and correct account of the philosophy of Kant, and examined it from the American point of view ; that is, by good sense and common logic. His exposition of the critical philosophy is, upon the whole, the best in the English tongue ; better than the well written but loose ones of Cousin and Morell ; better even than the epitomes by German scholars, who have commonly been so caught in the net of their great metaphysician that they cannot extricate themselves so as to view his labored system impartially. Thinkers are particularly grateful to him for his account of Schopenhauer and Hartmann ; and students wishing to keep up with the latest German thinking may satisfy themselves with these two articles without travelling to Germany or toiling through the works in the originals.

Schopenhauer.—Of late years German students have been wondering after Schopenhauer and Hartmann ; and American and British youths seeing the crowd, have joined them and been gazing with them. The laboriously constructed systems of these two eccentric men exhibit German idealism in its latest and possibly its last form ; they seem to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole speculative method introduced by Leibnitz and continued by Kant and Fichte, by Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart, a method which, it should be observed, began with optimism and has ended with an avowed and determined pessimism. These two men have not a place in the universities, from which they have been excluded by the old intellectual aristocracy of Germany, but they have hearers, if not believers, beyond the college walls—against which they have been shooting their arrows. Their systems have been gendered spontaneously out of the slimes of decayed systems, and can only have

an ephemeral existence. Schopenhauer speaks of Schelling as a "wind-bag," of Hegel as a "charlatan," and very soon there will arise avengers to apply like epithets to himself, and to describe the man himself, as he describes his philosophy, as a "pessimist."

Prof. Bowen evidently loves the men while he is exhibiting their follies. Thus he says of Schopenhauer :

"There are many good things in his philosophy, though he put them there by mistake. These we can pick out and leave the bad alone. He has often taught what is good and right, though most frequently with an evil purpose. In paving the way for his ultimate conclusions, which are often untrue and even diabolical, he has stumbled upon many intermediate truths of great moment, and has defended them with more wit, vigor, and originality than were ever expended upon them before. After the character now given of him, I am almost ashamed to add that I have read his works, not only with more interest and amusement, but in many parts positively with more instruction and delight, than those of any other metaphysician of this century." "He detests the whole tribe of German professors of the absolute; and, as he is a bitter hater, he does good service by demolishing some of their paradoxes and exposing the inordinate use of technicalities and abstruse phraseology, and their general disregard of common-sense. He has given far the ablest, most searching, and on the whole most sensible criticism of Kantian metaphysics which has yet appeared in Germany."

His special work is entitled, "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.*" First he represents the world as presentative. "It is my presentation (*Vorstellung*) or mental picture : is what I represent it to be ; it agrees exactly with my thought ; it is *my* thought. The world exists for me only as a picture and a belief existent in my mind only so far as it is portrayed by my thought and present to my consciousness." Subject and object are only different aspects of one and the same phenomenon, viz., the presentation. This is the most thoroughgoing idealism which has yet appeared in Germany. German and American youths who have thus far ascended in this balloon, not just to heaven but to the clouds, may as well stop here and inquire how they can safely descend.

He represents the world also as will. "My body is nothing else than objectified will ; that is, my will becomes a presentation, a perception."

"Will," says Schopenhauer, "is not one form or species of the genus power or force, but each and every power or force is one species of the genus will; will is not necessarily self-conscious, or known to itself as such; in the greater number of cases we infer what in several cases we directly know, that it is unconscious. Self-consciousness, knowledge as such, is only an accident of the manifestation of will *in animals*, particularly in man; but is not an invariable accompaniment of it even in him." "In the last analysis matter is nothing but force, and force is nothing but will." "This will is everywhere one and the same, a blind, unconscious God."

Following out his doctrine, he reaches the conclusion that "this is the worst of all possible worlds, tenanted by the worst of all possible beings, mankind :"

"He who, through his intellect, has arrived at a knowledge of this nature and essence of the world, has but one course remaining to him. It is to renounce the will altogether, to cease striving after any thing; to repudiate all desires; to sink into inaction and mere thought; and thereby, as far as in him lies, to reduce this life to the nothingness whence it was drawn, and which is heaven as compared with the miseries of the world. Hence, in the ethics of Schopenhauer, asceticism, celibacy, quietism, monachism, and the like, are the only virtuous modes of living. If all would adopt this course the world would immediately cease to be."

Hartmann was born in 1842, and is still living. His work is entitled, "Die Philosophie des Unbewussten," "The Philosophy of the Unconscious." It is divided into three books, the first of which brings together the evidence of unconscious mental action in the corporeal organism; the second contains proof of the activity of the unconscious in the phenomena of the human mind; while the third presents what the author calls the "metaphysics of the unconscious." Matter is resolved into the combined will and intellect of the unconscious. On one fundamental point he separates from both Kant and Schopenhauer. In a certain sense he maintains the objective reality both of space and time, and of the universe of external things; but it turns out that the objective reality is only an appearance of the unconscious All; and, in fact, his doctrine is the grossest materialism. He shows a greater acquaintance with physical science than Schopenhauer possessed, and his pessimism is not so extreme. "Most of his argument is intended to dissipate the illusions of the vulgar in respect to the attainableness of

happiness either here or hereafter, and thereby to induce the educated and thinking mind to strive only after such improvement of the intellect as will finally correct these illusions, and dispose mankind generally to bring the world to an end by common consent."

The reader before this time may have come to the conclusion that he has had enough of such perverted ingenuities. The circumstance that such books should have been written and have received a hearing discloses curious glimpses of a strange state of feeling among certain bodies of thinking men, and shows what an awful gulf is awaiting those who abandon Christianity. It is fortunate that the doctrine has been presented to English readers by so candid an expositor as Prof. Bowen. It is a notable circumstance that an elaborate discussion on these two authors and their subject has been produced by an acute writer well acquainted with later German thought, Mr. James Sully, who in his "Sensation and Intuition" sought, not very successfully, to combine *à priori* philosophy with empirical physiology, and who has now issued a work on "Pessimism, a History and a Criticism." This book is reviewed by Prof. Bain in *Mind*, an able periodical admitting articles on both sides, but which is, in fact, Mr. Bain's literary organ, edited by his pupil, Prof. Robertson of London University College. Mr. Sully, after weighing pleasure and pain in scales, concludes that, looking to the past and the present, "life has a bare positive value," but he expects better of the future. One good end may be accomplished by these unsatisfying discussions. Physicists, as they inquire into the origin of worlds, have of late years been discovering traces of terrible wars and struggles, and now philosophers are forced to look at the evil, though they are making a perverse use of it. Happy those who, while they see the evil, look also to the remedy which has been provided.

Caird's "*Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant.*"—Prof. Edward Caird is the brother of the Rev. Dr. Caird, who became known by his sermon before the Queen of England, and who, after being for a number of years Professor of Theology in Glasgow University, is now Principal of that University, and a leader of the Broad Church party, which is now so strong

among a body of ministers in Scotland distinguished for their literary ability. The professor occupies the chair of Thomas Reid, and is there teaching a philosophy which the common-sense philosopher would have found it difficult to comprehend ; and if he were permitted to rise from his grave to listen to his successor, Reid would say of his teachings, as he did when alive of the *à priori* arguments of Newton and Clarke, " These are the speculations of men of superior genius. But whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination beyond the limits of human understanding, I am unable to decide."

The professor was educated first at Glasgow, at a time when there was no man of influential intellect in the philosophic chairs, and then went up to Oxford, where, in the absence of any English philosophy, there was a running after German speculation, especially after Hegel. A youth of brighter parts than even his gifted brother, he was appointed in early life Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. He is there undermining the native philosophy, and probably the underlying principles of the old theology of Scotland ; and many are looking with apprehension to the crop which is sure to follow the sowing of the principal and the professor.

A Princeton Fellow, who lately studied at the universities of Berlin and Leipsic, has asserted¹ that the number of Hegelians in Germany might be counted on our ten fingers. Not sustained in its native land, Hegelianism has emigrated to the country of Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, and has there found a settlement for a little while. The ablest exponents of the Hegelian philosophy are to be found, not in Germany, nor even in Glasgow, but on the banks of the Mississippi. American youths do not need to go to Berlin in order to study it. They have the best exposition of it in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, which at St. Louis is courageously defending a falling cause.

The student wishing to become acquainted with the philosophy of Kant need not go to Caird's "Critical Account ;" he may find a far more intelligible account in Bowen's article.

¹ This Review, for April, 1875.

Caird's book is a historico-critical rather than an expository one. It opens with a chapter on the necessity of criticism, which, to serve any satisfactory purpose, should have been prefaced with an enunciation of the standard of criticism adopted by him. He traces with no great ability the critical spirit historically through ancient and mediæval times, and in the seventeenth century. He then gives the views which he, following the Germans, entertains of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, doing scant justice to Locke. He has a criticism of Leibnitz, but does not see wherein either his superlative greatness or his superlative weakness consists.

Coming to Kant, he shows the steps by which Kant was led on to his Critical System. This is by far the most valuable part of the work, though some works have just been published in Germany throwing still farther light on the *Origines Kantianæ*. Holding first by a commonplace rational philosophy got from Wolff, the formal redacteur of Leibnitz, Kant was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume, and sought to erect a mound to keep back the tide of scepticism. Prof. Caird has clearly brought out what, however, was well known before, that in order to meet objections, Kant changed his statements in the second edition of the "*Critique of Pure Reason*," thereby only landing himself in deeper difficulties.

Having devoted 180 pages to these preliminary matters, Prof. Caird now gives 500 pages of expository criticism, and promises another volume. It would require as many pages to review this criticism; and after the best had been done, the complaint would be that the author had been misunderstood—the complaint made by Hegel of his contemporaries was, that only one man understood him, and he did not understand him. The work has been extravagantly praised, as might be expected, in the *Westminster Review* and in *Mind*. It appears to us that Prof. Caird has followed Kant where he should have left him, and left him where it would have been better to remain with him. The author of the review in *Mind* speaks of him as a Hegelian, and he seems to proceed very much on Hegelian principles in his criticism, though Hegel would not have acknowledged him as a genuine expounder of his philosophy. He proceeds upon the principle that by the senses and con-

sciousness one does not perceive things, but appearances, and that thought lands him in contradictions. Such is the issue, the necessary issue, of Kant's *Analytic*, but he proposes by a synthesis to bring, after the manner of Hegel, the contradictions into a higher unity, and to reach realities, but what sort of realities it is difficult to find. Men are justified in assuming that the mind begins with realities, always singular and concrete; and that the alleged contradictions of Kant and the Hegelians, and, it may be added, of Hamilton, are contradictions, not in the principles of the mind, but in the wrong account given of them by metaphysicians, who do not inquire into their nature in an inductive manner. One is surprised to find him stating that the argument from design fails, as arguing an infinite God from finite works. All that the argument from design was ever meant to prove is that God is possessed of intelligence. It is argued that he is infinite from mental principles. All this was stated an age ago: "It is all true that the adaptation in the finite works of God does not prove that God is infinite, but it proves that he is a living, intelligent being, possessed of indefinite power; and this allows our intuition as to infinity to clothe him with infinite attributes." ("Method of Divine Government," *Append. II.*) Instead of trying to take the reader through the Hegelian windings, it is more profitable to state what are the fundamental objections to the philosophy of Kant.

A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy.—The system of Kant was meant, as every one knows, to take all that is good from the experientialism of Locke on the one hand, and the dogmatism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz on the other, and in this way to meet the scepticism of Hume, in which Locke's philosophy had terminated, and which could not be set aside by the innate ideas of Descartes and the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. He assumes, or rather attempts to prove, in a very weak and wavering manner, that there is an external world. But all that it discloses to men is phenomena, in the sense of appearances, being, in fact, the *impressions* of Hume. Even the internal sense or self-consciousness gives only appearances, and not things appearing. But if these be all, then metaphysics, philosophy, and theology are only a mirage. But men are impelled to seek for something higher and deeper. In

all cognition there is a more important element furnished by the mind itself in the shape of forms, imposed on objects and giving a unity to what is scattered. Without these the presentation, of sense, external and internal, are scattered and meaningless. These forms are in the mind ready to be imposed on the phenomena of sense, and the cognition, such as men are able to attain, is the result of the two : be it observed, first of appearances, and secondly of subjective moulds, the one called the *à posteriori*, the other the *à priori* element. The concrete thus constructed has turned out to be a very brittle substance, ever mouldering as it is employed in building. The phenomenon cannot be called a thing. The subjective form has no objective validity. The product partakes of the weakness of both its elements, baseless as the one, aërial and cloudy as the other, and is thus a sort of castle in the air arising from the swamps of the earth, rising toward heaven but never reaching it, in fact, obscuring it. The judgments and reasonings of the mind are themselves only forms imposed on the appearances of the sense, and on formless materials in which there is no true reality. True, there is, there must be, a reality, a *Ding an sich*, a thing in itself (though what guarantees this, men have not been able to discover), but the human mind can never reach it ; and as it attempts to do so, falls into paralogisms and contradictions. The philosophy of Kant, meant to counteract Hume, thus led, without the author meaning it, to a deeper scepticism, and ended, not in a mere negation as with the Scotch sceptic, but in a *maya*, all the more tormenting because it implied a reality beyond, forever shut out from man. The issue is seen in the Nescience of Hamilton, the Unknown of Herbert Spencer, and the Agnostic of the reigning English philosophy, which has associated so congenially with the development theory of matter, life, and mind.

It is necessary to meet all this. This should be the great work of the higher philosophy in the present day. America should hasten to take it up. There is no other country ready to undertake it. Germany could engage in it only by abandoning, what she is not prepared to abandon, the fundamental principles of the philosopher of whom she is so proud. England is following Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall, and is not on the track. There are no signs of its being done in Scotland,

where Prof. Bain of Aberdeen is a leader in the materialistic psychology, and Prof. Caird of Glasgow is expounding Kant on the principles of Hegel. America, which has never been addicted to *à priori* speculation, has here a rich and inviting field thrown open to her. Those of her youth who have spent a year or two in Germany and have been sucked in by the current may be disposed to swim along with it, instead of extricating themselves and resisting it, and may waste their lives in expounding German speculations. But Americans will never match the Germans or Oxonians in expounding transcendentalism or carrying it up higher into cloudland. They will be employed vastly better, and more in accordance with the genius of their country, in defending a sober realism which opposes materialism, and yet does not fly up into idealism. There must be more teachers of mental and moral science in the United States than in any other nation in the world. Instead of being dependent on foreign sources, why should they not combine to form a philosophy of their own worthy of their country?

The account given by Kant of the fundamental principles of the mind is an artificial and altogether a perverted one. It represents them as Forms, bringing the scattered presentations, which are appearances without things, into unity, an ideal unity, in which the idea becomes more and more prominent, and at the end the reality disappears, it being all the while certain that there is a noumenon which cannot be discovered. Now, looking to the mind itself, and studying its operations, the true account is that it possesses a power—or rather powers—of perception, which enables it to perceive things; not impressions, as Hume maintained; not appearances, but things as appearing; not qualities, but things with their qualities. When a plane surface is perceived, there is not a cloud of scattered phenomena, and the mind from its own stores imposing space as a form upon them; but there is a perception of an object as extended in two dimensions. If the question is put, How is this proven? the answer is that there is the same evidence of this that there is of the existence of an appearance; in fact, what is known is a thing appearing. An appearance without a thing is an abstraction formed from the thing presented. Taking this view, the statement is excluded that in sense-perception there is an *à priori* and an *à posteriori* element; in fact, these two

phrases might, like *idea*, be discarded from rigid philosophy. The mental exercise consists in perceiving the external object, and should be called an intuition, and not an *à priori* form. It does not tell beforehand what objects should have or must have been, but what is in objects on which the senses, external and internal, look.

The power of intuition is not confined to the external senses. There is an internal sense by which every one looks upon himself as thinking, feeling, and resolving. Not only so, but all the higher faculties, intellectual and moral, have a power of looking on things and the relations of things. In contemplating an effect, it is perceived that it must have had a cause ; on seeing a cruel action, men declare it to be evil.

As these intuitions work they may be noticed and generalized, just as Newton generalized the operations of nature into the law of gravitation. These generalizations become the principles with which philosophy has to deal. When they are properly formed out of the operations of the mind, they are the fundamental laws of cognition, belief, and judgment. When they are imperfect, one-sided, mutilated, they may lead to contradictions and serious errors. When they give the exact experience of the mind's actions, they constitute mental philosophy. As they begin with, so they end with, realities.

Flint's "Theism."—Professors Calderwood and Flint may be regarded as the two fittest representatives in Scotland at this present time of the genuine Scottish school. The latter was for a time a minister in Glasgow ; he then became Professor of Moral Philosophy in St. Andrews, and is now Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Edinburgh. He first became known beyond his native country by the publication of "The Philosophy of History in Europe," Vol. I., treating of France and Germany. In this book he does not treat of the philosophy of the history of these countries, but gives a historico-critical exposition of the books which have been written on the philosophy of history. The work is elaborate, and shows much reading and painstaking reflection. His recent work on Theism consists of lectures with notes, delivered in connection with the Baird Lectureship, a foundation analogous to the Bampton Lectureship. The book is calm, candid, and judicious, and is on the whole the best which could be put into

the hands of an intelligent young man who is troubled with sceptical doubts, or has become bewildered by the philosophical and scientific discussions of the times. The volume is to be followed by another upon *Anti-Theistic Theories*.

His argument is clearly thought and well expressed. He derives the idea of God and gets his argument from all classes of God's works, and from the thinking principles of the mind itself. So far as the physical facts are concerned, the argument is really, though not avowedly, that from collocations. But the lecturer sees that he needs to call in mental principles. The key to his argument may be found in the statement, "There is so much that is intuitive involved in the apprehension of God, that the apprehension itself may readily be imagined to be intuitive." He has, of course, to call in the principle of cause and effect. But he seeks to avoid metaphysical discussion as to the nature of causation. It may be doubted whether he can legitimately do this, for if causation is empirical, the theistic argument is not logically conclusive, for it will be argued that causation does not extend beyond human experience to world-making. The principle of causality is that every thing beginning to be must have a cause, and so he thinks it necessary to take it upon him to show that the world has had a commencement. He shows from recent science that the present state of things has had a beginning, but he has not shown that it cannot have come from a preceding one. It is not necessary for his argument that he should. We argue an intelligent cause of the order and adaptation as an effect continually produced before our eyes. Without committing himself to the development hypothesis, he shows, as Hugh Miller had done before him, that evolution, such as is proven to exist, needs an intelligence to guide it orderly and beneficently. He avoids the objection started by Kant, and still supposed by German metaphysicians and Prof. Caird to be unanswerable, about a finite effect not proving the existence of an infinite cause, by showing that belief in the infinity of God comes from mental principles. Altogether, the method in which he proves from internal principles that God is a spirit and clothes him with moral perfections is characterized by admirable wisdom, tact, and logical validity.

JAMES MCCOSH.

MATERIALISM AND THE PULPIT.

THE thesis that no design lies back of the system of things, of which man forms a part, attracts much attention at the present day. It asserts that man was not *intended* for his place, "but is simply flung hither by the competitive passions of the most gifted brutes," in the long struggle for existence. The naturalist who has been wont to think that if God is active anywhere, it is at crises or epochs in nature—"at the points, for instance, between successive species of organisms,"—as fast as he finds these intervals, or chasms, in the order of production, filled up by the discovery of intermediary forms, imagines that a divine agent may be altogether dispensed with. He recognizes no need of "a fountain of orderly power," which renders the tissue of laws intelligible. He overlooks the fact that a system of *thought-relations* presupposes a mind that thinks it. Mr. Martineau has uttered a truth¹ which, in the present state of discussion, deserves to be enforced with all urgency. Suppose that all the gaps between species of living beings were filled up, so that they were found to be no more distinct from one another than are varieties of the same species; suppose, further, that the space between organic and inorganic existences were bridged over in like manner, so that a kind of stairway were unfolded, leading from the lowest forms of unorganized matter, through vegetable and animal life, up to man. Finite existences would then form, as it were, an unbroken chain. It is not probable that this supposition has been, or is likely to

¹ "Modern Materialism, in its relations to Religion and Theology."

be, verified ; but if it were, the evidence of God would not be destroyed. For the *intelligible* character of this orderly succession, for all its harmonies and adaptations, forethought is absolutely required. Men could not account for such a world—that is, they could not assign for it an adequate cause : a cause that satisfies the natural curiosity which impels them to seek for an explanation of things—except by the assumption that an intelligent Being was its author. From both a theoretical and a practical point of view, it is, in the highest degree, desirable to make prominent the truth that God reveals himself in the orderly flow of things, in the daily movement of nature, shining of the sun, and the falling of the shower, not less really than in the miracles of creation. Science implies, in its very name, that there is a *mind-element* in nature, and to talk of an unconscious mind, is to talk nonsense. It is, as the logicians say, a *contradictio in adjecto*.

The man of science, as Mr. Martineau proceeds to show, concentrates his attention upon the question, *How ?* He deals with matters of fact ; he arranges and classifies phenomena. But there is another question, viz., *Whence ?* What is the originating power ? Religion does not deny any thing that physical and natural science observes, whether with the eye, the ear, the telescope, the microscope, or any other organ or instrument of discovery. Religion admits all the facts, but affirms that no solution of the facts is rational which ignores the agency of mind in the frame and order of things. The physicist is obliged to allow the impassable gulf that lies between cerebral movements and mental sensations. The notion of “inner” and “outer” “sides” of matter is mere jingle of words without meaning ; unless, indeed, it be taken to involve the very distinction spoken of. The atheistic physicist is obliged to set up a new conception of matter, and make it “up to every thing, even to writing Hamlet, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a molecular plébiscite for a divine monarchy of the world.” In other words, he has to ascribe to matter the attributes of mind. Nothing is gained by the futile attempt to set up “force” as a distinct entity. Force in nature has no concrete existence apart from matter. The physicist has to allow external causality ; but this he does not observe

with the senses, or with any of his instruments of research. It is an element which the mind itself brings, as the necessary condition of thinking of phenomena at all. The question is, what is the causality? The only causal power of which men are directly conscious, is the will. They are conscious of their own personal effort put forth in volition. This is the origin of the notion of force, and, according to Mr. Martineau, the sum of the knowledge of force. Behind the traces of phenomena which fall under human observation, men are compelled, by a law of thinking, to believe that force is active, but they have no right to postulate any different sort of force from that with which they are made acquainted in the operation of their own wills. It is the personal agency of God, in uniform lines of action, which gives rise to the laws of nature. They express only the regular and wise procedure of the divine will, by the direct determinations of which the uniformity of nature is produced. Of course, Mr. Martineau rejects the doctrine of the efficiency of second causes, and resolves all efficiency into the will-power of God, or man, or other intelligent beings. The polytheist was wrong, the primitive mythologies were wrong, not in referring the phenomena of the mind to personal agency, but in dividing up that agency into a multitude of separate, if not discordant, parts, and in attributing to it an irregular and capricious action. The progress of knowledge and of thought, which yields the conception of the cosmos, simply presents one all-knowing and Almighty person, in the room of the multiplied divinities of the Pantheon. The question whether second causes are efficient, or only occasional, is a branch of the subject needing here only the remark, that sound philosophy, as well as sound theology, ought, at least, to prohibit attributing a kind of self-existence to the forces of nature, as if there dwelt in matter an inherent energy, not communicated or fed from the eternal fountain of all power, the will of the personal God.

Mr. Martineau has very interesting observations upon the incompatibility between the highest feelings and aspirations of the human soul and the materialistic theory of the universe. The feeling of *compassion* is at utter variance with the system of things, if, as it is asserted, nature is *pitiless*, and there is no compassionate and helping power besides. *Self-forgetfulness* is

the very antipode of that *self-assertion* which reigns everywhere in the objective world. So with *moral obligation*. "The real world provides *interests* alone, which, when adequately masked, call themselves virtues, and pass for something new." In fine, the higher feelings shrink, under the withering breath of materialism, "into mere unaccredited subjective susceptibilities; they have lost all support from Omniscient approval, and all presumable accordance with the reality of things."

From a somewhat different point of view, the argument from conscience may be used with irresistible effect for the demolition of materialism. No man of sane mind can deny that the phenomena of the moral nature are as real as any which the senses or instruments of a physicist can observe. They are facts which science, in the large sense of the term, must take notice of or abdicate its functions. To ignore the vast and various phenomena which connect themselves with the sense of moral responsibility, is impossible. What account shall be given of moral praise and blame—of self-approval and censure? Here these feelings are, and here they always have been. Do they testify to the truth? If they do not, then away with the language which only serves to deceive; away with all the multiform expressions of moral approbation or condemnation; away with courts of law, and the other infinitely various manifestations of the sense of justice and moral accountability, on which the entire fabric of social life reposes! The evolutionist must allow that these verdicts of the moral faculty, be their genesis what it may, are as valid as are any judgments of the intellect. The moral discernment rests on as solid a foundation as the intellectual perceptions. Now apply the doctrine that the determinations of the will—the faithfulness of St. John, and the treachery of Judas, alike—are the necessary effect of atomic movements of matter. They simply indicate a certain molecular action of the matter in a corner of the brain. Their moral approval or condemnation, the joy of one who has triumphed over a temptation, the remorse of one who has betrayed the innocent, are the veriest folly. A man who maliciously shoots his neighbor has no more occasion to blame himself for the deed, than has a horse who destroys a man's life by a kick. Men call such an animal, in figurative speech, a

vicious animal ; and, if materialism is true, there is no other kind of vice possible to a human being. Tyndall, in one of his late productions, argues that this doctrine of molecular ethics is perfectly consistent with the application of motives for the purpose of inducing men to act in one way rather than another. These motives, it is implied, are forces thrown into the scale that the beam may rise on the opposite side. This is the statement which fatalists of every type are forever making. But the point insisted upon is not the freedom of the will as found by direct consciousness, although this evidence of man's moral freedom is incontrovertible ; but the phenomena of moral approval and disapproval, of guilt, self-accusation, and remorse, are the facts demanding some explanation which shall not destroy their reality in the very act of attempting to explain them. Here it is that the materialistic psychology breaks down. Nor can it be said that this is opposing a doctrine by merely pointing out its mischievous consequences. The affirmations of conscience referred to as putting to rout the advocates of materialism are as truly perceptions and judgments as are any of the propositions that result from the exercise of the senses or the understanding. If materialistic evolution, as predicated of moral action, be true, the rational nature is at war with itself. There is an insoluble contradiction in human intelligence itself, which no sophistical juggle of words can avail to cover up, much less to remove.

There is no end to the absurdities of materialism, and of the fatalism involved in it, when once you undertake to scrutinize this doctrine. What is truth and falsehood, on this hypothesis ? What are reasonable and irrational judgments ? What is normal and abnormal action of the mind ? What are sanity and insanity ? All these acts of perception and states of mind are, one as much as another, natural phenomena, occurring in the course of the regular action of nature's laws. As the molecular movement of the brain changes, one state of consciousness succeeds to another ; but, on the materialistic philosophy, one is equally rational with the other. All are alike parts and phases of the process of evolution. The Spencerian evolutionist is unable to deny that such molecular changes may occur in the thinking lump of matter, as to give an entirely different set of

intuitions from that which now possesses the organism, and on which his own metaphysics are founded. Tyndall ascribed the scientific belief of Agassiz, the sincerity of whom he did not question, to the circumstance that his grandfather was a clergyman ! But has not every one a grandfather ? Why not attribute Professor Tyndall's theories to an analogous cause ? Who shall decide, as between the two grandfathers, whose brain was the soundest ? But, as suggested, how can such a question be asked, when all is normal, all the operation of an inevitable natural law, and when the very discrimination by which one sets grandfather Tyndall above grandfather Agassiz is itself a mere phenomenon of molecular action ?

Mr. Martineau, in his little volume, subjects to a critical examination the atomic theories by which it is proposed to supersede the supposition of a creative mind in the formation of the universe. He demonstrates the truth of the thesis, that nothing can come from the atoms that was not already in them, and exposes the sleight-of-hand by which these diminutive entities are made to play such various parts in the construction of the world. That qualitative differences and mutual adaptations must subsist there, is made evident. The observation of Herschel that atoms have all the appearance of being manufactured articles, is vindicated against the sneer of certain physicists.

Leaving this branch of the topic, consider briefly the question how preachers should deal with the materialistic infidelity. In the first place, apologetic sermons are, as a rule, with occasional exceptions, worse than useless. It is not denied that there may be a state of the public mind when a preacher, who is sure of his ability to carry his audience with him, may open fire upon the adversaries of the faith, and in one discourse, or in a series of discourses, may attack the prevalent type of unbelief. In this way President Dwight, early in the present century, made a direct assault upon the old-fashioned infidelity, and by means of his vigorous reasoning and overbearing eloquence, produced a great change of opinion in Yale College. So, there may be sermons, like the astronomical discourses of Chalmers, which may not improperly be termed apologetic ; which, however, are not confined to the repelling of assaults,

but exhibit in strong array the positive evidences in behalf of religion. Notwithstanding these, and possibly other exceptions, argumentative and elaborate replies to infidelity from the pulpit are seldom judicious. The old French proverb, "Qui s'excuse s'accuse," is here applicable. When a great deal of time is taken to confute imputations and answer objections, the impression is made that the cause, if not exactly a weak one, is nevertheless vulnerable. If it happens that a poor argument is used on the right side, it operates to the discredit of the proposition which is thus badly supported. The feeling is awakened, in many minds, that the truth of Christianity is, after all, a matter very much litigated, that there are arguments on either hand, and such as distrust their power to hold the balance are, in a degree, bewildered and thrown into uncertainty. Even if the war is carried into Africa, and the attempt is made to demonstrate the unsatisfactory character of infidel theories, the effect may possibly be no better; since in this process there must be a like examination of arguments *pro* and *con*. The anecdote which Robert Hall told of himself is instructive. He set out to defend the doctrine of the Trinity, in a series of sermons. In prosecuting the discussion, he attacked the various forms of heretical dissent from the orthodox opinion—the Arian, the Sabellian, the Apollinarian, etc. At the conclusion of his discourses, much to his surprise, he discovered that there was a small party in the congregation for each of the heresies which he had combated, but which most of his hearers had probably never heard of before he made his onset upon them. One should be sure, before he raises the devil, that he is able to lay him. It implies no disparagement of the strength of the Christian cause, or of the cause of truth, that such effect should be produced. That which is plausible in any form of error, may catch the ear of an auditor who fails to inquire into the subject thoroughly, and may captivate him to such an extent that the objections to the controverted opinion are overlooked. Not unfrequently doubts and difficulties are lodged, by means of apologetic sermons, in the minds of men and women who had never thought of them before. If the result is not quite so bad as this, they may still go away from the house of the Lord with an uncomfortable feeling that the Christian faith is

less securely established than they had been in the habit of supposing. When distinguished expounders of erroneous doctrines or schools of opinion are mentioned by name in the pulpit, a consequence of a different kind may ensue, which ought to be deprecated. A prejudice against the persons thus referred to in terms of censure or denunciation is created in many who have, however, no intelligent acquaintance with their characters and writings. The unfavorable impression thus produced may not be in itself strictly unjust ; and yet it may not be enlightened or discriminating.

The injurious influence referred to is less likely to be exerted when errors are attacked in the pulpit, in a mere incidental way, while the preacher is engaged in the inculcation of some positive truth. A side blow may be effectively struck, without much outlay of time, and without throwing the hearer into a controversial mood, which is apt to be the consequence of a formal proclamation of an intention to make war on some obnoxious doctrine. Persons are sometimes surprised into the perception of a truth, when it comes before them in the shape of an unavoidable inference from a position which they have recognized as sound, with no anticipation, however, of the corollaries to be drawn from it. The modern method of warfare does not favor the storming of fortified places. This last way of proceeding is found to involve too great a waste of life, and to be too uncertain in its results. It is found that the ends of warfare can be reached more easily and successfully. The hostile position can be isolated, or so dealt with as to be practically useless to the enemy. This was, for the most part, the policy of the Germans in their war against the French. Preachers might take a hint from the latest discoveries in the military art.

In one of the sermons of F. W. Robertson, there is an interesting reference to the circumstance that the Sadducees, as well as the Pharisees, are said to have been addressed by John the Baptist in the words : " Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come ? " How, inquires the preacher, could such an address be made, with any propriety or hope of producing a salutary effect, to those who disbelieved in a future state, and therefore, in punishment hereafter ? But, Robertson replies,

when they heard John say, "Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come," they knew that there *was* a wrath to come. A truth of this kind, uttered with the accents of conviction, penetrates to the heart of a sceptical hearer, in whom conscience is not wholly dormant. The presentiment of penalty is a part of the operation of conscience; it is the counterpart of the emotion of guilt. The vivid apprehension of the reality and ill-desert of sin, on the part of a preacher, provided he avoids all rant, and speaks the language of truth and sobriety, with an earnestness befitting his theme, is directly adapted to awaken corresponding feelings in the auditor, even though he may have surrendered himself to speculative error. Especially are appeals of this nature potent, when they are made in the midst of solemn experiences of life. "I buried my materialism," said Robert Hall, "in the grave of my father." Here an event of itself dissipated a speculative belief. The native feelings of the heart were too strong for a gloomy and unnatural creed to sustain itself against them.

The main thought suggested under this head is, that the data for the establishment of the truth and the obligations of religion are found within the spiritual domain—in the operations of conscience, and in the aspirations and intuitions of the soul. The preacher has a perfectly firm footing within his own sphere. He is not obliged to go beyond the human mind itself, and beyond the truth of the Scriptures, which the mind, in the right exercise of its faculties, is obliged to allow, for the vindication of his doctrine. If there be any philosophy, so called, whether physical or metaphysical, which clashes with what men in their hearts and consciences know to be true—with what the soul testifies to be the truth—so much the worse for such a philosophy. The more intelligent a preacher is, the better. An acquaintance with physical discoveries and speculations will be an advantage to him. But such knowledge is not indispensable, either as a foundation for his own faith, or as a means of proving and enforcing Christian truth.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

CASUISTRY: THEOLOGICAL AND LEGAL.

SACERDOTAL directorship, or the assumption, by a priest, to direct the consciences of those subject to his influence, is not limited to the Church of Rome. In science, physical and psychological, there are high priests who utter dogmas to which their adherents are compelled to subscribe, and who excommunicate, with an intolerance theologians cannot surpass, other scientists who differ from them in points scarcely perceptible to the uninitiated. In politics, high priests of peculiar potency preside. This country has recently passed, for instance, through a presidential election, in the course of which it became necessary to determine several very delicate and difficult questions of constitutional construction. It so happened that as to one of these—the right of either House of Congress, by objection to throw out a disputed return,—the interests of parties shifted in the course of a few months; and with party interests shifted party dogmas as proclaimed by party high priests. If this right of sacerdotal directorship prevails in science and politics, it is not strange that it should be asserted in religion; and into religious communions of all classes it finds its way. In a very entertaining novel lately issued,¹ one of the principal characters, a broad-church clergyman (obviously meant as a caricature of Dean Stanley) is described as proposing, in order to accommodate Christianity to polite society, to concede away the existence of Christ. In a recent

¹ The New Republic; or, Culture, Faith, and Philosophy, in an English Country House.

volume of the Reports of the Supreme Court of Georgia,¹ is detailed the trial of a Presbyterian clergyman, who undertook, such was the case against him, to excuse a great crime by alleging that he was acting at the time under divine guidance ; and, although the verdict of guilty was set aside by the Court, and although the public is thereby justified in concluding that the whole charge was a fiction, yet the verdict and the specifications unite in showing that in the popular mind there is nothing inconsistent in the combination of crime with the sacerdotal pretension to remit crime.

If, however, sacerdotal directorship is a temptation which approaches all communions, why select the Roman Catholic Church for criticism, as if identifying that Church with this particular evil ? Such is the objection that may be aimed at in the following pages ; and to this objection there is a single reply. It is admitted that the evil is one based on qualities of human nature, independent of church organization. An attack on the Roman Catholic Church, as a Church, should be postponed until a Church can be founded, that, with greater purity of faith, has at least equal power in attracting the vast population that crowds the gates of that Church. To that population, comprising multitudes whose comforts in this life are scanty, she offers the consolation of a better life hereafter ; to all she offers the verities of Christianity, however much these verities may be incrustated with superstition ; and unwise as well as unfeeling would it be, to attempt, unless prepared at once to take her place, to shake her hold on those to whom she supplies what is now their only religion. As to sacerdotal directorship in the Roman Catholic Church, therefore, the following argument is not uttered with any controversial purpose, so far as concerns that Church. In Roman Catholic books, it is true, casuistical inquisition is elaborated with a logical minuteness and copiousness to be found in the literature of no other communion. But if dangers so serious as those that are there depicted result from casuistical inquisition in the Roman Church, where the priest is in such relations governed by strict law, and subjected to the supervision of his Bishop, *à fortiori* must such

¹ Reports of Cases in Law and Equity, argued and decided in the Supreme Court of Georgia, at Atlanta, vol. xlviii. 1873.

consequences be expected in communions where the confessional is governed by no law, and subjected to no ecclesiastical supervision.

The doctrine that when there are several probable opinions as to a particular act, men have a right to select either, is a fundamental assumption in the casuistical systems to which attention is now turned. In one sense, indeed, this doctrine is true. You pledge yourself, for instance, to the standards of a particular church; and if so, there can be no question that if at the time of this pledge, there is an interpretation of those standards publicly maintained by any recognized school in such church, then that interpretation you may accept. But why? Simply because when you make your pledge of obedience, it is a part of the understanding between yourself and those imposing the pledge, that the view in question is to be tolerated. There is no suppression of unlawful opinion on your part. The standards are offered to you with the several recognized interpretations, either of which you are at liberty to take.

In scholastic casuistry, however, the probable opinion comprehends not merely a construction recognized as permissible by the party with whom one is contracting, and therefore forming part of the contract, but a construction which he suppressed at the time of the contract, and the effect of which would be to give the contract a meaning entirely different from that which the other party contracting with him contemplated, and supposed the obliger contemplated. The rule of the casuists, in this respect, is, that every opinion is probable, and may therefore be safely followed, when it is approved by a *doctor gravis*. Moja, for instance, an eminent Romish casuist, says,¹ "When a person asks for a favorable opinion, the director errs if he does not accommodate himself to the desire of the inquirer, though he should himself disapprove of the opinion." When there is a conflict between two opinions, then, so Busembaum, another authority in the same line, declares,² the most convenient may be taken, though the weight of moral authority be against

¹ Opusculum, Lugd. 1664, extract de opinione probab. prop. I, p. 28; cited in Huber, Jesuiten-Orden, nach seiner Verfassung und Doctrin, Wirksamkeit und Geschichte, 286.

² Medulla, lib. I. tr. I. c. 3, Huber, 287.

it; and the inquirer is even told that any qualms of his own conscience on the subject may be properly smothered, if he can find a *doctor gravis* who sanctions his cause.

Some of the offshoots of this doctrine may now be mentioned.

I. To a forgiveness of sins, and to a worthy reception of the Eucharist, what is called natural repentance only is declared to be necessary; i. e., *attritio*, which is defined to be pain arising from fear of impending punishment, or from punishment actually inflicted, supposing that by this the will is diverted from future sins of the same class. *Attritio* is used in this sense in antithesis to *Contritio*, or repentance springing from love to God, and loathing of sin on account of its own sinfulness. *Contritio* is thus held unnecessary to salvation. Escobar maintains that even in the dying moments contrition is not necessary; and Valentia is so daring as to announce¹ that it is not only not required to secure the efficacy of the sacrament, but that it is rather a hindrance to such efficacy. Love to God, as a motive power, one would suppose to be recognized as essential not only by sound theology, but by sound ethics; yet Escobar² subjects this to the test of probability, and by this test finds that it is unnecessary for a good Catholic Christian to have a love to God. He interrogates the authorities of his order, and thus sums their answers: Vasquez, he says, thinks that this love is sufficient, if attained at the end of life. Others hold that there must be this love at baptism, or when there is some signal divine blessing received; or at certain festivals. According to Hurtado of Mendoza, the minimum is once a year; according to Coninch, once every three or four years; according to Fillutius, once every five years. Henriquez is contented with specifying as sufficient the first awaking of reason and the dying hour; and then intermediately every five years; and to this Escobar himself accedes. And Sirmond, sustained by Pintereau, declares that, on principle, obedience is sufficient without love. Under the Jewish system love was obligatory, but the sacraments were instituted so that their reception might dispense with love. Were it not so, Christians,

¹ Comment. Theol. tr. iv. disp. y. quaest. 8, p. 4.

² Theol. Moral. tr. i. ex. 2, nr. 21; v. ex. 4, nr. 8, Huber, 283.

he argues,¹ would be put under as severe moral restraints as the Jews.

Sin, according to the same authorities, only truly exists when there is a full consciousness that the divine law is by the particular transgression violated. No doubt, innocent and non-negligent ignorance relieves from the guilt, though not the consequences, of a violation of the law; but by the casuists this defence is extended to ignorance which is neither innocent nor non-negligent. Severe, indeed, was Pascal's rebuke,² when he said, speaking of criminals whose conscience was extinguished by sottishness or dissipated by frivolity: "I suppose that these were among the worst,—you tell me that they are among the best of men. What folly is it, then, to have any sense of duty at all! The only perfect man is the perfect villain." Yet this rebuke is deserved. John de Castillo says,³ that a sin committed without full deliberation is not morally wrong; and he illustrates this by the case of persons who are so much accustomed to steal, that at last they steal instinctively. Georges de Rhodes advances a little farther, and announces⁴ that he who, when he commits murder or adultery, is conscious of the wrongfulness of the act, is guilty of only a venial error, if this consciousness on his part is imperfect or transient. Unless there be a specific will to sin, so teaches Laymann,⁵ it is no sin specifically to will a sinful act.

With this is to be allied the maxim that when two motives, one bad and another good, may be assigned to a particular act, the act is not wrong if at its commission the good motive is kept in mind, and the bad motive is kept out of mind. Precisely opposite rule both the Roman and the English common law; for it is a settled doctrine of both of those jurisprudences that if an injurious act has a wrongful motive, no co-operation of good motives can make the act right. Here, however, casuistry comes in direct conflict with jurisprudence. One may resent an insult, so Lessius teaches,⁶ by death, provided that in

¹ Perrault, *La Morale des Jesuites*, Mons, 1702, II. 267.

² Pascal, *Lettres Provinciales*.

³ *De Just. et Jure*, I. II. tr. 2, disp. 9, dub. 2, nr. 48, p. 511; Huber, 290.

⁴ *Disput. Theol. Schol.* Antes, 1741, I. p. 332.

⁵ *Theol. Mor.* I. i. tr. 2, c. 3, nr. 6.

⁶ *De Just.* I. II. c. 9, d. 12, nr. 79.

killing one keeps his mind fast to the maintenance of his honor, and excludes from it the idea of revenge; and with men of noble rank, so declares Escobar and Mendoza,¹ this will enable conscience as well as honor to be saved.

Applying this subterfuge to another range of crimes, there is no harm, so instructs Moja,² in receiving as tenants women of lewd character (feile Dirnen), if the intention of the landlord is diverted from the trade they expect to pursue, and concentrated on the single fact of their tenancy.

Nor are judges unprovided with a convenient contrivance by which they can receive bribes without becoming corrupt. A judge, of course, if offered in advance a bribe to give a wrong judgment, must indignantly repel and expose the briber; for this is good for the judge as well as for the community. As soon, however, as his decision is announced (and he may have his own grounds for his decision), "it is matter of controversy whether he may not receive an offering of gratitude from one benefited by the delivered sentence, even when this had been contrary to justice."³ How wrong then to have driven from the bench Judge Barnard and Judge Cardozo, whose only error it was to have taken gratuities at the wrong end of the suit. Why was Mr. Belknap so unwise as to receive the money given him for the trading posts before, instead of after, the appointments? The *effect* would have just been the same—he would have sold the offices just as much—but by the casuistry of Father Gury's school, at least, he would not have been censurable. Put him under Father Gury's guidance, and his conscience would not stand in the way of such a disposition of Indian traderships. Fill the government with pupils of Father Gury, and the only check on corruption would be the fear of disgrace. But this check would not be of much value in a community taught by Father Gury to hold that to receive a reward from a suitor for rendering a wrong judgment is venial.

But the most pernicious principle advanced by sacerdotal casuistry is that already adverted to of the lawfulness of a secret reservation, *reservatio mentalis*, entered into at the time of en-

¹ Theol. Moral. tr. i. ex. 7, nr. 96, 98.

² Opusc. Mor. Extract de Charit. pr. 9, nr. 4. p. 91.

³ Gury, vol. II. p. 8, De Obligat. Judicium.

gement, by which the obligor in such an engagement reserves to himself the right to fulfil it in a sense different from that in which it was understood by the obligee. Within certain limits this is true ; for there are no words which have not interpretations more or less liberal ; and until a definite construction is authoritatively assigned, men are at liberty, provided this be known at the time of the making of the obligation, to accept any reasonable construction consistent with an honest performance of the obligation. But the *reservatio mentalis* undertakes, by a fraud, concocted at the time of the making of the obligation, to nullify it. Thus Escobar says ¹ that "a promise does not bind us if we made it intending not to be bound by it." "We may shelter ourselves behind an ambiguous oath," so maintains Castro Paleo,² "if we have sound reason for concealing the truth ; and if in order to pin us we are sworn to tell the whole truth without reserve, we may, nevertheless, use equivocal terms with a mental reservation as to their use." Thus, for instance, "I know of the commission of a particular crime concerning which inquiry is made. It is inconvenient to me to tell what I know ; and if I am asked whether I saw the thing done, I can safely say I did not." So says Castro, "If I mentally add to the words, 'I did not,' the words 'in prison,' in such case my answer would be true." So a promise of marriage can be denied under oath, if when it was made it was made with the intention that it should not be binding. A creditor who has received part payment, may on oath deny this part payment, if at the time of the oath he properly adjusts his intention as to the whole debt. So Filliatius declares³ "that it is not perjury nor is it wrong to swear equivocally for an honest purpose, *ex honesta causa*."

Father Gury, pursuing the same line, says that according to the more probable opinion, no oath is binding "if made with the intention indeed of swearing, but not of binding ;" and he closes his scrutiny by saying that an oath is to be interpreted according to its implied conditions, which are, (1) performance is not necessary, if accompanied with grave injury ; (2) matters

¹ Theol. Moral. III. ex. 3, nr. 48.

² Op. Mor. de Virt., Lugd. 1638, p. 18, Huber, p. 294.

³ Moral Quæst. t. II. tr. 25, c. II. nr. 321, p. 160.

must have remained substantially the same ; (3) the other party must have kept his faith, and not waived his right.

It is no doubt proper that a lower grade of responsibility should be applied to him who yields to a sudden exceptional temptation, than to him who enters into temptation habitually and on system ; but by the casuists this rule is so expanded as to make it venial to yield to exceptional temptations, even when such temptations are entered into by system. In fact, the first step to this dangerous result is taken by declaring that temptations that are only exceptional are not temptations at all, and can, therefore, be yielded to without sin. Thus Escobar announces ¹ that a temptation which only presents itself rarely, is not a temptation to be resisted ; and in this way sensual passions towards particular persons are excused if they are only yielded to three or four times a year. Sancius, a Madrid priest, enlarges this by saying ² that temptation under such circumstances is not to be avoided, when its resistance would involve peculiar inconveniences ; of which inconveniences he gives an illustration which it is not fitting to detail in these pages. In other words, unless a temptation is one that comes at all times, it is not to be resisted ; but no temptation, such is the natural conclusion, comes at all times ; therefore no temptation is to be resisted. Or, to formulate the argument of Sancius, no temptation is to be resisted when to resist would make an inconvenience of the temptation.

No civilized jurisprudence excuses private killing in self-defence in any other case than that of an attack so apparently violent and immediate that life can only be saved by taking of life. But the moralists under review are bound by no such distinctions. It is a probable opinion, says Lessius, ³ that a false witness may be rightfully got rid of by secret assassination ; and Molière relieves any scruple on the subject by saying ⁴ that it does not alter the case that the false witness, from the nature of things, will be eternally damned. Only it is not for the vulgar, *plebeis*, to avail themselves of this privilege. A nobleman

¹ Theol. Mor., tr. VIII. ex. 4, 226, p. 836.

² Select. Disp. 10, nr. 20, Huber, 295.

³ De Just. et Jure, I. c. 9 disp. 12.

⁴ De Just. et Jure, p. 1762, Huber, 298.

has the right to privately kill one by whom his honor is assailed. But the vulgar have no honor that is assailable ; and even a kick or a cuff, so Escobar declares, they are not entitled to resent. An ecclesiastic, however, is by all means bound to ward off disgrace to himself or his order ; and he may even secretly kill another to avoid such disgrace. In this opinion Lessius, Becerners, Reginold, and Laymann unite with Amicus, by whom it is vindicated at large.¹ Caramuel, a Cistercian, but a zealous adherent of Jesuit theology, who held at the same time high ecclesiastical and high military office, boasted that during the thirty years' war he had converted thirty thousand heretics with the sword ; and Caramuel betook himself, among his other duties, to the determination of the question whether an ecclesiastic who had fallen into sin could murder his accomplice if she should be inclined to boast of having had so honorable a connection. "I do not know," is his own solution, "but from a distinguished father of my society, a doctor and professor of theology, a man of peculiar talent and information, I have heard the reply : 'Amicus, indeed, avoided this point ; but we may regard it as a probable opinion which a monk may follow, that he may kill a woman of bad character to save himself from disgrace.'"²

Riembauer, a German Jesuit, whose trial is narrated by Huber, was convicted of killing a woman he had seduced ; and in extenuation of his guilt he declared that the homicide was committed by him solely to avoid scandal which would otherwise have fallen on his profession. It seemed a surprise to him that the ethics he had been taught should come in such sharp collision with the law of the land. Stattler was an ecclesiastical moralist of high authority ; and Stattler, in his "*Ethica Christiana*," first published in Augsburg and Munich in 1789, had taught³ that it was lawful to kill in order to escape disgrace. The plea which Stattler threw out as likely to be effective in some future case of homicide when there was no design to kill, was twisted by his disciple so as to cover cases in which killing was designed. Still more likely to mislead is the advice given

¹ Census Theolog. to. v. p. 538.

² Theol. Mor. Fundament. Lugd. 1676, t. 1. lib. 2, fund. iv. art. 6, p. 809.

³ Op. cit. i. 1889, 1891, 1893.

by Escobar : " If A.," so he declares,¹ " after a reconciliation with B., engages not to kill B., but nevertheless does kill him, we cannot say that A. in this acted treacherously (absolute *traditior*), unless by the intermediate intimate social relations it should be presumed that A.'s enmity to B. had actually ceased." No doubt we can conceive of a case in which a homicide in hot blood after a reconciliation, might be regarded as only manslaughter, or even as excusable, when in apparent self-defence. But this supposes that the homicide was unintended ; which was probably what Escobar meant. The difficulty arises from the fact that the moment that a homicide is intended, as it would be by those who took Escobar's hypothetical cases as patterns, then it becomes, if consummated, a murder.

The reader is thus led to a very interesting and pregnant fact in reference to casuistry. It is to jurisprudence and not to theology that the origin of casuistry is to be attributed ; and from jurisprudence, casuistry derives features which cannot be understood without taking their source into consideration. Jurisprudence, on awaking from the slumber of the dark ages, not having an actual world to deal with, proceeded to speculate on an ideal world. There were no courts in which real issues were to be tried ; and the jurists, in order to present their principles in the concrete, put a series of supposed cases. It is very much as if the statements of fact in the reports of courts were taken as hypothetical cases, with the verdict attached to them, and were then proposed as establishing absolute rules, not only of law, but of right. It will be at once seen that the practice thus adopted by the jurists was calculated to establish as absolute principles indulgences which are peculiar and exceptional. A man of singularly delicate sense of honor, for instance, occupying high social rank (to take one of the cases frequently put by the jurists), is insulted in a way so stinging and crushing that he becomes frenzied, and during the continuance of this frenzy seeks an opportunity to kill his assailant. There have been cases of this kind in American jurisprudence, that of Selfridge, famous in Massachusetts history, being one of the most conspicuous. Now it is a very good

¹ Theol. Mor., tr. vii., n. 4, c. 3. nr. 26, d. 726.

thing to have these cases reported ; but it would be a very bad thing if a casuist could get hold of Selfridge's case, and say, " If you receive an insult which a gentleman ought not to bear, and if you are in hot blood, and keep in hot blood, so long as your hot blood continues you can kill your opponent when you see him." If this was put as a rule of action to frame future conduct, and not as a rule of law to determine the quality of past conduct, then that which was a conclusion of mercy would be turned into an engine of assassination. Make such a verdict a rule for prospective action, and it will be equivalent to saying, " Get up your hot blood, and you can do any thing you choose."

To the church belonged, let it be remembered, under the mediæval system, the office of putting judicially in practice the casuistry which the jurists produced ; and that this casuistry consisted of a voluminous literature is evidenced by the fact that a well-stocked law library contains, under the head of " Civil Law," from forty to fifty folios of hypothetical cases, most of them involving questions of morals. These volumes were the text-books in casuistry which the clergy relied upon to guide them, not only in their dealings with penitents, but in the decisions of those matrimonial, testamentary, and equitable questions of which the church courts had then exclusive control.

It would seem, therefore, that the dangerous casuistry just criticised is not an outgrowth of the Roman Catholic system, but is a necessary consequence of any system which undertakes to propose in advance hypothetical cases, as forming rules of conduct. The Jesuits, in fact, when defending their treatises on sacerdotal directorship, are right when they say that the cases they put are substantially the same as those proposed by jurists as well as theologians, with the approval of all contemporaneous civilization. But the civilization which thus accepted the speculations of the casuists was a civilization which was scarcely aroused from the barbarism of the dark ages, and which adopted the fundamentally false rule, that intention is a presumption of law, to be attached beforehand to certain facts, and not an inference of logic, to be drawn from the circumstances of the particular case. In other words, the error the old

jurists and casuists fell into was in saying, "If you do certain wrong acts unintentionally, the law presumes you are free from blame;" and this being thrown out into a rule of conduct, was interpreted to mean, "If I fix my intention on something else than the wrong I intend, then the wrong I intend is unintended." Absurd as this conclusion is, it is a logical consequence of the position of the jurists (a position held down almost to the present day), that intention is a presumption of law to be invariably attached to certain conditions of fact. The blame of originating casuistry, therefore, is not attachable to the church. It belongs to the mediæval jurisprudence; a jurisprudence from whose pernicious glosses in this respect modern law has only recently been purged.

But while the Roman Catholic Church did not originate casuistry, casuistry has been converted into an engine of great power by the Roman Catholic Church. The Jesuits, in particular, have found the distinctions of the casuists an efficient agent in aid of their ambitious schemes. The *Imago primi sæculi*, for instance, an authoritative tract among the Jesuits, recommends "accommodation" (or the adjustment in advance of the intention so as to make an otherwise sinful act sinless), as the only means of keeping men of political and social power under ecclesiastical influence. The great, so Tamburini pleads,¹ are not to be disgusted by being called to account for their indiscretions. By a lax application of casuistry, especially in the transferring of intention in the way just specified, the Jesuits gradually monopolized the confessional, so far as concerns polite society. One need not wonder, therefore, at the witicism of Peter Bauny, who, pointing to a book of casuistry which taught that when the intention was properly adjusted, sin ceased, exclaimed, "Ecce Agnus Dei qui tollit peccata mundi." Christ's office, by this system, was to condone the sins of a worlding who continues sinful, not to take away the sins of a world to be converted to holiness.

Prurient enough are the casuistical books of the old scholastic jurists, and to these books the Jesuits can undoubtedly appeal as ample precedents. The jurists of the *Renaissance*,

¹ Method, expd. conf. 1-3, c. 9, § 3, No. 11.

which was the era of speculative jurisprudence as distinguished from the practical jurisprudence embodied in the Justinian compilation, exhausted their ingenuity in imagining every possible form of sexual transgression. There was then no trial by jury, and the judges, whether ecclesiastical or secular, could not, it was supposed, be trusted ; so the jurists undertook beforehand to announce every case that they thought could arise, and to say, " When this case arises, then a particular judgment is to be imposed." In those days, let it be remembered, parties accused were interrogated as to whatever was deemed pertinent to the issue ; and hence these hypothetical cases were put to the accused in civil as well as ecclesiastical trials. No doubt, under this vicious system of jurisprudence, it became the duty of the inquisitor to put every probable case, no matter how gross and unnatural the details ; and yet, notwithstanding this allowance, it is impossible not to be shocked at the mass of obscene and demoralizing material which the books, prepared for this purpose, contain.

It may be argued that what has been said of the priestly applies equally to the pastoral office ; and to sustain this, conspicuous scandals may be instanced where Protestant ministers have displayed a casuistry as vicious as that of the Jesuit fathers. The answer is that those ministers, in the very matter complained of, have abandoned the position of the pastor and assumed that of the sacerdotal director ; in other words, instead of *advising* their parishioners, they themselves claiming no power to *direct*, they have, in defiance of their principles, undertaken the direction they disclaim in theory : asserting sometimes a personal divine permission to themselves to do that which they wish, they " having prayed over the matter and received divine guidance." This, then, brings up in essence, relieved from all denominational prejudices, the distinction between the pastor and the sacerdotal director ; and this distinction may be illustrated by an appeal to another profession. The pastor is like counsel consulted by a client ; he gives to the client the best advice he can, but he does so with the understanding that his opinion is fallible—that the client is at liberty to seek advice elsewhere—and that at all events what he, the counsel, says, is subordinate to the law of his client's

conscience and to the law of the land as ultimately to be pronounced by the courts. The sacerdotal director, on the other hand, may be likened to a supreme judge, absolute in power, subject to no revisory court, who undertakes arbitrarily to suspend or change the law of the land as he chooses, and not merely to rule the consciences of those coming under his direction, but to tell them what their conscience really should say.

So far as concerns the assertion of sacerdotal directorship in Protestant communions—and it is asserted more or less fully in all cases in which the pastor undertakes *jure divino* to direct his parishioner's conscience—the following additional observations are to be made :—

Great as are the evils of this directorship, they are qualified in the Romish Church by the following conditions :

1. The power is subject to revision by the bishop.
2. Communications to the director are sacred ; he is privileged, in all Catholic and in some Protestant countries, from disclosing them in courts of justice ; and should he be detected in divulging them in any way, or using them in any way for his private purposes, he is subjected to ecclesiastical deposition and disgrace.
3. Confession must be made in open church, in boxes in which the confessor does not touch the penitent, and in which the penitent can conceal himself from the confessor.

On the other hand, among Protestants, if a pastor assume the office of a sacerdotal director—

1. There is no revisory authority exercised over him by an ecclesiastical superior.
2. There is no check or privilege which prevents such confessions from being used in any way the confessor pleases ; he may tell about them to others ; he may employ them for his own advantage or to further his own schemes ; and, without his connivance or concurrence, they can be wrung from him in a court of justice in any suit to which they may be relevant.
3. The pastor receives the confessions of the penitent in private (not, as is required in the Roman Catholic system, in a box, with two divisions, in the open church), with closed doors, and under circumstances which, when we consider the nature of the communications, may lead, especially between persons of

opposite sexes, to terrible abuse. Putting the questions specified in the casuistical books may be without evil consequences when the process is conducted in a church edifice, the parties separated by a partition ; but the probability of demoralization is much increased when the party putting the questions is under no ecclesiastical restraint, and when the investigation is conducted in a place divested of the solemn associations of a church, and free from the inspection of observers.

Viewing the question, therefore, on its ecclesiastical side, the following positions may be accepted :

1. The pastor is not to be permitted to assume the right of questioning his parishioners as their religious director, nor is a parishioner bound as a religious duty to confess to his pastor.

2. The pastor's care of his parishioner's conscience is subject to the law of the church and the law of the land, and the pastor is bound to disclaim all *jure divino* authority to interpret either.

On the juridical side of the question, some important suggestions remain. The English common law set itself, at an early period, in resolute opposition to the confessional. No matter how sacred, under the canon law, may have been the communications of the penitent to the priest, these communications the common law compel him to divulge. He can be interrogated under oath in any pending trial as to these communications, and if he refuse to answer, he is imprisoned until his scruples are removed. No doubt, this sometimes works hardly ; and we can understand why eminent English and American jurists should advise that only in cases of necessity, when a case could not otherwise be made out, should priests be put on the stand to answer as to what was imparted to them in their sacerdotal capacity. This is right enough ; but some of the American States have gone further, and by providing that priests shall in all cases be allowed to set up the privileges of the confessional as a bar to questions put them, in a court of justice, have made perilous concessions. We have thus established a sort of statutory relief from a burdened conscience ; and we have appeared to say, " Go to your priest ; get rid of this troublesome secret by depositing it with him ; be absolved by a deputy whom the State has authorized to hear confessions and to par-

don sin ; and when absolved by him start off, relieved, on a new career of wrong." The immunity thus given to the confessional is greater than that conceded to it in Europe, even in states where the Roman Catholic religion is that nominally of a majority of the population. It is questionable whether this statutory approval of the confessional has not already done much mischief. And certainly Americans should pause before they extend it to States where it does not, as yet, exist.

Another recent important statutory change in the common law demands, though from an opposite standpoint, equal attention. The old English common-law lawyers, influenced in great measure by their horror of the inquisitorial system of examination as elaborated by the scholastic jurists, made it a fundamental sanction of their system, that no person, when judicially examined, should be required to answer questions as to his own guilt. The principle thus adopted is both humane and wise ; and it can be well understood how it should have been cherished by men who saw in their libraries the ponderous collection of questions as to every possible phase of guilt which prosecutors, under the scholastic system of jurisprudence, were empowered to put to persons suspected of wrong. In our own country we have now, in part, done away with this check. By statutes adopted by the States of the American Union with but one or two exceptions, it is provided that parties on trial for crime may, on their own motion, be witnesses on their own behalf. When they thus become witnesses, the courts have agreed in holding that they waive their common-law privilege so far as to require them, if they tell a part of the transaction in which they are inculpated, to tell the whole. In other words, a party who, when charged with crime, offers himself as a witness on his own behalf, cannot refuse to answer any relevant questions put to him on cross-examination. It may be said that this is optional on his part, and that he need not submit himself to examination unless he choose. But this is illusory. Every man who is at liberty to testify on his own behalf must feel that to refuse to testify is, notwithstanding what the statutes may say, equivalent to an admission of guilt. There is a moral compulsion, therefore, on every person on trial for crime, to put himself in the witness-box ; and when

there, he will be compelled to answer all relevant questions under oath. It is not denied that this is, in the main, an improvement. It is far better that all technical rules excluding testimony which is material should be removed, and that the jury should be entitled to know all that they can be informed of by persons cognizant of the facts of the case. In England, where the statutes relieving parties from incompetency as witnesses do not apply to criminal cases, there is a growing feeling that even this final restriction should be withdrawn, and that such anomalous and dangerous verdicts as that in the Penge trial would be prevented if persons charged with crime were permitted to give their own explanations on the witness-stand.

But while this is conceded, it is essential that a tight rein should be kept on cross-examinations of defendants charged with crime. It must be remembered that the party is forced in the witness-stand by the necessities of the case, and it is therefore proper that his cross-examination should be restricted to the facts detailed in his examination-in-chief. If it is wished to avoid the moral and judicial wrong produced by the old inquisitorial system, it should be held that in no case should a party, thus examined, be questioned as to his character or as to any other offence than that for which he is specifically tried.

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